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Research on Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementations has 
been carried out since the late 1990s, identifying various CSFs, empirically testing them and summarizing 
them in taxonomies. Little attention has been paid so far to ERP programs, which are employed 
frequently in practice. In this context, a program is an additional entity which supervises and monitors 
the single projects within an ERP implementation, and during all phases of the ERP life cycle. It is 
important to note that research barely considers the notion of programs explicitly and often abstracts 
from challenges stemming from interdependent, related projects and the dynamics over the 
implementation life cycle. 
This research approaches this gap from the perspective of phases by investigating the CSFs of two large 
ERP programs in-depth over the course of their life cycles. We employ a variant of the "Straussian" 
grounded theory approach for our interpretive case studies. The structures and the contexts of the two 
programs were significantly different.  Consequently, as we deem the contextual information particularly 
important, we (1) perform two independent analyses of the programs. In this step we present two 
models which give us further insights into the dynamics of CSFs in ERP programs. The first model (a) 
attributes different perceptions of salient groups in relation to a CSF as determinants for IS-success. The 
second model (b) presents the program construct as a means of organizational learning to impact CSFs 
over the life cycle of an ERP program.  In a second analysis step (2), we continue with a comparative 
cross-case analysis and discuss differences and commonalities. Furthermore, a common set of CSFs and 
the benefits of ERP programs are presented.  
The results show us that CSFs can change over the program life cycle and a more dynamic view is 
warranted. Furthermore, we illustrate programs as powerful tools that increase the likelihood of 
successful implementation efforts. We present two models highlighting the roles of perceptions (a) and 
organizational learning (b) and how they can shape their underlying CSFs. These parsimonious, easily 
applicable models provide the basis for empirical research in this area, and can be used by practitioners 
as a point of reference, increasing the likelihood of a successful implementation. Lastly, we demonstrate 
that an ERP program as an additional entity is most beneficial in contexts with a high degree of 
integration, dependencies and interrelations between the projects, where the resources need to be 
allocated and prioritized efficiently. 
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Forschung im Bereich kritischer Erfolgsfaktoren (KEF) für Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
Implementierungen wurde seit den späten 1990er Jahren durchgeführt. Dabei wurden verschiedene KEF 
identifiziert, empirisch getestet oder in Klassifizierungen zusammengefasst. Nur wenig Augenmerk 
wurde bisher auf ERP Programme gelegt, die in der Praxis häufig eingesetzt werden. In diesem Kontext, 
wird ein Programm als eine zusätzliche Entität verstanden, welche die einzelnen Projekte der ERP 
Implementierung während aller Phasen im ERP Lebenszyklus steuert und überwacht. Dabei ist es wichtig 
zu erwähnen, dass die Forschung kaum das Programmkonstrukt explizit berücksichtigt und dabei die 
Herausforderungen von abhängigen, miteinander verbundenen Projekten, und die Dynamiken über den 
Lebenszyklus außer Acht lässt. 
Diese Studie schließt diese Lücke, indem zwei detaillierte Fallstudien von großen ERP Programmen über 
den gesamten Lebenszyklus untersucht werden. Dabei wenden wir für die interpretativen Fallstudien 
eine Variante der "Grounded Theory"-Methode nach Strauss an. Nachdem wir den Kontext als besonders 
wichtig erachten, und sich die untersuchten Programme auch in ihren Strukturen beträchtlich 
unterscheiden, werden (1) zwei unabhängige Analysen der Programme durchgeführt. In diesem Schritt 
präsentieren wir zwei Modelle die uns weitere Einsichten in die Dynamiken von KEF in ERP-Programmen 
bieten. Das 1. Modell (a) spricht den verschiedenen Wahrnehmungen bedeutsamer Gruppen hinsichtlich 
eines KEF eine entscheidende Rolle für den Erfolg von ERP-Programmen zu. Das 2. Modell (b) präsentiert 
das Programmkonstrukt als „Instrument zum Lernen in Organisationen“, um die KEF über den 
Programmlebenszyklus zu beeinflussen. In einem zweiten Analyseschritt (2), führen wir eine 
fallübergreifende Analyse durch und diskutieren Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten, indem wir für 
beide Fälle gültige KEF und den zusätzlichen Nutzen von ERP-Programmen präsentieren.     
Die Resultate zeigen uns, dass sich KEF über den Programmlebenszyklus ändern können und eine 
dynamischere Betrachtung zielführend ist. Des Weiteren zeigen wir Programme als wirkungsvolle 
Werkzeuge, die die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer erfolgreichen Implementierung erhöhen. Wir präsentieren 
zwei Modelle mit dem Hauptaugenmerk auf (a) Wahrnehmungen, und (b) Lernen in Organisationen, die 
KEF formen. Diese einfach (auch für andere Fälle) anzuwendenden Modelle dienen als Basis für 
empirische Forschung in diesem Bereich, und können in der Praxis als Referenzmodell für eine höhere 
Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit verwendet werden. Schließlich zeigen wir in welchem Kontext der zusätzliche 
Nutzen eines ERP Programms am besten generiert werden kann. In einem Kontext mit einem hohen 
Grad an erforderlicher Integration, Abhängigkeiten und Verbindungen zwischen den Projekten, wo die 
Ressourcen effizient und nach Prioritäten verteilt werden müssen. 
Stichwörter: Programm, Programmmananagement, Enterprise Resource Planning, ERP, ERP 




Follow your bliss. If you do follow your bliss, you put yourself on a kind of track that has been there all the while waiting for you, 
and the life you ought to be living is the one you are living. When you can see that, you begin to meet people who are in the field 
of your bliss, and they open the doors to you. I say, follow your bliss and don't be afraid, and doors will open where you didn't 
know they were going to be. If you follow your bliss, doors will open for you that wouldn't have opened for anyone else.  
(Joseph Campbell, 1904-1987) 
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In the first chapter of this doctoral thesis, we start with an elaboration on the significance of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) research and why programs as an implementation method become increasingly 
important (Section 1.1). In the following Section 1.2 we highlight some important accounts and identify 
important research gaps before we pose our central research question. Thereafter, in Section 1.3 we 
present the way this thesis intends to answer the central research questions and we lead over to the 
executed work plan of the research and the structure of the thesis. Finally, we close this chapter with a 
summary (Section 1.4). 
 Significance of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Program Research 
An Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is a standard software package that integrates various 
business functions, such as purchasing, production, sales and financials along the value chain and across 
geographic boundaries. All the data are stored in an integrated database such that holistic reporting in 
real time is enabled.  Benefits such as cost savings (Holland and Light, 1999; Poston and Grabski, 2001; 
Seddon et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2014) tend to be as substantial as the implementation costs. Although 
SMEs1 are included in the 2014 ERP report, the average cost of an ERP implementation has been $6.5 
million with an average duration of 16.1 months. 54% of all projects have exceeded their projected 
budgets, while 72% have gone past their planned durations. Furthermore, 66% of the respondent 
organizations realized less than 50% of their expected benefits (Panorama Consulting Solutions, 2014). 
We assume that for ERP programs the budgets and the durations might be higher, since the 2014 ERP 
Report includes also data from SMEs, while programs are typically in place within large organizations. 
This observation underlines the importance of ERP research in order to better manage its sheer size, 
risks and costs (Bernroider, 2013), such that the dream of seamless integration does not turn into a 
nightmare (Davenport, 1998), or implementation failure (Pan et al., 2008). The advent of new 
technologies, as in-memory databases (e.g. SAP HANA), provide opportunities to review long-standing 
and obsolete processes and new integration possibilities (Krüger, 2016). This indicates that the 
tremendous importance of ERP implementations will continue. 
CSFs are the underlying guiding principles and activities that must be regarded (Caralli et al., 2004; Bullen 
and Rockart, 1981) for an implementation to be successful. Although considerable research effort has 
been spent during the last two decades to investigate critical success factors (CSFs), we believe that 
specific aspects of a program can inspire novel perspectives on this topic. First, there is typically a 
structure defined around an implementation with a dedicated program management at work, which 
                                                          
1 Find an overview about ERP integration issues and critical decisions for SMEs in the account of Malhotra and Temponi (2010). 




pays attention to competing resources and the interrelations between the projects (Chang et al., 2014; 
Jiang et al., 2014; PMI, 2008). Such program management and its governance mechanisms are an 
important locus for studying the course of implementation and the related organizational change 
(Cabinet Office, 2011; Pellegrinelli, 1997; PMI, 2008). Second, and beyond the formal organizational 
structures, there exist social networks and potential emerging group memberships and perceptions that 
alter during the implementation (Schwarz and Watson, 2005). This means shifting the focus of research 
from the outcomes as a result of the perceptions and the interplay between human action and 
technology (Leonardi, 2011; Orlikowski, 2000; Schwarz and Watson, 2005) towards the dynamics of 
evolving stakeholder perceptions (Besson and Rowe, 2001; Grainger et al., 2009; Markus et al., 2000b). 
Third, depending on the program type (Evaristo and van Fenema, 1999) a program could contain several 
implementations in a multisite context. Thus, it is interesting if a program can increase its knowledge 
base through organizational learning from previous implementations to apply this knowledge to 
subsequent implementations (Robey et al., 2002; van Fenema et al., 2007). 
Given the importance of this phenomenon, research has hardly discussed ERP programs within their life 
cycle extensively, and we see the absolute need to close this gap, as we will show in the next section.  
 Research Gaps and Central Research Questions – CSFs, Phases, Dynamics of ERP 
Programs and Associated Benefits 
Typically, programs are divided into phases, referred to as the program life cycle phases (PMI, 2008), 
sometimes referred to as stages (Ross and Vitale, 2000). Table 1-1 depicts an overview of program 
phases, as they are seen in program management literature and the ASAP (Accelerated SAP) 
methodology established from the software vendor SAP (SAP, 2016; Sullivan, 2014). All the different 
approaches have one delivery phase in common, and differ in regard to the preceding and succeeding 
phases. For our purposes, we will use three phases. All three phases2 together we denote as the ERP 
program life cycle (Table 1-1).  
The preparation & chartering phase includes all the organizing aspects, e.g. program charter, initial 
business case, program structure and implementation strategy at the beginning of each program. During 
the implementation & project phase the ERP implementation and the work on the systems are 
performed. This might include a template project and one or more rollouts. Furthermore, additional 
projects, e.g. a change management or a documentation project, might be subject to this phase. In each 
case multiple related projects are comprised within an overarching program. During the operations 
phase typically all the projects are formally closed and the benefits are realized. Often the program 
                                                          
2 For the reason of completeness, we want to emphasize that the different phases themselves consist of different phases, as 
emphasized, for example, by Parr and Shanks (2000). They subdivide their project phase into set-up, reengineering, design 
configuration and testing, installation. Regardless how the phases are named exactly, it depends on the research objective and 




mandate is renewed (e.g. Pellegrinelli, 1997), a new program is created, and the cycle continues with 
the preparation & chartering phase. In the program management context, the results of Ritson et al. 
(2012) suggest that program design and structure need to be continually assessed from program 
formation through to program closure.  
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Table 1-1 Overview of Program Phases, Program Management Literature & our Approach 
Our research approach, focusing on all phases of the ERP program life cycle, is particularly useful to 
describe the dynamics of CSFs, thus paying attention that the static view and antecedents are not 
sufficient to predict success (Markus and Robey, 1988; Lyytinen and Newman, 2015). This approach is 
exemplified by Sarker and Sahay (2003), taking the process view when they develop their theoretical 
model, describing the development of virtual teams over the life of a project. They employ their 
grounded theory approach, with an underlying interpretive stance (Sarker et al., 2001; Sarker and Sahay, 
2003).  Similarly, we will use two derived phase models (one for each case, grounded in data) as a lens 
for interpreting our case studies, and we will investigate which CSFs are relevant in which phase of each 
case and aim to highlight the dynamics of CSFs.  
 With this approach we aim to answer two central research questions: 
Central research question 1: What are the CSFs of a successful ERP program and how do they 
dynamically evolve over the course of the program? 
Central research question 2: How can the dynamics of CSFs be considered in a general, parsimonious 
phase model?    
As interpretive researchers, we will relate our models to general ideas and concepts (Klein and Myers, 
1999). Theory building is particularly a strength of the grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin, 




our approach is well established to create a theoretical account in the form of general, parsimonious 
phase models.   
Our phase models put the CSFs into a framework, and describe what makes an ERP program a success. 
This approach is similar to the one used by Parr and Shanks (2000). They use a project phase model 
(planning phase – project phase – enhancement phase) and add CSFs to each phase. This is done for two 
ERP implementation projects and afterwards similarities and differences are compared. Furthermore, 
the consideration of phases is consistent with Markus and Tanis (2000)3 who associate CSFs and activities 
with each phase of the ERP implementation, and state that the outcome of each phase becomes a 
starting condition for the next phase. Therefore, it is of major importance to consider phase-specific CSFs 
during all phases of the ERP program. 
In some publications, research on program management acknowledges the use of programs in major IT- 
and ERP implementations. So does the PMI (2008), which refers to ERP implementations, major IT 
implementations, and business process improvement initiatives, as programs that deliver incremental 
benefits during their life cycle, which is typical for a phased approach. Pellegrinelli (2002) mentions an 
ERP implementation as an example, when he investigates missing capabilities of project managers in 
managing programs. The Cabinet Office (2011) uses ERP as an example of a specification led program, 
and Yu and Kittler (2012) of a centralized program where an ERP system is centrally imposed from the 
headquarters to its subunits. Within ERP research (Chang et al., 2014; Davenport et al., 2004; Jiang et 
al., 2014; Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Seddon et al., 2010; Seidel, 2009), the existence of programs as a 
means to implement an ERP system is acknowledged. Hence we can conclude that, as well from the 
perspective of existing research, the use of programs and program management within ERP 
implementations is recognized. 
Also from practical experience it is emphasized that program management is actually applied to 
implement ERP systems (Sullivan, 2014), with budgets sometimes exceeding $100 million, e.g. Sarkis and 
Sundarraj (2003) report an implementation budget of $250 million. The experts at Gartner use programs 
for Information Technology (IT) transformations (Gartner, 2014).  
The various benefits of program management are mentioned in the literature (Cabinet Office, 2011; 
Lycett et al., 2004; Pellegrinelli et al., 2007; PMI, 2008) which might have the potential to be realized also 
in the ERP context.  Although countless research in relation to ERP systems and CSFs accounts exists (e.g. 
Finney and Corbett, 2007; Dezdar and Sulaiman, 2009), previous ERP research has hardly discussed the 
program construct in the ERP context and its potential benefits. Given the importance of this 
                                                          
3 Four phases for ES implementations are used: 1) Project chartering phase, 2) project- or configure and rollout phase, 3) 
shakedown phase, 4) onward and upward phase. One needs to mention that the model of Markus and Tanis (2000) does not 
consider multiple projects. In our model the shakedown will take place during the implementation & project phase, or within 




phenomenon, research has failed to discuss it appropriately, and has “blind spots” which need to be 
filled. Therefore, one central intention of our research is to answer the following central research 
question, which is relevant for research and practice: 
Central research question 3: What are the benefits for companies of structuring their ERP-
implementations in programs? 
 Research Approach and Design – Position of the Work 
The arguably most important aim of our research is to develop a theoretical account as a basis for future 
researchers. The grounded theory approach is appropriate to develop new theories of information 
systems phenomena, which are firmly grounded in empirical data, as stated by Urquhart et al. (2010). 
They furthermore propose two guidelines, which should increase the scope of the theory. Scaling up is 
the grouping of higher-level categories into broader themes, whereas theoretical integration is the 
process of comparing substantive theories with, previously developed, theories. This helps to consider 
the “who, where and what” aspects of the theory, and in the generation of more formal theories 
(Urquhart et al., 2010). Our research therefore provides a theoretical account to the limited knowledge 
base of ERP programs, including its benefits, its CSFs, and two general parsimonious phase models. 
Consequently, we contribute to more formal theories. 
We position our work as Information Systems Research, according to the framework of Hevner et al. 
(2004). As depicted in Figure 1-1, we develop theories, following the paradigm of behavioral science. 
According to them, the environment (research context) - that is the people, organization and technology 
- define the business needs. “Behavioral science addresses research through the development and 
justification of theories that explain or predict phenomena related to the identified business need” 
(Hevner et al. 2004, p.79). We take the existing knowledge base, that is e.g. theories and methodologies 
identified in prior literature (Hevner et al., 2004), and inductively develop a theoretical understanding of 
a new phenomenon grounded in data (Sarker et al., 2001). Through continuous interplay between data 
collection and analysis (Urquhart et al., 2010), we subsequently refine the theory, following the 
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle (and the other principles) for interpretive case studies 
(Klein and Myers, 1999). In this way, we will add to the knowledge base for practice and further research. 
Future researchers can build on this increased knowledge base, and continuously assess and refine the 
theory. Practitioners can use the increased knowledge base to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 





Figure 1-1 Information Systems Research Framework (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 80) 
 
Table 1-2 depicts the executed work plan of our research project, structured according to the guidelines 
of Urquhart et al. (2010). The first row contains all inputs (actions) we conducted to generate our final 
theoretical account. In the second row we provide an overview of the intermediate and the final 
product(s) of our research. Furthermore, in the third and fourth row we refer to the chapters and which 
research questions are answered within those chapters. One principle of grounded theory is the 
continuous interplay between data collection and data analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Therefore, 
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Table 1-2 Inputs (Actions) and Outputs of the Research Journey – Executed Work Plan 
 Summary 
In this chapter, we highlighted the significance of ERP program research. Afterwards, we presented some 
important research gaps and posed our central research questions. Lastly, we provided an overview of 
our research journey and the structure of this research account. In the next chapter, we focus on the 






2 Theoretical Background 
In this chapter, we elaborate on the necessary research background of ERP and program management. 
We begin with the characteristics of ERP systems. Thereafter, we highlight typical challenges of large 
scale ERP implementations and the dynamic nature of ERP systems. Next, we elaborate on programs, 
discuss some typical differentiation points to projects and portfolios, and highlight organizational 
program structures and roles. We lead then over to existing research in the ERP program context and its 
potential benefits. Next, we discuss existing research about CSFs, and present our seed concepts as a 
result of our structured literature review. We close this chapter with the definition of success and a 
summary. 
 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
ERP systems are off-the-shelf systems standard solutions in contrast to custom applications (Scheer and 
Habermann, 2000). They are designed with a best practice approach to fit the needs of many 
organizations, supporting generic business processes (Markus and Tanis, 2000). ERP systems incorporate 
best practices to facilitate rapid decision-making, cost reductions, and greater managerial control 
(Bernroider and Hampel, 2005; Holland and Light, 1999).  
ERP systems are often defined as a specific type of enterprise system. “Enterprise systems are large-
scale, real-time, integrated application-software packages that use the computational, data storage, and 
data transmission power of modern information technology to support processes, information flows, 
reporting, and business analytics within and between complex organizations” (Seddon et al., 2010, p. 
305). According to this view, the term Enterprise System (ES) includes, amongst ERP systems and other 
applications, Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Supply Chain Management (SCM) and data 
warehousing. This is in line with Davenport et al. (2004) who stress the benefits of ES in terms of process 
integration. Great benefits stem from seamless information flows within a company and across the inter-
organizational supply chain (Markus and Tanis, 2000). Apart from the integration of business functions 
within the company, ERP systems are therefore also increasingly used to share information beyond 
organizational boundaries or as Davenport et al. (2004, p. 19) state “Integration also does not stop within 
a company’s own four walls”. 
ERP systems are typically vast and costly (Bernroider, 2013). While ERP systems were initially designed 
for organizations reaching a certain size, the major ERP software vendors have been targeting the small- 
to medium-sized enterprises for over a decade (Bernroider and Koch, 2001). However, the efforts 
required to implement ERP solutions are very high even for smaller businesses, which more regularly 
experience an initial decline in organizational performance after going live (Bernroider and Hampel, 
2005). Generally, business process modeling methods can help to reduce the cost of software 




extensive business reorganization increases the time needed for ERP implementations (Bernroider, 
2013).  
 Challenges of Large Scale ERP Implementations 
Certainly the most important challenge of a large scale ERP implementation is the major business 
change, which is concurrently triggered by the introduction of such a system. Norms, underpinned by 
the stakeholders´ values and beliefs, can be violated, since the organizational environment is changed 
through the implementation of the ERP system. This is suggested to be the root cause of most ERP 
implementation problems (Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001). In order to realize the full range of business 
benefits, an ERP implementation should be accompanied by business process redesign (Accenture, 
2011). A prominent example is the massive business process reengineering effort at Texas Instruments 
for the whole organization with the goal of setting standard processes globally (Sarkis and Sundarraj, 
2003). However, the higher the level of business process redesign (associated changes), the higher the 
implementation complexity (implementation challenge) (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Accenture, 2011), 
and, consequently, the more resources are expended for ERP implementation (Bernroider, 2013). 
The definition of harmonized business processes is a huge challenge, especially when more than one 
business unit (and/or more than one site) is subject to a large scale ERP implementation. This is usually 
the case since scale effects lead to cost reductions and time savings during the configuration of the new 
system (Huber et al., 2000). The definition and the adoption of new harmonized business processes, the 
establishment of key information entities, the settlement of reporting and information aggregation 
structures, are time consuming activities (Davenport, 2000). Often, local sites are quite independent and 
strong, which may result in tensions between local sites and central management. A common 
understanding of the future business must be developed. This process may be blocked by political 
conflicts, prestige, communication problems and different priorities and habits. Changes can be forced 
by a strong management (Gulla and Mollan, 1999). Thus, with respect to the organizational changes and 
the harmonization of business processes, large scale ERP implementations are strongly interrelated 
across business units and sites (Klaus et al., 2000) such that strong management attention is 
indispensable. 
Beside changes how daily business is conducted, a large scale ERP implementation is always associated 
with interrelations between its elements, which increase the implementation complexity. Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002) propose three measures for implementation complexity. Variety reflects the interrelations 
in a system and will increase with the number of sites affected or the functions of an implemented 
package. Variability is related to dynamics over time and the interrelations between the elements of a 
system. Examples are scope changes, lack of resources, and dependencies on other implementations 




innovation in IT and business processes (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). In our research, we associate a large 
scale ERP implementation with interrelations between its elements (e.g. projects) and with a change in 
the business processes (Seidel, 2009) and the measures for implementation complexity proposed by 
Ribbers and Schoo (2002). Since interrelations and changes are key characteristics of large scale ERP 
implementations, we will use the term ERP programs (in contrast to projects) for the remainder of this 
study.  
 Dynamic Nature of ERP Implementations 
A second problem we see in the fact that in previous research the life cycle of large-scale ERP programs, 
including organizational change and the adoption of business processes, is insufficiently investigated. 
Lyytinen and Newman (2015) stress that the majority of previous research aiming to explain the success 
of ERP implementations only considers antecedents and static elements of the implementation context. 
They largely ignore the role of process events in explaining the outcomes. The static view of the factors 
assumes that the influences of CSFs are frozen in time, and neglect the dynamics of the process of 
organizational implementation (Nandhakumar et al., 2005). An exception here is the account of Parr and 
Shanks (2000), which considers CSFs during different phases of two investigated implementation 
projects; nonetheless, they focus on projects not programs. Markus and Tanis (2000) explicitly consider 
different implementation phases and stress that the starting conditions may not remain the same over 
the life cycle of the implementation. Grainger et al. (2009) stress two implementation attempts and 
address the often incomplete view of accounts, which only presents the outcome at one point in the 
project life. Similar results are emphasized by Mueller et al. (2014) and Akkermans and van Helden 
(2002). Wagner et al. (2010) describe a turnaround process and exemplify how a troubled project at go-
live becomes a working ERP system. Thus, we conclude that a view spanning the entire program life cycle 
is beneficial for a comprehensive view of an ERP program and might describe its course beyond the 
formally defined life cycle phases.  
In their accounts regarding IT enabled BTM (business transformation management) Safrudin and Recker 
(2013; 2014; Safrudin, 2014) exemplify that different managerial capabilities are needed during different 
key periods (concept development - blueprint design - solution delivery - post transformation). These 
key managerial capabilities are invoked by strategic triggers, which are pertinent to a key period, and 
inform senior management when certain resources and capabilities are required. Safrudin and Recker 
(2013; 2014; Safrudin 2014) derived their insights from three case studies in the ERP context and they 
define “business transformations as a collection of management services that are demanded and 
enacted at a program level, defined as abstract resources that provide the managerial capabilities 
necessary for business transformations” (Safrudin and Recker, 2013, p. 2). As an organizational change 
program an ERP implementation is directly related to the life cycle of organizational strategy (Seidel, 




of an ERP program to these life cycle phases of organizational strategy, the dynamic treatment is 
absolutely necessary, also in the tradition of management science.  Thus, these accounts are supporting 
the view to pay attention to the strategic and dynamic nature of ERP programs, which is in line with the 
approach and views in this study. 
 Programs 
In the next sections we elaborate on programs, and the demarcation points of programs in contrast to 
projects and portfolios. Furthermore, we highlight generic and potential program structures and roles. 
Finally, we discuss existing research in the ERP program context, and potential benefits. 
2.4.1 Projects, Programs, Portfolios and their Relationships 
Apart from projects, the increasing importance of programs and portfolios (of programs) as mechanisms 
for managing organizations could be observed (Maylor et al., 2006). Although program management is 
often seen as an extension or variant of project management (Pellegrinelli, 2011; Partington et al., 2005), 
there are some points that clearly distinguish the two. Whereas programs are focused on a change of 
the permanent organization, its strategy with a wide set of impacts, a project is more narrowly defined 
and focused on concrete business results. A program has far-reaching, long term implications and 
outcomes, whereas a project is more focused on short-term outputs (Artto et al., 2009). According to 
the PMI, “a program is a group of related projects, subprograms, and program activities managed in a 
coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually.” (PMI, 
2013a, p. 9). Moreover, program management contributes to achieving the program´s strategic 
objectives and benefits (PMI, 2008).   
The relation of projects in a program through a common outcome or common capability (PMI, 2013a) is 
also the major differentiation point between a program and a portfolio. If this relation does not exist, 
then it is better to manage the projects as a portfolio, or whereas a program always consists of projects, 
a project may not be part of a program (PMI, 2008; PMI, 2013a). On the other hand, portfolio 
management aligns with organizational strategies, selects the right programs and projects, whereas 
program management harmonizes its projects, subprograms and program components and controls 
their interdependencies to realize specified benefits. Lastly, project management is driven by the 
objectives of the program or portfolio, and implements plans to achieve a specific scope (PMI, 2013a). A 
good overview of the creation, administration and optimization of portfolios can be found in the account 
of De Reyck et al. (2005), whereas we focus specifically on the management of a bundle of related 
projects, a program.  
Several organizations emphasize the importance of program management as part of their standard 
guidelines. Most important is the Project Management Institute (PMI which published three editions (a 




Standard for Program Management” (PMI, 2006; 2008; 2013c). The second edition is by far the most 
comprehensive source and thus we stick to this edition (PMI, 2008). These guidelines are closely linked 
to the PMBOK guide (A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge) currently in its fifth edition 
(PMI, 2013a). A second prominent guideline is published by the Cabinet Office, “Managing Successful 
Programmes”, fourth edition (Cabinet Office, 2011), which is closely linked to PRINCE2 (Projects in 
Controlled Environments), the well-known project management methodology.  The growing interest in 
program management is reflected by the importance which is attributed to this knowledge area within 
those project management methodologies. These program management approaches focus on business 
changes (Gareis, 2010; Lehtonen and Martinsuo, 2008), which is often associated with ERP 
implementations, or as Hong and Kim put it ITIT-managers see “ERP systems as their organizations' most 
strategic computing platform” (Hong and Kim, 2002, p.25). Thus, we conclude that program 
management is a well-established knowledge area which also warrants sufficient consideration in the 
ERP context. In this section we elaborate on the demarcation points of programs in contrast to projects 
and portfolio.  In the next section we will elaborate on generic program structures and roles  
2.4.2 Program Organization - Structures & Roles within a Program 
A program setup typically depends on the context. Figure 2-1 depicts a generic program structure and 
roles according to the MSP guidelines (Managing Successful Programmes) published by the Cabinet 
Office (2011). In this section we will elaborate on these generic program setups. 
 
Figure 2-1 Generic Program Structure and Roles – MSP (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
At the top level the sponsoring group represents the senior management. This level is responsible for 




strategic alignment of the program with the strategic direction of the organization. The sponsoring group 
authorizes the program mandate and the appropriate funding, and is responsible for the sign-off at 
closure. The role of the sponsoring group could be performed by an existing executive committee or 
other board of the organization. One of its members will become the senior responsible owner (SRO). 
The senior responsible owner (SRO) is accountable for the program, for realizing the benefits and 
achieving its strategic outcomes. Consequently, the SRO must have seniority, be visible, and 
communicate the program´s vision to key stakeholders. The SRO secures the funds over the entire life 
cycle and establishes the program board.  
The program board has the responsibility to drive the program forward and deliver the outcomes and 
benefits. The program board reports to the SRO. The SRO may delegate some responsibilities and action 
to the members of the program board. The program board defines an acceptable risk profile, ensures 
that the program delivers within boundaries and resolves strategic and organizational issues between 
the projects. Furthermore, the program board assures the integrity of the benefit profiles, the realization 
plan and assures operational stability.  The SRO, the program manager and the business change manager 
are mandatory members. Optional members are project executives, representatives of corporate 
functions and lead suppliers. 
The program manager is responsible for delivering the new capabilities of the program. The business 
change manager is responsible for the benefits realization via the organizational adaption, the usage of 
the capability and the transition to the desired outcome. Table 2-1 depicts the responsibilities of the 
program manager and the business change manager. 
Responsibilities of Program Manager Responsibilities of Business Change Manager 
Day-to-day management of the program; being the day-to-
day agent of the SRO; planning, designing and monitoring 
of the program; defining and maintaining program 
governance; coordination of interdependencies between 
projects; risk- and issue management; maintaining overall 
integrity; monitoring the budget and costs against 
benefits; assuring appropriate quality of outputs and the 
meeting of requirements; ensuring delivery in time; 
allocating resources efficiently; reporting to the SRO; 
developing and maintaining working relationships with key 
players and third-party service providers. 
Primarily benefits-focused; defining the benefits 
and future state; assessing progress towards the 
realization of benefits; achieving measured 
improvements; the business change manager is 
“business-side” and thus communicating with all 
areas of business; identifying and monitoring the 
performance metrics; reporting to the SRO on the 
readiness to change; optimizing the timing of the 
release and securing business stability. 
Table 2-1 Responsibilities of Program & Business Change Manager (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
The responsibilities of the two functions are quite extensive. Thus, the business change manager receives 




thoroughly prepared for the transition. The program manager is assisted by the program office, which 
has two distinct roles. The first is to provide guidance and support to the projects. The second is to be 
the home for governance and control, including standards, financial monitoring, and health checks. As 
such, the program office must be independent of the initiatives. 
The appropriate level of integration between the program and its projects is a key part of an effective 
program organization. The organizational structures on the project-level need to have a clear leadership, 
a direction-setting and guidelines how they are operating. Different forms of integrating a project into a 
program exist. Project 1 in Figure 2-1 has a dedicated project board. That is not the case for Project 2. In 
Project 1 the project manager reports to the project board (should have clear responsibilities defined on 
the program level). In Project 2 the project manager reports to the program manager, who is fulfilling 
the project executive role and maintaining a very tight relationship between the project and the 
program.  
In this section we provide an overview about potential program structures, as they are defined in MSP 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). They are generic and several different options exist. As such, it depends on the 
context which program roles are considered and how an appropriate setup could look like.   
2.4.3 Existing Program Literature in the ERP Context 
A generally accepted definition of program management has been developed in recent years (e.g. 
Cabinet Office, 2011; PMI, 2008) and the practical use of ERP programs is acknowledged in these 
accounts. Pioneering research on the specifics of program management of ERP implementations was 
conducted by Ribbers and Schoo (2002, p. 45), who define a program as “a portfolio of projects, defining 
a set of related activities, both for the IT and the business side, which have defined goals and benefits, 
and need to be controlled as a whole.” In their view, a program is the controlling instance of the 
transformation process. This definition is comprehensive and includes in principle the same aspects of a 
program, as they are used in the guidelines of the PMI (2008) and the Cabinet Office (2011).  
Several insights into the management of ERP implementations using programs have been reported in 
the literature. Ribbers and Schoo (2002) describe how different contextual factors as the degree of 
change, the number of sites included, and the degree of concurrency shape the design of the program. 
Seidel (2009) develops a model intended to predict the probability of a successful ERP program but 
without considering the actual implementation phases. Markus et al. (2000a) use the term multisite ERP 
implementation, which shares characteristics with a program, and describe elements such as 
architecture, business strategy, software configuration, technical platform, and management execution. 
Grainger et al. (2009) use the term “umbrella project” for a series of implementation projects, with a 
dedicated single overall project coordinator and multiple project leaders, but neither mention the term 




of shared commitments and understandings of program goals between key-managers as one specific 
program-related aspect; Chang et al. (2014) have a similar focus using a case study approach. Apart from 
this these contributions, program management in the ERP context was rarely explicitly considered in the 
past. 
2.4.4 Benefits of ERP Programs 
Other definitions in program management literature (Cabinet Office, 2011; Ferns, 1991; Lycett et al., 
2004; Thiry, 2004) are in line with the definitions of Ribbers and Schoo (2002) and the PMI, 2008; 2013) 
and refer to the strategic nature of programs. Programs are used for business transformations and 
adoption of new technologies (as ERP systems), for multi-organizational delivery and globalization of 
technology services (Cabinet Office, 2011), and generate additional benefits by grouping related projects 
(Cabinet Office, 2011; Ferns, 1991; Lycett et al., 2004; Thiry, 2004). Some of those additional benefits 
and goals are categorized (see Table 2-2), by Lycett et al. (2004), who also refer to some exemplary 
literature (e.g. Pellegrinelli, 1997).  Pellegrinelli (1997) mentions all those benefits apart from the more 
effective knowledge transfer compared to traditional project structures. Programs are effective 
organizational structures to cope with the impacts of resource interdependence (Parolia et al., 2011). 
Nowadays, ERP implementations often consist of related projects which are coordinated through some 
sort of overarching program (Chang et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014; Seddon et al., 2010). Consequently, 
we conclude that programs are generally accepted as additional entities which supervise and monitor 
the often related projects and products in an ERP implementation. As such, programs generate 
additional benefits, which could not be generated by managing related projects individually (PMI, 2008). 
An “ERP-project can be viewed as an organizational change project, rather than as the replacement of a 
piece of technology” (Boonstra, 2006, p. 38). The strategic nature of an ERP implementation is therefore 
consistent with the goals for program management. Programs are becoming accepted as a mechanism 
to manage strategic change and organizations are now exploiting their potential (Reiss and Rainer, 2013; 
PMI, 2008; Pellegrinelli and Bowman, 1994). 
In the previous sections, we highlighted the knowledge areas of ERP and program management, and 
focused on the challenges of ERP programs, which warrant the central intention of our research. In the 








Improved coordination Identification and definition of project interdependencies 
Improved dependency 
management 
Reduce the amount of re-engineering required due to inadequate 
management of the interfaces between projects 
More effective resource utilization Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the allocation of shared 
resources. 
Assist in providing justification for specialist resources that deliver an 
overall improvement to program delivery 
More effective knowledge transfer Provision of a means to identify and improve upon transferable lessons. 
Facilitate organizational learning 
Greater management visibility Enable senior management to better monitor, direct and control the 
implementation process 
More coherent communication Improve communication of overall goals and direction both internally 
and externally to the program 
Improved project definition Ensure that project definition is more systematic and objective, reducing 
the prevalence of projects with a high risk of failure or obsolescence. 
Bundling of projects leads to economies of scale 
Better alignment with business 
drivers, goals and strategy 
Provide an enabling framework for the realization of strategic change and 
the ongoing alignment of strategy and projects in response to a changing 
business environment 
Table 2-2 Program Management Goals and Benefits (Lycett et al., 2004). 
 Research on Critical Success Factors 
The objective of this section is to present the approach of our structured literature review, and the 
presentation of the preliminary results, which we name seed concepts. Given the increasing popularity 
and importance of ERP implementations, research on critical success factors has a long history and 
evolved in the 1990s. CSFs are defined as “the underlying or guiding principles of an effort that must be 
regarded to ensure that it is successful” (Caralli et al., 2004., p. 27).  Paying attention to the dynamics of 
ERP program, we add a second definition. “Critical success factors are the few key areas of activity in 
which favorable results are absolutely necessary for a particular manager to reach his goals. Because 
these areas of activity are critical, the manager should have the appropriate information to allow him to 





Based on the definitions above we define in the ERP program context: 
CSFs in the ERP program context are the underlying guiding principles and activities, in certain key 
areas, that must be regarded by managers to reach the goals of the ERP program. To ensure that CSFs 
are proceeding sufficiently well in each area, CSFs are continually assessed during all phases of the ERP 
program life cycle. 
Thus, it was of major importance to conduct an initial literature review at the beginning of our research 
journey. The method applied for our literature review is based on Webster and Watson (2002), who 
propose a structured approach; (1) creating an initial basket through identifying major contributions, (2) 
going backward by reviewing the citations of the initial basket, (3) going forward to accounts which cited 
the accounts of the first two steps, (4) to the three steps suggested by Webster and Watson (2002) we 
added standard works. The keywords we used included: program management, programme 
management, program, programme, ERP, enterprise resource planning, enterprise systems, ES, 
implementation, multinational, global, CSF, critical success factors, risk factors, multisite, multi-project, 
phases, and various combinations of these keywords. The leading journals on which we put a special 
focus include all journals in the “AIS Senior Scholars' Basket of Journals”.  Although the initial literature 
review was one of our first steps on our research journey we considered accounts which were published 
during our research project. However, the results presented in this section include mainly the concepts 
as present at the beginning of our research journey, reflecting our historical starting position.  
In Table 2-3 we depict some major accounts we deemed most relevant for identifying our seed concepts. 
Particularly, but not solely, we selected accounts which encompassed more than one CSF (taxonomies), 
and which were cited many times according to Google Scholar. It is interesting that accounts of journals 
included in the “AIS Senior Scholars' Basket of Journals4” were not overly represented. One exception is 
the account of Akkermans and van Helden (2002) published in the European Journal of Information 
Systems. Furthermore, the list of accounts depicted in Table 2-3 is not an exhaustive list, apart from the 
accounts listed in the cluster “CSFs of ERP programs” in the 4th row. We clustered the accounts according 
to the date of publication and the area of research5 we assigned them to. The results reveal that 
particularly within 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 ERP CSF research was very prominent. We did not identify 
any major accounts from 2010-2014, so we would assume that the research community considered this 
area of research to be saturated. We found accounts in the research area of programs within all three 
timeframes, indicating that the continuing importance of program research. In the area “CSFs of ERP 
                                                          
4 We want to emphasize that many interesting accounts were published in in the “AIS Senior Scholars' Basket of Journals” 
related to ERP implementations and CSFs. Many of those accounts can be found elsewhere in this thesis. A reason most of these 
accounts are not used in our compilation of CSFs is our premise that we were mainly looking for the most cited taxonomies. 
5 We are aware that the area “CSFs of ERP programs” is a subset of ERP CSF research and of programs too. We depicted it in 




programs” we found only three accounts (third row of table 2-3). The accounts of Ribbers and Schoo 
(2002) and Seidel (2009) only cover antecedents of successful programs, neglecting the dynamics of ERP 
programs.  The account of Sullivan (2014) was identified at a later stage of our research project, and was 
published as a book for practitioners in SAP Press (indicating the practical importance of ERP programs). 
Thus, we shaded the relevant row in Table 2-3 to illustrate that no dedicated research accounts exist 
which examine the dynamics of CSFs of ERP programs.  
 
Area of Research  1991-2000 2001-2010 2010-2014 
ERP CSFs Bingi et al. (1999), Holland 
and Light (1999), 
Davenport (2000), Markus 
and Tanis (2000), Parr and 
Shanks (2000), Sumner 
(2000),  
Akkermans and van Helden 
(2002), Al-Mashari et al. 
(2003), Finney and Corbett 
(2007), Nah et al. (2001), Nah 
and Delgado (2006), Somers 
and Nelson (2004), Umble et 
al. (2003), Vosburg and Kumar 
(2001), Zhang et al. (2005) 
No relevant accounts 
identified 
Programs Ferns (1991), Pellegrinelli 
(1997) 
PMI (2006), PMI (2008), 
Lycett et al (2004), Thiry 
(2004), Vereecke et al. (2003) 
Cabinet Office (2011), 
PMI (2013c) 
CSFs of ERP programs No relevant accounts 
identified 
Ribbers and Schoo (2002), 
Seidl (2009) 
Sullivan (2014) 
Table 2-3 Relevant Research Accounts Clustered (Time/Area of Research) 
 
In another form, the results of the literature review from a CSF perspective are shown in Table 2-4. 
Column 1 includes the seed concepts we identified. Column 2 describes the concepts and contains typical 
associated actions. The seed concepts were only a sensitizing device (Matavire and Brown, 2013) for the 
succeeding interpretive case studies. Nevertheless, the intention of this initial, structured literature 
review was to help us in later phases of the research, e.g. a better understanding of interviewees´ 






Seed concepts Description (associated actions) Literature in alphabetic order (program related first)  
A) Securing top 
management support 
Securing sponsorship and commitment during the whole 
program, appointing program/project champion who promotes 
the program/projects actively 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo 
(2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry (2004), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), 
Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Bingi et al. (1999), Finney and Corbett (2007), 
Holland and Light (1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), 
Nah and Delgado (2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Somers and Nelson 
(2004), Sumner (2000), Umble et al. (2003), Zhang et al. (2005) 
B) Establishment of a 
business case and a 
vision 
Comparing additional costs for managing the change within a 
program against the additional benefits, defining the intended 
future state, communicating vision, defining and updating 
regularly program and project business cases 
Ferns (1991), Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al (2004), Pellegrinelli 
(1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Thiry (2004), Akkermans 
and van Helden (2002), Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett 
(2007), Holland and Light (1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. 
(2001), Nah and Delgado (2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Umble et al. 
(2003) 




Identification and categorization of all stakeholders affected by 
the program, deciding how and when information will be 
distributed, ensuring ongoing commitment from all relevant 
stakeholders 
Ferns (1991), Cabinet Office (2011), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo 
(2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry (2004), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), 
 Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett (2007), Holland and Light 
(1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Nah and Delgado 
(2006), Somers and Nelson (2004), Umble et al. (2003), Sumner (2000), 
Zhang et al. (2005) 
D) Securing change 
management 
Ensuring that target business environment meets requirements 
of the new business model, organizing trainings and education, 
ensuring appropriate resources, managing transition into 
operations 
Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al. (2004), PMI (2008), Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Vereecke et al. (2003), Al-Mashari et al. 
(2003), Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. 
(2001), Nah and Delgado (2006), Somers and Nelson (2004), Umble et 
al. (2003), Zhang et al. (2005) 
E) Establishment of a 
company-specific ERP 
strategy  
Defining the ERP strategy (Minimum customization, phased 
implementation approach vs. big bang strategy, 
rolling out a template, release and upgrade strategy), aligning 
the program goals with strategic goals 
Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel 
(2009), Thiry (2004), Bingi (1999), Finney and Corbett (2007), Holland 
and Light (1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah and Delgado (2006), 
Parr and Shanks (2000), Somers and Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), 
Umble et al. (2003)  
F) Establishment of a 
program-governance 
structure 
Defining management structure, establishing program office, 
defining decision making, reporting requirements, roles, 
responsibilities, interfaces and communication to project 
representatives, formal closure 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Lycett et al. (2004), Pellegrinelli 
(1997), PMI 2008, Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry (2004), 
Vereecke et al. (2003) 
G) Business process 
reengineering 
Redesigning business processes in accordance with the ERP 
strategy and envisioned target business environment 
Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Bingi et al. (1999), Holland and Light (1999), 
Nah et al. (2001), Markus and Tanis (2000), Somers and Nelson (2004), 




H) Appropriateness of 
the ERP vendor 
Choosing the appropriate ERP vendor and package, ensuring 
ongoing vendor support 
Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Bingi et al. 
(1999), Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah and 
Delgado (2006), Somers and Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), Umble et al 
(2003), Zhang et al. (2005) 
 
I) Risk and issue 
management 
Identifying and tracking of risks and defining the risk strategy, 
ensuring that actions taken succeed 
(Aritua et al., 2011), Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Lycett et al 
(2004), PMI (2008), Thiry (2004), Davenport (2000), Finney and Corbett 
(2007), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001) 
J) Definition of an 
integration management 
strategy 
Identifying interdependencies and interrelations and defining 
how to manage them, considering shared processes, managing 
transition into operations, providing customer support 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Lycett et al (2004), Pellegrinelli 
(1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Thiry (2004), Vereecke et 
al. (2003) 
K) Time and scope & 
financial management 
Including scope management (defining what is inside the 
program, managing change requests), time management 
(program schedule, planned duration and sequencing projects, 
analyzing performance against the plans, milestones) and 
financial management (cost estimation and budgeting, 
performing within budget, early paybacks, ensuring funds) 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns 1991, Lycett et al (2004), Akkermans and 
van Helden (2002), Nah and Delgado (2006), PMI (2008), Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry (2004), Markus and Tanis (2000) 
L) Definition of a 
program-methodology 
Securing all quality aspects, regression testing, end-to-end 
testing, ensuring that the results meet expectations, planning 
and conducting of audits and reviews, securing knowledge 
management 
Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al. (2004), PMI (2008), Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Thiry (2004), Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett 
(2007), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Seidel (2009), 
Vereecke et al. (2003), Zhang et al. (2005) 
M) Proper use of 
consultants 
Choosing consultants, managing them, building stable relations Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Bingi et al. (1999), Finney and 
Corbett (2007), Nah and Delgado (2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), 
Somers and Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), Zhang et al. (2005)   
N) Ensuring data 
migration/ 
Accuracy & management 
Ensuring that data is migrated accurately to the ERP system, 
establishing appropriate data entry procedures, data 
governance 
Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), 
Somers and Nelson (2004), Umble et al. (2003), Vosburg and Kumar 
(2001), Zhang et al. (2005) 
O) Readiness of 
organizational culture 
Considering organizational culture, readiness of sites, national 
cultures and legal requirements 
Finney and Corbett (2007), Nah et al. (2001), Seidel (2009), Zhang et al. 
(2005) 
P) Realization of benefits Identifying and realizing key benefits, ensuring that key 
benefits meet objectives, reviewing benefits with stakeholders  
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI (2008), 
Thiry (2004), Al Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett (2007), 
Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Zhang et al. (2005) 
Table 2-4 Seed Concepts, Derived and Conceptualized from Existing Literature, as Sensitizing Device for the Interpretive Case Studies and to Receive an Overview about 




We now elaborate on the seed concepts presented in Table 2-4: 
2.5.1 Establishment of a Business Case and a Vision 
Early in the life cycle, during the initial change initiation, the intended future state should be established in 
the form of a vision. A successful vision reflects the overall business strategy and can then be translated into 
measurable goals and targets (Al Mashari et al., 2003). An initial business case can be calculated, including 
financial analyses (PMI, 2008), on the basis of an optimized mix regarding benefits, time, costs and risks and 
in accordance with other key documents (Cabinet Office, 2011), as the program charter.  As the vision 
reflects the corporate mission and business strategy, the approval of the top management is needed, and 
once it is approved (Umble et al., 2003), it can be communicated to the entire organization (Al Mashari et 
al., 2003; Nah et al., 2001; Umble et al., 2003). In that direction the management of user expectations plays 
an important role, including clear goals and objectives reflecting the business vision (Somers and Nelson, 
2004).  
The alignment with often-international business strategies (Madapusi and d´Souza, 2005), and the system 
justification play an important role. A good example is the implementation at Texas Instruments, where 
global capacity utilization and standardization resulted in increased profits of several hundred million dollars 
(Sarkis and Sunderraj, 2003).  Whereas it is important to develop a sound business case in the chartering 
phase (Markus and Tanis, 2000), it is also important that this business case remains viable and valid (Cabinet 
Office, 2011). As a consequence, we conclude that although the main emphasis on the vision has to be put 
in the beginning of the program, the tracking of goals and benefits (Holland and Light, 1999), as well as 
possible adjustments of the vision and its related documents, are ongoing tasks throughout the whole 
endeavor. 
2.5.2 Securing Top Management Support 
Probably the most prominent and cited CSF for ERP implementations, is the related to the assurance of top 
management support. An ERP implementation is always associated with major business changes (e.g. 
Boonstra, 2006). In a fast changing economic environment characterized by the rapid change of customer 
needs, mergers and acquisitions, a consistent need for business process consolidations and harmonizations 
is evident (Accenture, 2011), and this requires top management support. The strategic implications of the 
implementations must be considered by the top management, the implementations must be funded by 
significant means, and the progress must be constantly monitored to ensure a smooth rollout and an 




implementation phase (Markus and Tanis, 2000; Parr and Shanks, 2000). Ribbers and Schoo (2002) stress 
this under the term “program organization”, and report that in 90% of their 15 observed cases the program 
structure included a steering committee, a program sponsor and a program manager.  In the program 
management literature, the PMI (2008) acknowledges the authorization of a program through a steering 
committee or a different organizational body, whereas the Cabinet Office (2011) stresses the involvement 
of the senior responsible owners (sponsoring group, key stakeholder) early, at appropriate milestones and 
throughout the program. This view is consistent with the ERP literature: Al Mashari et al. (2003) stress the 
extension of top management support until the end of the implementation. Thus, we conclude that securing 
top management support is of major importance during all phases of the program life cycle. 
2.5.3 Definition of Stakeholder- & Communication Management Strategy 
The program management and the ERP literature agree on the necessity of an early definition of an 
appropriate stakeholder- and communication management strategy. This includes the identification of all 
relevant stakeholders, including their requirements (PMI, 2008) and figuring out where potential benefits 
might be realized (Cabinet Office, 2011). Furthermore, the definition of a communication plan is warranted 
as different stages in the program involve different groups of people (Markus and Tanis, 2000). The ongoing 
stakeholder engagement and the management of expectations is necessary throughout the program to 
mitigate potential conflicts and diverging requirements, and the communication plan might be adapted 
when stakeholder change (PMI, 2008). The high impact of effective communications to all key players, and 
the use of a communication plan, is also emphasized in the account of Somers and Nelson (2004), from 
initiation to the system acceptance. They summarize this as interdepartmental communication and also 
emphasise the interdepartmental cooperation and cross-functional involvement of people. Their view is 
consistent with Zhang et al. (2005) who stress the company wide commitment of key players across 
functional departments. To sum up, it seems that this CSF plays an important role in all stages of the 
program, and particularly in the early stages, including the implementation(s). 
2.5.4 Securing Change Management 
One of the most prominent CSFs, which is evident in the current ERP literature, is how an organization deals 
with the level of business changes associated with the ERP program. The change impact is also a 
distinguishing point between projects and programs or as Seidel (2009) puts it, “While ERP projects are 
focused on outputs (a functioning ERP system), ERP programmes are focused on outcomes (a change in how 




beliefs, are violated, since the state of the world is changed through the implementation of the ERP system. 
This is the source of most ERP implementation problems (Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001), and increases 
considerably the risk and the costs (Markus and Tanis, 2000).  
The major business change, which comes along with the introduction of an ERP system and global process 
harmonizations as a response to mergers and integration initiatives (Accenture, 2011), needs to be 
addressed properly. In the program management literature, the Cabinet Office (2011) distinguishes between 
three phases dealing with the change. In the pre-transition phase, the impact of the change on the 
stakeholders is estimated and the “as is” state is opposed to the intended future state during the 
development of a blueprint. New operations will be introduced with the transitions, while old ones will still 
be in place.  During the transition phase single projects are taken into operations (in the simplest case in 
only one business unit) after the readiness of the change is ensured (project go-live). In the post-transition 
phase, the transition management continues until the new operations are fully embedded and self-
supporting, “a change that sticks” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 117). The PMI (2008) speaks about component 
approvals as one of the last steps (gate reviews), when the component has achieved its objectives in relation 
to the overall program. Also within the ERP literature (e.g. Markus and Tanis, 2000; Somers and Nelson, 
2004; Umble et al. 2003) it seems that there is a general consensus about the necessity of change 
management accompanying the ERP initiative along its life cycle.    
A second aspect of change management is to ensure that the target business environment meets the 
requirements of the potential new business model. This includes the organization of training and education 
of end users (e.g. Al Mashari et al., 2003; Somers and Nelson, 2004), and ensuring appropriate resources 
(Markus et al., 2000b; PMI, 2008). Activities in that direction need to be started early in the program and 
the human resources aspect continues to play an important role until the changed operations are fully lived 
in daily business.  
 
2.5.5 Establishment of a Company-Specific ERP Strategy  
Previous ERP literature differentiates between different approaches how to implement an ERP system (Parr 
and Shanks, 2000; Sullivan, 2014). Davenport (2000) lists different options of how to implement an ERP 
system. He mentions the two extremes of the incremental and the big bang approach, with a phased rollout 




pieces, a big bang approach implements everything at once. Phasing can be undertaken in different 
dimensions: a) geographical phasing, b) process phasing and c) business unit phasing. The necessity to 
integrate the ERP with legacy applications is a major risk factor (Sumner, 2000), and needs to be considered 
as well as the question to what extent the system will be integrated including its own applications but also 
intercompany-integration (Markus and Tanis, 2000). Decisions in regard to the degree of integration and 
innovation, which processes to implement, and in how many sites add to the associated risk. As such, they 
are determinants of the implementation complexity (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). A phased approach, with 
several smaller and implementation projects, can help to reduce these risks (Parr and Shanks, 2000), in 
multisite implementations sites can learn from each other (Umble et al. 2003; van Fenema et al. 2007).  
The size of the company and the number of distributed systems are major determinants for which strategy 
to use. Establishing standards and the harmonization of business processes have a profound, often positive, 
competitive impact, and can be rolled out via templates. This includes common customizing and master data 
(Huber et al., 2000).  Whether standard processes offered by the ERP systems are used (plain-vanilla) or the 
system is heavily customized, depends on the question whether a tailored system might support the 
competitive advantage of the company. The higher costs must be compared with additional benefits 
(Davenport, 2000). The degree of process standardization has an impact on the implementation and the 
maintenance effort. The maintenance and support strategy also needs to be defined and can range from 
regional teams with direct user contact to central support structures, including time-zone bases difficulties 
(Seidel, 2009). This includes the question of whether IT services will be primarily provided in-house or will 
be predominantly outsourced (Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
An important aspect is also the instance strategy, and the question of how many clients might be used in 
the ERP system. The usage of only one instance facilitates better data exchange, whereas multiple instances 
are technically easy to implement (Seidel, 2009).  The technical monitoring and infrastructure is part of the 
responsibilities of the support center as well as the need for a system upkeep through release management, 
and the up-to-date documentation (Sullivan, 2014). As a consequence of all the tasks which are part of the 
ERP strategy, we conclude that this area is comprehensive and warrants major attention throughout the life 






2.5.6 Establishment of a Program Governance Structure 
ERP implementations often consist of related projects which are coordinated through some sort of 
overarching program (Seddon et al., 2010). In the ERP context a program is a portfolio of projects, defining 
a set of related IT and business activities that have defined goals and benefits and need to be controlled as 
a whole (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). A program consists of components, which are in most cases projects 
themselves. Another component is the program itself, which is the management effort and infrastructure to 
manage the program and its components (PMI, 2008). Sullivan (2014) stresses that large-scale 
implementations, with multiple locations often require additional financial resources known as programs 
and a program management office (PMO). Depending on the size, the PMO functions can be performed by 
single or multiple individuals. The functions involve integration management, financial control, risk 
management, resource management, scheduling and tracking (Sullivan, 2014). The program manager 
coordinates efforts between the projects, but does not directly manage the project themselves (PMI, 2008). 
As such, program management is not micromanagement of individual projects, which is the independent 
domain of project managers given certain tolerances set by program management. The program 
management must create mechanisms to assess the performance of its processes and projects (Cabinet 
Office, 2011) within these tolerances. “The effective use of tolerances can directly enable the efficient 
execution of a program” (PMI, 2008, p. 82). 
A program should include the following roles: program manager, steering committee, program sponsor, user 
representatives, global process owners across projects, a coordinator with external suppliers, site 
implementation manager (project managers), and external quality assurance (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). 
Below the level of the project managers, functional processes are typically introduced via workstreams, and 
are led by a company expert in the specific processes, referred to as functional workstream leads (Sullivan, 
2014). Workstreams are often referenced by a three letter acronym as depicted in Table 2-5. The 
establishment of a stringent governance model is also emphasized by Seidel for ERP programs (Seidel, 2009). 
Having said that, we conclude that a governance structure for programs is particularly complicated, and 
includes at least one level more than a traditional project setup. However, exactly this additional level seems 







Functional Workstream (Acronym) Description 
Contract-to-pay (CTP) Procurement process, from supplier contracting, to payment of 
services 
Human capital management (HCM) Human resources process, from hiring to discharge 
Order-to-cash (OTC) Order fulfilment process, from order processing to funds receipt for 
invoice 
Plan-to-report (PTR) Financial process, from planning to reporting 
Plan-to-schedule (PTS) Production planning to master scheduling 
Plan-to-stock (PTS) Production planning to warehouse stocking 
Procure-to-pay (PTP) Procurement process, from purchasing to payment 
Procure-to-demand (PTD) Production of product to factory shipment 
Record-to-report (RTR) Financial process, from recording of financial transactions to 
reporting of company results 
Recruit-to-retire (RTR) Human resources process, from hiring to discharge 
Table 2-5 Acronyms Typically Used for Functional Workstreams and Descriptions (Sullivan, 2014) 
 
2.5.7 Business Process Reengineering 
ERP systems are built on best practices and the costs and benefits of reengineering the existing business 
processes to the ERP model could be very high, particularly when the system is rolled out worldwide (Bingi 
et al., 1999). In order to realize the full range of business benefits an ERP implementation must be 
accompanied by business process redesign. Figure 2-2 (Accenture, 2011, p. 7) illustrates this proposition and 
puts the implementation complexity in relation to the expected business benefits. It seems that the higher 
the level of business process redesign (associated changes), the higher the implementation complexity 
(implementation challenge). 
The definition and the adoption of new business processes, the establishment of key information entities, 
and the settlement of reporting and information aggregation structures are time consuming proceedings 
(Davenport, 2000). Furthermore, it is important to decide if the business processes are implemented as 
offered by the ERP system and the company adopts the best practices, or the system is adapted to the 





Figure 2-2 Growing Added Value Versus Increasing Complexity in an SAP Consolidation. Business Benefit in 
Comparison to the Degree of SAP Rationalization (Accenture, 2011, p. 7). 
 
The question how to adopt best practices offered by the ERP system can become even more difficult when 
more business units or sites are involved (Gattiker and Goodhue, 2005; Huber et al., 2000). Subunits with a 
high dependency on other subunits may benefit substantially, whereas subunits which with a high degree 
of differentiation (suboptimal business processes) may incur costs (Gattiker and Goodhue, 2005). A common 
agreement about future business processes between central management and local sites needs to be built, 
which is sometimes more difficult when the subunits are independent and strong (Gulla and Mollan, 1999). 
This agreement is even more difficult to achieve regarding the end-to-end view of business processes 
(Sullivan, 2014). 
Table 2-5 gives us an impression of the integrative nature of end-to-end business processes, and their 
reflection in workstreams, as part of the governance-structure. The integrative nature of end-to-end 
business processes also warrants regular meetings between the streams, led by the stream owning the 




an important role in the earlier and implementation stages of the ERP program (Al Mashari et al., 2003; 
Somers and Nelson, 2004). 
2.5.8 Appropriateness of the ERP Vendor 
It is important that the characteristic of an ERP system match the overall business strategy of a company 
and that the software is chosen which has the best fit with the current business procedures, and can be well 
integrated with existing software applications (Al Mashari et al. 2003). The software needs to effectively 
support the required business functions, functional areas, as well as the overall company vision (Umble et 
al., 2003), and business requirements (Zhang et al., 2005). Thus, an ERP system is in the majority of cases, 
when all potential benefits should be employed, a determinant how a company is going to conduct its future 
business and therefore strategic at its best. 
Furthermore, it needs to be considered that an ERP implementation is an expensive endeavor, sometimes 
costing tens to hundreds of millions of dollars, considering systems Integrator staff, software licenses and 
hardware (Sullivan, 2014). The price of ERP software is often a major factor, but should not be the only 
criterion, as the ongoing vendor support, flexibility and ease of implementation, as well as tangible and 
intangible benefits associated with the software application also play a role (Umble et al., 2003). Moreover, 
the opportunity of receiving continuous maintenance and upgrade support is crucial (Bingi et al., 1999). The 
priorities also depend on the size of the companies and smaller organizations spend less money on the 
selection process and the overall price is more important than internationality and organizational flexibility 
(Bernroider and Koch, 2001). Pre-built packages, which are associated with less risk, might be a suitable 
alternative for small and medium-sized businesses, and constructed to solve a specific business problem and 
greatly ease the implementation process (Sullivan, 2014). The partnership with the ERP vendor is particularly 
important in the early stages of the implementation (Somers and Nelson, 2004), but as a strategic decision 
the future vision of the vendor needs to be considered too (Zhang et al., 2005). As a consequence, we 
conclude that choosing the right ERP vendor and software is of major importance, given the fact that this 
decision will have major impacts on how the company conducts its future business, future upgrade projects 
(Sullivan, 2014), and the long-lasting relationship which can be expected with the ERP vendor and the chosen 
package. 
2.5.9 Risk- and Issue Management 
There is a general consensus that business process changes add considerably to the expense and risk of ERP 




contribute considerably to the risk of the implementation, as rollout approaches, either phased or big bang 
(Davenport, 2000). Scope, business process complexity, user base, geographies and languages, and the 
degree of system integration are further factors increasing the risk (Sullivan, 2014). The risks need to be 
considered and resolved in one phase: Otherwise they are inherited and become a starting condition for the 
next phase (Markus and Tanis, 2000).  
The program management office is responsible for risk management, and tracks the risks over the program 
life cycle in a risk register. Impact and probability are part of the risk register, as well as the impacted 
deliverables, mitigation actions, cause and the owner (Sullivan, 2014). Sometimes, proximity is tracked to 
inform the management about the likelihood that a risk will occur at a particular time and its impending 
urgency (Cabinet Office, 2011). Program risk management includes its planning, identification, analysis, risk 
responses and the monitoring of it (PMI, 2008). The PMI differentiates between positive and negative risks, 
commonly referred to as opportunities and threats (PMI, 2013a). The program risk management body of 
knowledge is still evolving whereas project risk management is relatively mature (Aritua et al., 2011). Small 
risks in a project might accumulate with other risks in adjacent projects, and could significantly impact the 
program. Thus, the risks need to be evaluated across the program and projects (Cabinet Office, 2008). 
Issue and incident management is closely related to risk management. It is likewise tracked during diverse 
phases of the implementation (Cabinet Office, 2011). This includes issues cropping up during testing and the 
resolution of incidents after go-live in the hypercare6 phase (Sullivan, 2014). Suitable tools might drive the 
efficiency (Seidel, 2009). Consequently, we conclude that efficient risk- and issue management throughout 
the program life cycle and across the program and projects will contribute to the success of the 
implementation. 
2.5.10 Definition of an Integration Management Strategy 
In most companies, data are not kept in a single repository, but rather dozens or even hundreds of separate 
computer systems serve individual functions (Al Mashari et al., 2003). A good number of those systems might 
be replaced by the ERP system, but necessary interfaces will remain, which can be integrated via middleware 
or, when middleware focus only on technical aspects, company-specific interfaces must be built to integrate 
end-to-end processes (Al Mashari et al., 2003). Those end-to-end processes can include different modules, 
different internal systems or even interfaces to external systems from business partners (Davenport, 2000; 
                                                          
6 The “hypercare” phase is a common term within ERP implementations. It refers to the increased attention in relation to incidents 




Sullivan, 2014), or as Ribbers and Schoo (2002) put it, organizational integration which spans organizational 
boundaries. The exchange of documents with business partners can be facilitated via the EDI (Electronic 
Data Interchange) standard (Davenport, 2000; Sullivan, 2014), but each customer and vendor needs to be 
treated individually (Sullivan, 2014). As such, integration is a predictor for a program's complexity. High 
integration complexity warrants complete alignment mechanisms (reviews, steering committees, release 
control) and coordination with external partners. In certain cases, the integration can be associated with a 
complete new architecture (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). As a consequence, we conclude that the high 
integrative nature of ERP systems warrants a company-specific integration strategy. 
From a program management perspective, the importance of integration management is stressed likewise 
(Cabinet Office, 2011; PMI, 2008). Integration includes unification, consolidation, articulation, and 
integrative actions that are crucial for completing the program, managing stakeholder expectations and 
delivering program benefits. The program deliverables should be integrated, either with ongoing operations 
of the performing or the customer´s organization and with consideration of long-term strategic-planning 
(PMI, 2008). Existing projects might be adopted and integrated into the design of the blueprint and the 
program plan (Cabinet Office, 2011). In the same way, Thiry (2004) stresses that the emphasis on the 
interdependability of projects ensures strategic alignment. “The expected outcome of the programme can 
be a change of the business by replacing the existing systems and processes versus a change of the business 
by modifying/improving the existing systems and processes” (Vereeke et al., 2003, p. 1281). As a 
consequence, existing projects at the program start and the degree of change need to be considered 
(Vereecke et al., 2003). Thus, we conclude that from a program management perspective the integrative 
nature of programs is well considered and a program is a good means to achieve that integration. 
2.5.11 Time, Scope and Financial Management 
Time- and scope management is rarely considered as a separate CSF in the current ERP literature, and rather 
subsumed under the general term project management. As such, a proper schedule and scope is 
acknowledged (e.g. Markus and Tanis, 2000). The program management literature provides a more explicit 
picture regarding time and scope management, and addresses special techniques to manage time and scope 
adequately at the program level. According to the PMI (2008), the program management plan includes all 
program and component (project) plans, milestones, deliverables, and dependencies. A program roadmap 
is created early in the program and subject to regular updates and refinements. Lastly, a program transition 




defined and is particular important in programs due to the increased complexity. Scope changes must be 
approved by a change control board (PMI, 2008). 
The Cabinet Office (2011) stresses regular health checks throughout the program which includes, amongst 
other issues, time, scope and costs. Regular updates and the iterations of the blueprint and business case 
are emphasized as the consequence of being a learning organization (Cabinet Office, 2011). Seidel (2009) 
emphasizes securing of appropriate funds (funding model) as a CSFs to be considered at the program level.  
Scope, budget and a change control budget are considered in the accounts of Ribbers and Schoo (2002) and 
Lycett et al. (2004). The latter account emphasizes the need of a dynamic and flexible view of the program 
life cycle, confirming the views of standard works (Cabinet Office, 2001; PMI, 2008). As a consequence, we 
assume that the appropriate consideration of time, scope and funding is in a program environment even 
more important than in a traditional project environment, due to the more complex nature of programs. 
2.5.12 Definition of a Program Methodology 
For ERP programs the selection and execution of a company-specific methodology, and the consistent 
application through design, deployment and localization is emphasized by Seidel (2009). For SAP 
implementations the ASAP-methodology for implementation (Accelerated SAP); consisting of Phase (1)-
Project Preparation, Phase (2)-Blueprint, Phase (3)-Realization, Phase (4)-Final Preparation, Phase (5)-GoLive 
Support, Phase (6)-Operate; is very popular and applied frequently (SAP AG, 2016; Sullivan 2014). Apart from 
that product-specific methodology, program management (PMI, 2008) and project management (PMI, 
2013a) guidelines published by the Program Management Institute are very popular, as well as the 
guidelines from the Cabinet Office for program management (Cabinet Office, 2011).  
According to Sullivan (2014), the ASAP-methodology fits both program management guidelines. Due to the 
alignment with project- and program management guidelines, what is also recognized by the SAP AG (2016), 
the applicability of ASAP is widespread. Thus, we can easily map the ASAP phases (italic) to other approaches 
as depicted in Table 2-6. This is a further indication that ASAP can complement (or perhaps replace in some 
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Table 2-6 ASAP Phases (Italic) Mapped to Other Approaches 
 
Table 2-7 provides an overview per phase. Regardless which methodology is used, it will contain many (if 
not all) of these deliverables. It is obvious from Table 2-7 that even when the methodology might be adapted 
to meet company-specific purposes, the deliverables per phase are massive. These deliverables per phase 
have to be delivered according to the predefined schedule, and quality gates have to be passed in order to 
proceed to the next phase (Sullivan, 2014).  These quality gates are formal reviews and provide the sponsors 
with targeted understanding of the program performance. This has the advantage that any significant issues 
are captured early in the life cycle. When the sponsors decide to move to the next phase they admit to 
understanding the risks well (Sullivan, 2014).  Thus, a company-specific method (regardless if ASAP is used 
complementary, exclusively, or not at all) should be applied continuously and rigidly to contribute to a 
successful program. Consequently, the associated risks are also mitigated. 
ASAP – Phase Deliverables 
Project Preparation Creating a project charter, defining and staffing of the project team, installing sandbox-
systems, identifying risks and critical success factors, setting initial milestones, blueprint 
plan, conducting project team training, planning of the project infrastructure, holding 
kick-off meeting 
Business Blueprint Conducting design workshops, defining system requirements, identifying custom 
objects and preparing gap documents, completing design documentation, holding 





Realization Building final configuration, defining custom object functional and technical 
specifications, designing and coding of custom objects and testing them afterwards, 
assigning security authorizations and roles, planning and conducting system testing, 
developing user training materials, conducting data- reviews and loads, installing 
quality and production systems 
Final preparation Developing the cutover-plan, conducting dry-runs, managing production data load and 
verification, building the production environment, assigning final end use roles 
mapping, Issuing User-IDs, promotion of configuration and development to the 
production system, conducting end-user training, preparing super users for support 
roles, creating the hypercare-plan, approval for go-live 
Go Live & Support Tracking service level performance, monitoring incidents, assessing business ramp-up 
status, transferring support responsibility to operations ream, conducting hypercare-
close review, shifting the team to new assignments 
Table 2-7 ASAP-Methodology. Phases and its Deliverables (Sullivan, 2014) 
The ASAP methodology can be used for implementation, enhancements or upgrade of SAP solutions and 
supports cost effective and speedy implementation of the SAP solutions, in different environments. It 
provides a proven, comprehensive, repeatable and rich implementation methodology to streamline projects 
and programs and helps to achieve lower total costs of implementation. ASAP supports project and program 
teams with templates, tools, questionnaires, and checklists, including guidebooks and accelerators (SAP AG, 
2016). Some further benefits are listed in Table 2-8. 
ASAP can not only be used for the SAP ERP package but covers the entire solution portfolio of the SAP AG. 
As such, it is suitable for projects and programs likewise. The roadmap is structured into logical work streams 
and can support multisite projects (SAP AG, 2016). 
Markus and Tanis (2000) stress the importance of a company linking its plans to its starting conditions and 
goals as there is no single methodology which guarantees success. This company-specific plans need a good 
execution (Markus and Tanis, 2000; Seidel 2009). While there is agreement that no general method is 
appropriate in all settings, ASAP is one of the group of SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle) 
methodologies and has a similar purpose to comparable frameworks from system integrators like Accenture 
or IBM (Sullivan, 2014). As such, SDLC methodologies can help to make a program successful, but particularly 
for programs the methodology should be tailored to meet the company´s requirements. Thus, 




Benefits of ASAP (Accelerated SAP) 
 Transparent proven approach using the experiences of other successful projects and programs 
 Leverages the experience of the software vendor in implementation of its solutions 
 Extends across all aspects of the solution life cycle, including strategic reviews and analysis, 
design, implementation, training and post project support 
  Scalable method that can be tailored to the implementation requirements 
  Supports different implementation types (e.g. single-site, multisite, template rollout) 
 ASAP has been developed over many years (current version ASAP 8) to deliver cost-effective and 
successful implementations 
Table 2-8 Benefits of ASAP (SAP AG, 2016) 
2.5.13 Proper Use of Consultants 
For an ERP implementation it is important to find the consultants with proper functional, technical and 
interpersonal skills (Bingi et al., 1999; Somers and Nelson, 2004; Zhang et al., 2005), and keeping them 
throughout the implementation (Bingi et al., 1999) or even the complete life cycle. Furthermore, it is of 
major importance how the consultants of external companies are managed (Bingi et al., 1999; Somers and 
Nelson, 2004). Consultants can help to overcome insufficient internal expertise, and a good mix of 
consultants (Parr and Shanks, 2000; Robey et al., 2002; Sumner, 2000) and internal staff enables the internal 
to grow (Sumner, 2000).  
Choosing the right consultancy is a decision of major importance, and is also reflected in associated costs. 
The respondents of the 2015 ERP report reported that 61-75 percent of their project budget was used for 
consulting fees (Panorama Consulting Solutions, 2015). This depends on the industry the implementing 
company is doing business in, as well as on the size of the implementation and whether it is global or local. 
A new integrator also needs successful on-boarding, including history and rationale for the project (Sullivan, 
2014).  
Somers and Nelson (2004) provide empirical support that consultants are particularly important in the early 
stages of the life cycle but unexpectedly again during the infusion stage. When the consultants leave the 
implementing company it is important that the support organization has the capability to solve incidents. 
This knowledge transfer of the project team is referred to as transition, is usually done in the hypercare 
phase in the months after go-live and ends with the transfer of responsibility for resolving incidents to the 




major determinant for a successful implementation, and the relationship with the consultants, as well as 
with external consultancies is very important throughout the life cycle.  
2.5.14 Ensuring of Data Migration Accuracy & Management 
A major topic in every company implementing and using an ERP system is the appropriate handling of data. 
To ensure that the new business processes use correct data deliverables during all phases of the life cycle 
are necessary. This starts with a data migration strategy (Markus and Tanis, 2000). The data migration 
strategy includes decisions about which data will be migrated in which granularity. The data needs to be 
incorporated from legacy systems, warranting mapping rules, data conversion, and data cleansing according 
to the new system’s needs (Markus and Tanis, 2000, Sullivan, 2014). This is usually done during iterations 
and repeating data loads during the implementation phase (Sullivan, 2014). After the production data load, 
the data is verified (Somers and Nelson, 2004; Sullivan 2014) and data input errors might be corrected 
(Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
Somers and Nelson (2004) emphasize the high importance of data analysis and conversion during the early 
stages of the system life cycle, and its moderate importance during the operations phase. This might be 
caused because they only focus on the implementation and verification of data, and not on its actual usage 
(Somers and Nelson, 2004).  Umble et al. (2003) stress the correct training of employees and the necessity 
that data is entered accurately due to the integrated nature of an ERP system. Data integrity and information 
quality is also emphasized by Zhang et al. (2005). Some companies have their own data governance rules 
particularly for master data to ensure the accuracy of data. As a consequence, master data objects are 
governed by data owners (Sullivan, 2014). At the program level, Seidel (2009) emphasizes data conversion 
and master data as part of the common CSF “technical aspects”; that is, the consideration across sites.  To 
sum up, when all aspects of data (strategy, migration, accuracy, governance) are considered its appropriate 
consideration is highly important during all phases of the ERP system life cycle, and should be considered 
across sites at the program level. 
2.5.15 Readiness of Organizational Culture 
An ERP implementation impacts the way business is done in organizations according to the best practice 
processes encapsulated in the ERP package, and thus affects organizational cultures. Krumbholz and Maiden 
(2001) examine the influence of national and organizational cultures on the success of ERP implementations. 
They find some support that cultural differences impact the success of an ERP implementation, as well as 




ERP package reflect to a certain extent the ERP vendor’s country culture. In the same way, Zhang et al. (2005) 
investigate possible implementation problems attributed to culture in China and propose some CSFs in 
different stages to overcome resistance. Open organizational cultures, with a strong corporate identity and 
shared values and beliefs are more likely to succeed in ERP implementations. Thus, corporate 
communication, training, education and support should be encouraged to leverage organizational cultures 
(Nah et al., 2001). 
Krumbholz and Maiden (2001) emphasize the role of national cultures, impacting organizational cultures in 
multinational companies and thus leading to implementation problems. Language problems and even the 
log-on language can lead to problems in multinational organizations, and local training resources should be 
used (Gulla and Mollan, 1999). The readiness of organizational business cultures, the consideration of 
intercultural aspects and a suitable business model of a site are amongst the site-specific success factors for 
the ERP program (Seidel, 2009). In many accounts, culture (Umble et al., 2003) and resistance (e.g. Somers 
and Nelson, 2004) are emphasized under the CSF “change management”, and play an important role 
throughout the life cycle. The category could be effectively considered a subcategory of change 
management, given the number of citations that dealt specifically with the issue of cultural change, it was 
decided to consider it as a separate CSF in the account of Finney and Corbett (2007). It seems that 
organizational and national cultures are critical for an ERP implementation. Furthermore, we assume that 
this factor will be even more important in a program where multiple cultures and sites are more likely to 
subject to the implementation than in traditional project setups. 
2.5.16 Realization of Benefits 
For the success of an ERP program, and to ensure a return on investments, the performance evaluation and 
measurement is essential. This requires a holistic perspective which comprises financial aspects, technical 
aspects and synergy through integration (Al Mashari et al., 2003). The CSF realization of benefits corresponds 
to the CSF establish a vision and business case which is eminent in earlier stages, as the intended goals are 
quantitatively and qualitatively evaluated and the company and employees are continuously encouraged to 
use and improve the system (Umble et al., 2003). Reviewing planned versus actual benefits are also strongly 
emphasized in the program management literature, as well as ongoing business support, and securing 
effective operations and further change initiatives (PMI, 2008; Cabinet Office, 2011). Although supporting 
documents, e.g. benefits realization plan (PMI, 2008), benefits registers (Cabinet Office, 2011) are prepared 




Furthermore, not only expected benefits might be realized but also unexpected benefits should be realized 
and valued (Cabinet Office, 2011; Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
 Success in the Context of ERP Implementations and Programs 
One of the most enduring topics in IS research is related to information system success and the search for 
the dependent variable (Markus et al. 2000b). Significant research effort has been undertaken in relation to 
IS systems in general (e.g. Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; DeLone and McLean, 1992; DeLone and McLean, 
2003) and in relation specifically to ERP systems (e.g. Markus et al. 2000b; Al Mashari et al. 2003; Bernroider, 
2008).  All of these accounts consider the importance of stakeholder views as a measure for information 
systems success. The views are complemented by traditional measures as time and cost (e.g. Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim, 1987; Markus et al., 2000b).  In the same direction, for ERP programs, Seidel (2009) 
differentiates between project success (time and costs) and program objectives (directly or indirectly 
quantifiable). Similarly, Ribbers and Schoo (2002) differentiate between successful programs on the 
dimensions of project success (implementation process; that is, time and costs) and product success 
(results). 
A further important point is the question when the success is to be evaluated, as the entire scope of success 
will only materialize at later stages during use (Bernroider, 2008; Uwizeyemungu and Raymond, 2010). 
Moreover, how do business benefits evolve during the post-implementation period (Poston and Grabski, 
2001; Staehr et al., 2012)? Markus et al. (2000b) emphasize that an early success can turn into a failure, thus 
proposing the need of measuring success at different stages (Markus et al, 2000b; Velcu, 2010).  The 
importance of a dynamic view is also emphasized by Lyytinen and Newman (2015), and previous research 
focused on static antecedents for success in the form of critical success factors (CSFs). In our research, we 
considered the dynamics of critical success factors and took into consideration the dynamic and phase 
specific nature of critical success factors in our literature review. For example, we considered a CSF, which 
is typically of importance after go-live, such is the “realization of benefits”. 
For our research, we mainly followed the same method as Lyytinen and Newman (2015), who take the 
stakeholder view as a measure of success in relation to an ERP implementation. As a consequence, we asked 
all interview partners (consisting of different stakeholder groups) about their perceived success of the 
program. Similarly, Uwizeyemungu and Raymond (2010) use the perspective to what extent organizational 




During data collection, we considered the time perspective, in asking for details of successful outcomes in 
different phases. When possible, we complemented the perceived success with performance indicators, 
such as meeting the business case targets, number of incidents, ease of adopting new releases. Metrics, 
which are partially suggested by Markus et al. (2000b) for different phases, and consistent with the 
approaches used specifically for ERP programs (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Seidel, 2009).  
This view is also consistent with program management literature, as empirically exemplified by Shao and 
Müller (2011). Business results and stakeholder satisfaction are the most mentioned program success 
criteria in their study (Shao and Müller, 2011) and are deductively tested as having significant impacts in a 
further study (Shao et al., 2012). A similar view on stakeholder satisfaction in program management research 
is taken by Thiry (2001; 2002). Meeting the stakeholders´ needs and expectations and a shared 
understanding about anticipated benefits (sensemaking) is necessary to meet the business objectives (Thiry, 
2001; 2002). Thus, the stakeholders´ views are directly related to the strategic business objectives of a 
program, and we conclude that they are appropriate means to measure the success of a program in 
conjunction with relevant metrics. Thus, we define in the ERP program context: 
Success in the ERP program context is how success is perceived by relevant stakeholders in conjunction 
with relevant metrics for the specific case. 
 Summary 
In this section we presented the theoretical background guiding our research. We started with 
characteristics of ERP systems, followed by the typical challenges of large scale ERP implementation and the 
dynamic nature of ERP systems. Then we elaborated on programs, highlighted what we know about ERP 
programs and possible benefits. Next, we discussed previous research on CSFs and the resulting seed 
concepts. Finally, we defined our understanding of success relevant for this study. In the next chapter, we 





3 Research Method 
In the next chapter we present our research method. First, we elaborate on our interpretive philosophical 
stance. Second, we present our research approach, which is based on the grounded theory method (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998) and we highlight some main elements of this method. Next, we present how we assure 
quality and increase the plausibility of the story (Myers, 2009). Then, we elaborate the criteria for how we 
selected our cases, before we highlight the preparation of the data collection and the collection itself. Then, 
we present our coding procedure which follows an adapted grounded theory approach (Sarker et al., 2001) 
of the “Straussian” grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Finally, we summarize this chapter. 
  Philosophical Stance  
The famous theoretical physicist, well known for his seminal work in the area of quantum physics, John 
Archibald Wheeler asserts “it is a participatory universe” (1990, p. 311), which basically means that the 
observer-participant generates information.  In interpreting Wheeler´s work Davies states “an observation 
involves the acquisition and recording of information. On the other hand, an observer, at least of the living 
variety, is an information processing and replicating system. In both cases it is not information per se that is 
crucial, but semantic information” (Barrow et al., 2004, p. 22).  To put it in Wheeler's words regarding the 
meaning circuit “the communicators and the communications between them generate meaning” (Wheeler, 
1986, p. 25).  Although this view is taken in the tradition of quantum physics, the necessity to interpret 
information is also very much evident for social phenomena and IS. The interpretive process of generating 
meaning is described in the seminal work “Truth and Method” of Gadamer (1975; 1994). Interpreting and 
generating meaning is an approximative process, during which fore-conceptions based on expectations are 
replaced by more suitable ones (hermeneutic circle). Thus, the meaning is generated after several revisions 
in which the unity of meaning becomes clearer (Gadamer, 1994).  
In the context of interpretive fieldwork in IS, the hermeneutic circle is fundamental for Klein and Myers 
(1999), who describe the potential of interpretative research “to produce deep insights into information 
systems phenomena, including the management of information systems and information systems 
development” (Klein and Myers, 1999, p. 67). As a consequence, the author of this thesis generates meaning 
in taking an interpretative philosophical stance, which is deemed as appropriate in this research context. 
An interpretive philosophical stance is particularly useful for our purposes as it best captures complex, 
dynamic, context- and time-dependent social phenomena (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) and to access the 




and Duchon, 1988; Klein and Myers, 1999). This well-accepted approach is not new and was used for IS 
implementations and framework generations in the past. Orlikowski (1993) presents a theoretical 
framework of the implementation of CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering) tools, which is developed 
through an interpretive grounded theory approach. She emphasizes the importance of the social context, 
the intentions and actions of key players and the implementation process. In a recent interpretive case study 
from Berente and Yoo (2012), a similar approach was taken where they identify four generalizable forms of 
loose couplings grounded in data of a single ERP implementation. Yet, the validity of a theory in a different 
setting would remain an open question (Lee and Baskerville, 2003). The author of this thesis generally does 
not want to generate universal laws or ensure quality in terms of validity and reliability as proposed by 
positivist researchers (Benbasat et al., 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Paré, 2004; Yin, 2003) - or using rigid positivist 
case study approaches as exemplified in Lee (1989). The author rather wants to inform other settings 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) and secure quality in terms of plausibility of the story and the argument 
(Myers, 2009).  
Although we propose an interpretive philosophical stance for our study, we do not necessarily believe that 
interpretivism and positivism are in contradiction. We subscribe to the weak view of constructionism, 
according to which “interpretive research is understood to complement positivist research, that is, by 
generating hypotheses for further investigation, and by filling in knowledge gaps that positivist research 
cannot attend to, such as the contextual exigencies, the meaning systems, and the interaction of various 
components of a system” (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991, p. 15). According to the strong constructionist view, 
the second primary variant of interpretivism, it does not make sense to accommodate positivistic beliefs 
with an interpretive perspective. Interpretive research is thought to replace positivist research (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi, 1991). Researchers cannot merely describe the actors´ views, since they are relying on their 
propositions and with their personal world views they construct the form and the nature of the phenomenon 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). The author primarily chooses the interpretive approach since this stance is 
appropriate for the purposes of this research and to answer the research questions. Certainly, also positivist 
research can and should build on the results in the future, as well as mixed methods which employ elements 




Grounded theory is independent from the underlying philosophical assumptions and has been variously 
described and applied in interpretive, positivist and critical7 studies (Urquhart et al., 2010).  Grounded theory 
belongs to the realm of qualitative empiricism (Urquhart et al., 2010) and is a qualitative research method 
for data gathering and data analyzing (Myers, 1997). The accounts of Berente and Yoo (2012), Boudreau and 
Robey (2005) and Orlikowski (1993) are three typical examples, where the grounded theory was applied in 
studies with underlying interpretive philosophical assumptions. Myers (1997, p. 9) emphasizes that the 
grounded theory “method is extremely useful in developing context-based, process-oriented descriptions 
and explanations of the phenomenon.” Therefore, we conclude that our stance is well accepted for the 
intentions of our research, and the application of the grounded theory method is particularly useful for 
answering our research questions. 
  Grounded Theory Method  
Grounded theory approaches are increasingly used in IS research (Myers, 1997), for theory generation, 
mixed-methods approaches and data analysis (Matavire and Brown, 2013). One of its key advantages - and 
challenges - is that it is applicable to research domains that are new or emergent and may yet lack 
substantive theory (Recker, 2013). The grounded theory method (GTM) was introduced by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) in their book “The Discovery of Grounded Theory", with the goal to systematically derive 
theories of human behavior from empirical data (Urquhart et al, 2010; Urquhart, 2012).  One of the inventors 
of the original grounded theory method, Strauss, together with Corbin (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 1998), 
introduced a coding technique, named the “paradigm”, which explicitly differentiates between conditions, 
actions/interactions and consequences. The paradigm was often seen as too rigid (Seidel and Urquhart, 
2013) and in their later works, it is no longer seen as mandatory by the inventors themselves (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). 
The debate about the paradigm triggered a split between the founders of grounded theory Glaser and 
Strauss (Seidel and Urquhart, 2013), and led to different strands of grounded theory. The “classical “and the 
“evolved” approaches are distinguished. They are also often referred to as the “Glaserian” and the 
“Straussian” approach (Urquhart et al, 2010; Matavire and Brown, 2013), after the founders of the original 
method.  The coding stages in the “Glaserian approach” are open coding – selective coding – theoretical 
coding, whereas the “Straussian” approach employs open coding – axial coding – selective coding (Urquhart 
                                                          
7 We do not discuss critical research in this dissertation. For further reading we suggest Myers and Klein (2011). According to them, 
“critical research in information systems is concerned with social issues such as freedom, power, social control, and values with 




et al, 2010). Charmaz (2003; 2006) developed a further prominent approach (Flick, 2009). A good overview 
of the grounded theory method can be found in the account of Flick (2009) and in more detail in Urquhart 
(2012). 
In this research a variant of the “Straussian” approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) is employed, which is 
arguably the most influential strand of the grounded theory method and mostly used in the IS discipline 
(Seidel and Urquhart, 2013; Urquhart, 2010). We use primarily integrative memos, as proposed by Sarker et 
al. (2001), instead of the paradigm, or, as Seidel and Urquhart (2013) put it, a more flexible use of axial 
coding. This was an important decision, as axial coding refers to the process of defining the relationships 
between the concepts, which is critical for theory generation (Urquhart, 2001). Furthermore, we feel more 
familiar with the “Straussian” approach, as it is more flexible in the use of a priori theory and the role of an 
initial literature review in the substantive area of study (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Matavire and Brown, 
2013), and therefore consistent with the research approach which derived and conceptualized seed 
concepts from existing literature. The compatibility of doing a literature review in combination with the 
grounded theory method is also stressed by Urquhart (2012). 
In the account of Sarker et al. (2001), “Using an Adapted Grounded Theory Approach for Inductive Approach 
for Inductive Theory Building”, two different research approaches to studying new organizational forms (in 
their case virtual teams) are distinguished. First, a deductive approach that is tested in the new context (in 
our case the ERP program) “of existing theories on related aspects of traditional organizational form 
synthesized with the researcher´s intuitive understanding of the new forms or what is known from 
exploratory studies regarding these new forms”. Second, the inductive approach, “developing a theoretical 
understanding of the new forms that is grounded in the experiences of human subjects who are/have been 
members of such forms” (Sarker et al., 2001, p.38). They emphasize that the second approach is more useful 
when the new organizational forms are novel, as this is the case for ERP programs. Following the essence of 
the grounded theory method, which is building “theory that was derived from the data, systematically 
gathered and analyzed through the research process” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 12), we took the latter 
inductive approach for researching ERP programs, and used the grounded theory approach in a similar way 
as Sarker et al. (2001) exemplified in their paper for virtual teams. In their account, they also stress that an 
inductive approach should not ignore existing literature and the personal experiences of the researchers 
(Sarker et al. 2001), but the researchers need to constantly conduct self-examination regarding assumptions, 




Boudreau and Robey (2005) conduct an interpretive case study of an ERP system after its implementation. 
They explicitly mention the potential to use prior literature, theory, personal and professional experiences 
to guide the data analysis. As they progressed with the analysis they consulted different concepts to provide 
insight in the empirical observations. Boudreau and Robey (2005) did not specify a priori theory, as done 
within an interpretive case study about the introduction of electronic trading in the London insurance 
market (Barrett and Walsham, 1999). They use concepts of Giddens social transformation theory and follow 
an approach similar to a “Straussian” adaptation of grounded theory (Boudreau and Robey, 2005).  
Different grounded theory approaches are employed in IS research, often following the “Straussian” or the 
“Glaserian” variant of the grounded theory method. Nevertheless, which approach is used mainly depends 
on the purpose of the intended research, and although they have their differing points, e.g. in terms of when 
and how literature is to be used, the different approaches share certain commonalities.  
In the following, we want to present some main elements of the grounded theory method, which we 
deemed important for our research. For structuring those elements, we use the guidelines for conducting 
grounded theory studies in information systems of Urquhart et al. (2010), an account which bears many 
general recommendations and basic principles inherent to the original variant (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), 
and consider also the subtleties of the more specific approach (Sarker et al., 2001) which we finally 
employed.  Whereas the first three guidelines deal with the degree of conceptualization necessary for good 
theory building, the final two guidelines compare the outcome of the first three guidelines with existing 
theories with the aim of theoretical integration (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
Figure 3-1 represents how we achieve our final target of theoretical integration. First, we increase the degree 
of conceptualization through applying the three coding steps (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Sarker et al., 2001) 
of the “Straussian” approach (open coding, axial coding, selective coding). Second, we raise the theory 
scope, and the generalizability, by comparing it to other (substantive and broader) theories in the field, thus 






Figure 3-1 A Framework for Analyzing Grounded Theory Studies (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.1 Constant Comparison  
Continuous comparison is arguably the most important guideline and the heart of grounded theory. This 
enlightening rule of thumb assists the researcher to understand the process of analysis (Urquhart, 2001), 
and enables rigorous scrutiny (Urquhart et al., 2010). “Constant comparison is the process of constantly 
comparing instances of data that you have labelled as a particular category with other instances of data, to 
see if these categories fit and are workable” (Urquhart, 2001, p.  7). Depending on the phenomena 
investigated the researcher decides if coding at the word and sentence (low-level) is appropriate. The 
insights of low-level must not be underestimated, and as such the grounded theory methods provides a 
chain of evidence superior to other approaches, and every category has dozens of instances (Urquhart et al., 




3.2.2 Iterative Conceptualization 
This guideline refers to the relationships between the categories and the iterative fashion of building theory 
(Urquhart et al., 2010). It is the stage where the paradigm (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) comes into play. The 
application of the paradigm was often seen as difficult (Urquhart, 2001), emphasizing that the process of 
theory building is essentially creative, and cannot be achieved following rigid procedures alone. Through 
iterative conceptualization in relating the categories to each other the level of abstraction is increased, codes 
become inferential and explanatory, and the theory gains depth, explaining “what” and “why” (Urquhart et 
al., 2010). In our research this process is accompanied by using integrative memos (Sarker et al., 2001). The 
role of (theoretical) memos is also stressed by Urquhart et al. (2010).  It is not of major importance which 
coding stages are used and that procedures are mechanistically applied, the key thing that all these stages 
are followed, intuitively and iteratively, to allow adequate conceptualizations as basis of the grounded 
theory (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
3.2.3 Theoretical Sampling 
Theoretical sampling means that the data gathering is driven by existing concepts, to go to places, people or 
events to discover variation of the concepts, and to densify categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), or, as 
Urquhart et al. (2010) put it, more from the same until saturation is achieved. This principle is strongly 
intertwined with “constant comparison” with additional data (Urquhart, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), 
achieving a theory that is well-grounded in data (Urquhart et al, 2010). The sampling of data should not only 
be limited to a specific research with a cohesive theoretical construct, therefore increasing the “fit” of a 
theory by keeping it up-to-date with changing circumstances and extending its scope over the theory´s 
substantive limits (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
Sampling, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998), starts at the beginning of the research project when a site 
is chosen. Furthermore, a decision for which types of data to be used must be made, how long an area should 
be studied and finally how many sites should be observed and how many interviews should be conducted. 
To avoid endlessness of theoretical sampling, Flick suggests balancing what was found, and build a list of 
priorities. In his view, the criterion of theoretical sampling leaves it up to the researcher and the theory 
selected to make decisions about selection and ending (Flick, 2009). These considerations depend mainly on 
the research goals and the available resources, but might be subject to modification. Sampling is directed by 
logic and aim, and the sensitivity the researcher develops to the emerging concepts. Usually this sensitivity 




refers to returning to the data themselves, and the reorganization, according to theoretically relevant 
concepts, until all categories are saturated (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Thus, theoretical sampling 
accompanies the research project from the beginning to the end, but leaves it up to the researcher to decide 
when saturation is reached. 
3.2.4 Scaling Up 
Scaling up relates to the process of grouping higher-level categories into broader themes, which are then 
related to competing theories. As such, scaling up contributes to the generalizability of the theory (Urquhart 
et al., 2010). The integration of concepts is achieved through relating the main concepts to the core category 
and saturate poorly developed categories by theoretical sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The resulting 
theoretical scheme could contain explanatory statements, relationships (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) as well 
as propositions (Urquhart et al., 2010). It is important that the resulting abstraction fits the raw data. This 
could either be achieved by comparing the resulting theoretical scheme with the raw data or present it to 
the interviewees and see if they perceive the scheme reasonable and find themselves in the story being told 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The definition of the core category is used to scale up the substantive theory 
(Urquhart et al., 2010), and represents the central idea (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), how the story is being 
told.  
3.2.5 Theoretical Integration 
The grounded theory needs to be put into relation and the context of other existing theories (Urquhart et 
al., 2010). According to Strauss and Corbin (1998) integration is the process of moving from description to 
conceptualization. That is, identifying the central idea, the definition of the core category and integration of 
the concepts. The definition of the core category and developing the storyline is sometimes difficult, and 
researchers might turn to the literature “to look for a unifying concept that might fit their data” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 155). Urquhart et al. (2010) stress the role of meta-theories as useful guides for integration 
and viewing the emergent theory through a certain lens, like actor-network theory or structuration theory. 
Likewise, Sarker et al. (2001) use a meta-theory for selecting the core category, creating the storyline, and 
integrating their grounded theory. In our research, we deemed the use of meta-theories for these reasons 
as particularly useful.  
 In this section we elaborated on the grounded theory method. We highlighted different approaches, the 
“Straussian” approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) on top, and provided a clear rationale (Seidel and 




for how to use the grounded theory method in IS. In the next section, we will have a deeper look into what 
role those guidelines played in relation to quality assurance in interpretive research. 
 Quality Assurance – Principles of Interpretive Research (Klein and Myers, 1999) 
Applied to the Grounded Theory Method 
Interpretive research does not use the traditional quality criteria as we know from positivism. Whereas 
proponents of positivist case study research suggest ensuring quality in terms of validity and reliability 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Paré, 2004; Yin, 2003), these criteria are not appropriate for interpretive research (Klein 
and Myers, 1999). Interpretive case studies define quality in terms of plausibility of the story and the 
argument (Myers, 2009). Different leading interpretive researchers, such as Klein and Myers (1999) and 
Walsham (1995; 2006) provide guidelines for how to conduct fieldwork in interpretive research. We 
conclude that a consistent, shared view, how to conduct interpretive research - in particular, interpretive 
case studies - exists, and we tried to adhere to these standards. For example, in the ERP context the 
principles of Klein and Myers were applied in the accounts of van Fenema et al. (2007) or Silver and Fulk 
(2012). 
In particular, we adhered to the principles of Klein and Myers (1999), who suggest seven principles to 
conduct interpretive research of hermeneutic nature.  According to them, the application of the principles 
requires considerable creative thought, and their use is not mandatory: It depends on the research project 
and the judgement and discretion of the research whether, how, and which of the principles should be 
applied. In our research the principles of Klein and Myers (1999) played a major role and we want to show 
how they were applied in our research using the grounded theory method, and how they correspond with 
the grounded theory guidelines (e.g. Sarker et al., 2001; Urquhart et al., 2010). 
3.3.1 The Fundamental Principle of the Hermeneutic Circle 
Expanding on the philosophical tradition of Hermeneutics; (Gadamer, 1975; 1976a; 1976b) Klein and Myers 
(1999) define this principle as the meta-principle for interpretive work of hermeneutic nature, upon which 
the other six principles build.  “The idea of the hermeneutic circle suggests that we come to understand a 
complex whole from preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their interrelationships” (Klein and 
Myers, 1999, p. 71). The parts can be the historical context applying the principle of contextualization and 
alternatively, the interactions between the interpretive researchers and the participants, and their 
preliminary understanding of each other and the parts, applying the principle of interaction between the 




can be applied iteratively, forming a complex web of interpretations, and a shared understanding of the 
whole emerges (Klein and Myers, 1999).   
In our research the concepts emerged from data and there is a continuous interplay between data collection 
and analysis, referred to as constant comparison (Urquhart et al., 2010). That means that all codes and 
concepts resulting from the initial coding steps had a preliminary nature, and were continuously compared 
with new data, new insights stemming from existing theories and literature. We sampled events and 
incidents and looked for variation within the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In our research this does not 
mean that we necessarily had to add new cases to our sample, but we searched in the interview transcripts, 
and other data for variations, constantly changing and refining the initial codes and concept. This procedure 
continues until no more instances of the same concept were found in the data and no new concepts emerged 
- that is, they are saturated, referred to as theoretical sampling (Urquhart et al., 2010). In later steps of the 
coding process, hierarchical network views of the main categories were built, integrative memos were 
written to interpret the data through integrating as many concepts as possible into a memo (Sarker et al., 
2001) and to relate the concepts iteratively (Urquhart et al., 2010). For our research, that means that we 
constantly jumped between the grounded theory coding steps open, axial and selective coding. We refined 
them until a complex and plausible whole emerged, and the storyline was created (Sarker et al., 2001; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As a consequence, we conclude that we met the targets of the fundamental 
principle of the hermeneutic circle. 
3.3.2 The Principle of Contextualization 
This principle requires that the researchers highlight the historical and social context in which the subject 
matter is embedded, particularly for the target audience, to understand how the researched situation 
emerged. In contrast to positivist researchers, interpretivists argue observable organizational patterns are 
constantly changing (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Klein and Myers, 1999). The relationships between 
people, organizations and technology are not static and interpretive research seeks to understand a moving 
target. Thus, each research situation is a unique historical occurrence and therefore ideographic, which does 
not mean that interpretive research cannot generalize (Klein and Myers, 1999), as Lee and Baskerville (2003) 
exemplified. The research is not only influenced by the historical context, but becomes part of the 
organization’s future, and people are not only products, but producers of history (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
Although the paradigm of Strauss and Corbin (1998) considers conditions for the consideration of context, 




approach are defined as “sets of events or happenings that create the situations, issues, and problems 
pertaining to a phenomenon and, to a certain extent, explain why and how persons or groups respond in 
certain ways. Conditions might arise out of time, place culture, rules, regulations, beliefs, economics, or 
gender factors as well as the social worlds, organizations and institutions in which we find ourselves along 
with our personal motivations and biographies” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 130). We did not apply the 
paradigm of Strauss and Corbin, but employed the adapted grounded theory version of Sarker et al. (2001), 
where the components of the paradigm (including conditions) are considered in integrative memos. 
However, the consideration of the context was rather a result of our interpretive philosophical stance, and 
not a consequence of applying a specific method. Moreover, we did not find any grounded theory specific 
guideline in the IS field which met these targets. Urquhart et al. (2010) use the terminology “bounded 
context” for concepts resulting from limited, exploratory fieldwork, but also in their account the 
consideration of context is very limited. As a consequence, and under consideration that the grounded 
theory is neither an interpretivist nor a positivist approach, we conclude that the rich description of the 
underlying organizational contexts is mainly determined by the philosophical stance which the researcher(s) 
take. 
3.3.3 The Principle of Interaction Between the Researchers and the Subjects 
The researcher is required to place himself and the subject into a historical perspective. The results of the 
research need to be critically reflected, as they are a socially constructed product of the interaction between 
the researcher and the research participants. Both of them are interpreters and analysts. Participants may 
alter their horizons as a result of the concepts which are used by the researcher and other parties. This effect 
may be lessened when the researcher relies, for example, on secondary data and does not interact with the 
participants, but still the researcher´s preconceptions will affect the construction of data (Klein and Myers, 
1999). 
The influencing role of the interacting researcher is particularly evident in qualitative research when 
interviews are employed, as the researcher inevitably influences the interpretation of the people who are 
being researched (Walsham, 1995). A researcher cannot be removed from the context (Trauth, 1997), and 
even a neutral researcher is biased by way of background, knowledge and prejudices, interpreting things in 
certain ways (Walsham, 2006). Trauth (1997) gives an answer how to address these problems and, although 
her account cannot be particularly attributed to grounded theory literature, which grounded theory 





“I believe the answer is not for the researcher to remain apart from the context but 
rather to embrace it. At the same time, however, the researcher should constantly be 
conducting self-examination with respect to assumptions, biases and motivations 
being used to interpret data; should make use of multiple perspectives and sources of data - and be open as 
to their source. […] Collecting and analyzing the data in this way speaks to the need for an iterative rather 
than a linear approach to the conduct of the research” (Trauth, 1997, p. 238).  As such the “Principle of 
Interaction Between the Researchers and the Subjects” can be addressed through constant comparison and 
iterative conceptualization (Urquhart et al., 2010), together with triangulation to corroborate the findings. 
Consequently, as we employed all of these techniques, we conclude that we considered this principle 
adequately. 
3.3.4 The Principle of Abstraction and Generalization 
Although interpretive research states that the human affairs are not governed by natural laws that are 
culturally independent, there is a philosophical basis for abstraction and generalization. Interpretive 
research is the attempt to relate particular context bounded concepts (principle of contextualization) to 
abstract categories, and relating unique ideas that apply to multiple situations. Those generalizations should 
be carefully related to the field study details, so that readers can follow their theoretical insights.  Theories 
are used as sensitizing device viewing the world in a certain way (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
For meeting this principle, we applied three guidelines. First, we scaled up the codes to rise above the detail, 
considering the big picture (Urquhart et al., 2010). The target of abstraction is also tackled by multiple rounds 
of coding, building higher level categories and relating them to competing theories (Sarker et al., 2001; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Urquhart et al., 2010). Second, we employed integrative memos as proposed by 
Sarker et al. (2001) to integrate concepts and relate concepts to its sub-concepts or, as Urquhart et al. (2010) 
put it, to increase the level of abstraction through iterative conceptualization. Third, theoretical integration 
(Urquhart et al., 2010) we achieved in applying different meta-theories when we chose the core category to 
which the other concepts were related to (Sarker et al., 2001), or like Urquhart et al. (2010) argue putting 
the grounded theory into the context of other theories in the field.  
3.3.5 Principle of Dialogical Reasoning 
The initial preconceptions of the researcher, which guided the research design, need to be confronted with 




manifested in the philosophical assumptions transparent to the readers, and relating the strengths and 
weaknesses to the purpose of the work. In contrast to positivist research which propose a value-free 
position, hermeneutics recognizes prejudices and preconceptions as necessary starting points for our 
understanding. During several applications in the hermeneutic circle and improved understanding one stage 
becomes the prejudice (preconception) for the next iteration (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
As for the fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle, the principle of dialogical reasoning was tackled 
through the continuous interplay between data collection and analysis, referred to as constant comparison 
(Urquhart et al., 2010). Our seed concepts are used as a sensitizing device as a starting point for 
understanding, but at the same time we were cautious that our concepts emerge from the data (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998; Trauth, 1997).     
3.3.6 The Principle of Multiple Interpretations 
This principle requires that the influence of social context (power, economics, values) has on the actions 
under study. This might lead to multiple viewpoints in the stories and different narratives of the same 
sequence of events. The researcher should confront the multiple interpretations of the participants with 
each other and revise his or her preconceptions and understanding accordingly. Even when no 
contradictions are found this leads to “probing beneath the surface” (Klein and Myers, 1999, p. 77). 
Again, constant comparison (Urquhart et al., 2010) plays an important role in meeting the targets of this 
principle. During data collection, and particularly during conducting interviews, we selectively posed 
questions which were related to the viewpoints of previous interviewees or questions which cropped up 
during the document analysis. The social context was considered as much as possible, yet this is sometimes 
hard to attain. Thus, we conclude that we could partially meet the target of this principle as full consideration 
would have been impossible given the means and time available for our research. 
3.3.7 The Principle of Suspicion 
This principle requires the researcher(s) to be sensitive to possible biases and systematic distortions in the 
narratives of the participants, and false preconceptions. This principle seems to be one of the least 
developed in the IS research literature, and would require the researcher “to 'read' the social world behind 
the words of the actors, a social world that is characterized by power structures, vested interests, and limited 
resources to meet the goals of various actors who construct and enact this social world” (Klein and Myers, 




disagreement between its application exists, Klein and Myers (1999) explicitly leave the possibility open of 
not following the principle of suspicion in interpretive works.  
As suggested by Klein and Myers (1999) we did not explicitly follow the principle of suspicion. However, we 
did not have a reason to believe that narratives were distorted and participants biased, and as we employed 
multiple sources (e.g. interviews and documents) of evidence (triangulation) we could increase the 
plausibility of the narratives. Furthermore, the interview guide was regularly adapted so that we could 
deductively test previously analyzed data, following the guideline of constant comparison (Sarker et al., 
2001; Urquhart et al., 2010) suggesting a continuous interplay between data collection and analysis. Lastly, 
for one case, we employed the Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and dealt with different 
stakeholder groups and perceptions, but this was rather a means to analyze the data than to follow the 
principle of suspicion. Nevertheless, we believe that, although not explicitly intended, we could meet the 
targets of this principle to a certain extent. 
 
Principles for Conducting Interpretive Field Studies in IS 
(Klein and Myers, 1999) 
Grounded Theory Guidelines in IS (e.g. Sarker et al., 
2001; Urquhart et al., 2010) 
1) The Fundamental Principle of the Hermeneutic Circle Constant Comparison & Theoretical Sampling 
& Iterative Conceptualization 
2) The Principle of Contextualization No specific guideline for grounded theory in IS 
(considered through interpretive philosophical stance, 
and rich description) 
3) The Principle of Interaction Between the Researchers 
and the Subjects 
Constant Comparison & 
Iterative Conceptualization 
4) The Principle of Abstraction and Generalization Scaling up & Iterative Conceptualization & 
Theoretical Integration 
5) Principle of Dialogical Reasoning Constant Comparison 
6) The Principle of Multiple Interpretations Constant Comparison 
7) The Principle of Suspicion Constant Comparison & Theoretical Integration 





Table 3-1 summarizes how we adhered to the principles of Klein and Myers (1999) in combination with 
grounded theory guidelines (e.g. Sarker et al., 2001; Urquhart et al., 2010), thus assuring the plausibility and 
quality of our interpretive case studies. 
 Field Access and Sampling 
The field access to appropriate research partners was one of the main challenges of this dissertation project. 
Qualitative researchers usually work with small sample sizes, nested in their context and studied in depth, 
whereas for quantitative researchers the context is not so important and statistical significance is sought 
through large sample sizes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Even though the sample size is small, we had to 
consider that ERP programs are usually only in place within large companies. Furthermore, program 
managers and those in the position to grant researchers the access to study the features of an ERP program 
are usually located at higher organizational levels. In most cases, such people are often unavailable and it is 
hard to gain access to them. Moreover, companies might be reserved towards the research project, since 
ERP programs are of a strategic nature and are therefore often seen as strictly confidential. Further 
reservations might exist towards the expected time investment and the benefits for the company. All the 
possible reservations are understandable, and we tried to address them early in the research project. We 
primarily contacted persons where linkages via personal relations exist to establish initial trust. Walsham 
(2006) describes how to gain and maintain access to the field.  
The cases had to meet predefined criteria (Table 3-2). The criteria should help to identify exploratory cases, 
which tell us something new and serve as vehicles for exploring a new subject area (Myers, 2009).  First (1), 
a case company had to have undergone an ERP implementation consisting of multiple, related projects, 
which were connected via an overarching governance entity. Second (2), through the implementation the 
way the company conducts business must have been impacted; thus, a change in processes was subject to 
the implementation. This could have included an ERP system with all modules, but also an additional module 
or the implementation of an industrial solution. Furthermore, reporting systems (data warehousing) might 
have been involved. Third (3), to investigate the CSFs in all relevant phases of the ERP program only full-life 
cycle implementations were considered. Fourth (4), the implementation must have been conducted recently 
to better access the interpretations of the interviewees.  Fifth (5), only cases were considered as suitable 
where the contact person agreed with the frequent visits of the site over an extended period of time 
(Walsham, 1995), including the opportunities (a) to interview knowledgeable key players (Myers, 2009) in 




important for the ERP program. Only cases where all six criteria were met were deemed as suitable to 
address our research questions. We will portray in detail how our cases met these criteria in the relevant 
chapters. 
No Criteria Definition 
1 Program involved A group of related projects was coordinated through a form of overarching program 
(e.g. PMI, 2008), which clearly demarcated the implementation from a traditional 
project setup with an individual project as subject to the implementation.   
2 Processes affected The way the business conduct was affected. ERP systems are involved at the core 
and additional ES (enterprise systems, e.g. data warehouse) might be involved. ERP 
programs focus on outcome; that is, a change in how the organization operates. 
Contrarily ERP projects focus on outputs; that is, a functioning ERP system (Seidel, 
2009). 
3 Full life cycle The ERP program was subject to a full life cycle implementation, including the 
different phases (e.g. design, implementation, operations) to address the process 
perspective of CSFs and to evaluate them over the program life cycle. In the case of 
a multisite ERP program a significant number of sites needed to be in the operations 
phase. 
4 Time perspective An appropriate case recently executed an ERP program or the case has been in and 
advanced phase of the ERP program life cycle. This prerequisite was relevant to 
better grasp the interpretations of the interviewees about relevant actions and 
events.    
5a Data perspective 
(Interviews) 
It was possible to conduct a sufficient number of interviews (>5) in sufficient detail 
(60-90 minutes), with key informants who know most about the program (Myers, 
2009). Interviews are the primary source of evidence as they allow best to gather 
interpretations of the participants (Walsham, 1995) 
5b Data perspective 
(Documents, informal 
talks) 
As additional data source, a suitable case site needed to provide the opportunity to 
analyze official program documents, or as Walsham (2006) proposes that in an 
interpretive case study the interviews should be supplemented by other forms of 
field data. Apart from internal documents this includes public media, press, and 
informal talks.   
Table 3-2 Criteria to Identify Suitable Cases 
With a lot of effort and the right strategy, it was possible to identify appropriate cases and to convince the 




we offered a form of feedback (Find in Appendix A a letter of invitation and an info paper) in order to give 
something of value back to the participating sites (Walsham, 2006). 
 Preparation and Application of the Interview Guide  
Based on the seed concepts which we synthesized during the literature review and earlier research on ERP 
and program management, we developed our initial interview guide (Find one version of the interview guide 
in Appendix A).  An initial theoretical framework taking into account previous knowledge is useful in the 
early stages of interpretive case studies to create a sensible theoretical basis and to inform the topics and 
approach of the early empirical work (Walsham, 1995). Our approach is therefore in line with interpretivist 
research, but also with the “Straussian” variant of the grounded theory method. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) stress how literature can be used to enhance and not to constrain theory 
development, as well as to increase sensitivity. They emphasize that concepts, if they also appear in the data 
and not only in the literature, might indeed be significant. It is important that these concepts are truly 
emergent and are not only seen in the data because the researchers are so familiar with them. As a next 
step the researchers can compare how the emerging concepts are different from those in the literature 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As a consequence, we included as many seed concepts as possible in our initial 
interview guide, for the purpose of enhancing theory development.  
The interview guide was a helpful instrument when we performed our semi-structured interviews, but was 
never applied mechanically. The questions were posed selectively, particularly in the later stages of the 
fieldwork. If questions are too tightly controlled by the researcher, the data will lose much of the richness 
of interpretation and therefore raw material (Walsham, 1995). Moreover, the interview was subject to 
permanent adaptions depending on the outcome of previous interviews (and document analyses), which is 
referred to as permanent interplay between data collection and analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This 
approach is also useful to enable researchers to step back and examine the interpretations of other 
interviewees in sufficient detail (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Walsham, 1995). Thus, we were able to sharpen 
emerging concepts regardless of whether they were part of the literature review and the seed concepts or 
appeared the first time in the data. 
 Data Collection - Multiple Sources of Evidence 
The primary sources of evidence are interviews, which best allow access to the interpretations of the 




interviews with a special focus on open questions, but also on the context, program design and demographic 
information. We selected the interviewees after consultation with, who was our single point of contact with 
the intention to gain rich insights. Furthermore, the interviewed persons represent different groups within 
the program, and therefore different perspectives. As suggested for interpretive studies, we supplemented 
the interviews with data from other sources (Walsham, 2006). In our research, we used informal talks, public 
media and a magnitude of official program documents as additional sources. Thus, the results are grounded 
in data and built upon multiple sources of evidence (data triangulation).  
 Data Analysis 
As proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), we used the three-step coding procedure, including open coding, 
axial coding and selective coding. The usage of this original three-step coding procedure has been criticized 
for being too rigid, for forcing of data, and for hindering emergence (mainly in combination with their coding 
paradigm). Seidel and Urquhart (2013) showed that while grounded theory is adapted frequently, the usage 
of the scheme can be varied and depends on the studied phenomena and the intent of research (Seidel and 
Urquhart, 2013). One approach to modify the paradigm is well exemplified by Sarker et al. (2001), who 
related categories hierarchically to their subcategories (concepts). Furthermore, they wrote integrative 
memos on each major category, including as many subcategories as possible, to accomplish the goals of axial 
coding. For selective coding, Sarker et al. (2001) used two meta-theories to develop the storyline, and to 
relate the core (central) category to the other categories. 
We also used parts of this adapted approach, which can be seen as being less rigid as the paradigm of Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), but is still based on the basic principles of the “Straussian” grounded theory method. In 
particular, we started with open coding, where we labeled data chunks with open codes, referred to as a 
concept. A concept is a labeled phenomenon; that is, an abstract representation of an event, object, action 
or interaction that a researcher identifies as being significant in the data. When they are similar the 
researchers group them under a common heading or classification; that is, the concept (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Thus, the result of open coding is to reduce the complexity of the data to be investigated, making the 
data more tangible in relation to researched phenomenon. If too many concepts are the result of open 
coding the level of abstraction could be increased by grouping concept into categories, therefore increasing 
the analytic power (with the ability to predict and explain) by looking into what the concepts share in 
common. According to Urquhart (2001) it is not of major importance how chunks of data are labeled, either 




reasonable amount we can work with and reducing complexity, but we did not clearly distinguish between 
the naming of the data chunks and their order. 
The order was instead achieved in step 1 of axial coding, where we grouped the concepts into categories 
and related them hierarchically to their subcategories (that is we created network views reflecting the 
relations). In step 2, of axial coding, integrative memos were written, detailing the relations of step 1, to 
meet the targets of axial coding. This is exactly the coding stage where we clearly deviated from the original 
approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990) and replaced the coding paradigm through integrative memos and 
network views as described in the adapted grounded theory approach. 
Importantly, as already stated, the role of paradigm as a coding device is subsequently weakened and is only 
optional (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Furthermore, in their earlier works they mentioned memos in relation 
to axial coding: “Because the purpose of axial coding is to relate categories and to continue to developing 
them in terms of their properties and dimensions, the memos written during axial coding will reflect this 
purpose. They present answers to the questions what, when, where, with whom, how and with what 
consequences” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 230). Let us recall the role of the paradigm, with its basic 
components conditions (causal/intervening), actions/interactions and consequences, and observe how the 
inventors described it: “In actuality, the paradigm is nothing more than a perspective taken toward data, 
another analytic stance that helps to systematically gather and order data in such a way that structure and 
process are integrated” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 128). When we look at the definitions above we 
conclude that the data can also be integrated with integrative memos and network views, as suggested by 
Sarker et al. (2001) in their adapted version of the grounded theory approach, as they saw the paradigm as 
too mechanistic, constraining and forcing. As a consequence, we followed this specific variant8. 
Third, during selective coding and further iterations in the continuously ongoing data analysis process, we 
chose a meta-theory for interpreting the data and for creating the storyline (Sarker et al., 2001), and to 
interpret the results gained through open and axial coding. In this step we chose a category as our core 
category and related the other categories to it. In order to accomplish this, we did further iterations and 
went back to open and axial coding with a particular consideration on the core category, followed by a new 
round of selective coding. Klein and Myers (1999), in their set of principles of interpretive field studies, name 
this process of iterating and considering the interdependent meaning of the parts and the whole, “the 
                                                          




fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle”. All three steps of the coding process were discussed and 
aligned during several sessions between the authors.   
The computer program ATLAS.ti7 (www.atlasti.com)  was used to assist the data analysis and was also our 
repository for the transcripts and documents. Each case had his own repository, a case database (Yin, 2003), 
an approach which is used in positivist (Yin, 2003) and interpretivist studies (Berente and Yoo, 2012). 
 Summary 
In this chapter we presented our research method. We started with the philosophical stance, followed by 
characteristics of the grounded theory method. Next, we showed how we assured the quality of our 
interpretive case studies. Then we elaborated on the site selection process, the preparation of data 
collection, the actual data collection and its analysis. In the next chapter, we present our first case of an ERP 





4 The Case at A1/TA – The Salient Group IS Success (SGISS)-Model of Different 
Perceptions 
In this section we present our first case study at A1/TA (A1 Telekom Austria). We start with elaborating how 
A1/TA met the predefined criteria relevant to the case selection. Second, we present the research objectives 
of this specific chapter, which is a model to explain the dynamics of CSFs over the entire program life cycle. 
Next, we highlight the data collection. We continue with the data analysis and the coding steps. As SIT (Social 
Identity Theory) played a crucial role in interpreting the data we briefly elaborate on SIT and what we know 
about the interplay of CSFs and perceptions. Then, we present the results of our case on the basis of the 
derived “Salient Group IS Success Model (SGISS) of Different Perceptions”. Finally, we discuss the results, 
suggest how a generalized SGISS-model of different perceptions can be applied, and provide implications for 
research and practice before we close with the conclusion. 
 Case Selection  
According to our predefined criteria, we present in Table 4-1 how the case at A1/TA met these prerequisites. 
Already the initial contact, which was established during a professional event where the program was 
presented, was very promising. The researchers therefore continued to find out more about the program 
and concluded that all the necessary criteria of a suitable case are met.  
No Criteria Definition 
1 Program 
involved 
A group of related projects was coordinated through a form of overarching program (e.g. 
PMI, 2008), which clearly demarcated the implementation from a traditional project setup 
with an individual project as subject to the implementation.   
  The program “ASAP” at A1/TA consisted of five different projects, which were related in 
terms of scope (merger of systems), time (big bang) and strategy.  
2 Processes 
affected 
The way the business conducts was affected. ERP systems are involved at the core and 
additional ES (enterprise systems, e.g. data warehouse) might be involved. ERP programs 
focus on outcome; that is, a change in how the organization operates. Contrarily ERP projects 
focus on outputs; that is, a functioning ERP system (Seidel, 2009). 
  The program was subject to business- and IT strategy. While on the business side either 
processes were harmonized or consolidated, on the IT-side the TCO (Total Cost of 
Ownership) should have been reduced. As such, two ERP systems were merged, as well as 
two reporting systems consisting of a BI and a data warehouse component. To prepare 




established, assessing the change impact, conducting necessary training and providing 
guidance and communication over the life cycle of the program. 
3 Full life cycle The ERP program was subject to a full life cycle implementation, including the different 
phases (e.g. design, implementation, operations) to address the process perspective of CSFs 
and to evaluate them over the program life cycle. In the case of a multisite ERP program a 
significant number of sites needed to be in the operations phase. 
  The program followed the ASAP-methodology for implementation (Accelerated SAP) 
consisting of Phase 1-Project Preparation, Phase 2- Blueprint, Phase 3-Realization, Phase 4-
Final Preparation, Phase 5-GoLive Support, Phase 6-Operate (SAP AG, 2016; Sullivan 2014).  
4 Time 
perspective 
An appropriate case recently executed an ERP program, or the case has been in an advanced 
phase of the ERP program life cycle. This prerequisite was relevant to better grasp the 
interpretations of the interviewees about relevant actions and events.    
  When we started our interviews in July 2013, the program was in the operations phase 
(Phase 6 ASAP-methodology), following the hypercare phase (Phase 5 ASAP-methodology), 
which ended in April 2013. The total duration of the program was from October 2010 to April 




It was possible to conduct a sufficient number of interviews (>5) in sufficient detail (60-90 
minutes), with key informants who know most about the program (Myers, 2009). Interviews 
are the primary source of evidence as they allow best to gather interpretations of the 
participants (Walsham, 1995) 
  We had the opportunity to conduct 12 interviews (average duration 60 minutes) with 11 key 
players, who were identified by our single point of contact the program manager. This led to 





As additional data source, a suitable case site needed to provide the opportunity to analyze 
official program documents, or as Walsham (2006) proposes that in an interpretive case 
study the interviews should be supplemented by other forms of field data. Apart from 
internal documents, this includes public media, press, and informal talks.   
  As documents, we had the opportunity to sight and code: 
- 23 meeting minutes of the periodic program steering meetings, which provided a good 
overview of the progress over the course of the rollouts. 
- Other documents as risk register, program plan, program concepts, kick-off presentation, 





- The comprehensive minutes of the lessons-learned workshop at the program end, which 
reflected the views of various stakeholder groups 
Additionally, we had the opportunity to conduct 8 informal talks where we could discuss our 
findings: 
1 informal interview before the “official data collection phase” with the Head of Corporate 
Process- & Project Management, Head of Project Management Office. Initial contact during 
his program presentation, hosted by the Austrian interest group for Process Management, 
“Gesellschaft für Prozessmanagement”. 
 
4 informal interview were conducted during the “official data collection phase” ending with 
the last “formal” interview 1 BPM Manager, 3 Consultants 
 
3 informal interview after the “official data collection phase” 
1 Consultant, 2 business experts 
Table 4-1 Suitable Cases: How the Program at A1/TA Met the Predefined Criteria 
In this section we elaborated how A1/TA met the predefined criteria relevant to the case selection. In the 
next section we present research objectives of this specific chapter. 
 Research Objectives of this Chapter 
The main objective of this chapter is to build a theoretical model that helps to clarify how stakeholder 
perceptions and critical success factors (CSFs) are interrelated and have evolved throughout the life cycle of 
a large ERP program. We find that different perceptions are particularly important within the studied 
program. Therefore, we use Social Identity Theory (SIT) as a meta-theory for interpretation. Our result is a 
deviation model, which (1) considers the different perceptions of salient groups (2) at different points in 
time (phases) and (3) proposes that a low fit of perceptions with regards to the underlying CSF contributes 
to program failure as opposed to (4) a high positive fit of perceptions with regards to the underlying CSF 
contributes to program success. The resulting model we label the “Salient Group IS Success (SGISS) Model 
of Different Perceptions”. 
The SGISS-model of different perceptions is a general and a parsimonious deviation model to explain the 
change of success probability throughout the course of an ERP program. The model that we describe shares 
characteristics with the “fit as matching” concept as discussed by Venkatraman (1989) and Hoehle and Huff 




multiplicity of involved groups and their potentially changing perceptions along the program course. Our 
case is a large ERP program, which took place between 2010 and 2013 at the leading Austrian 
Telecommunication Provider A1 Telekom Austria (A1/TA), and the challenges that emerged throughout its 
course. We associate these challenges with critical success factors (CSFs), which we henceforth evaluated 
over the entire ERP program life cycle. This helps us to explain the dynamics of CSFs over the program life 
cycle in the case at A1/TA and to answer one of our central research questions posed in the initial chapters: 
Central research question 2: How can the dynamics of CSFs be considered in a general, parsimonious phase 
model?    
When using a grounded theory approach, the context in which a program is embedded is particularly 
important. The aim of our research account is the creation of a theoretical empirically grounded in data 
(Urquhart et al., 2010). We specifically found that perceptions regarding CSFs and informal group affiliations 
changed during the course of the implementation. These perceptions formed salient groups and had a strong 
impact on the successful outcome of the different program phases. We interpret our findings from a Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) perspective and relate the perceptions of salient groups to 
the underlying CSFs. The model for our case, which we term the “Salient Group IS Success Model of Different 
Perceptions (SGISS-Model of Different Perceptions)” has implications for research and practice. It calls for 
research into the definition of measurement items of perceptions and salient groups at different phases of 
an ERP program. It also sharpens the view of program managers regarding the fit at a particular state of their 
implementation and the measures that need to be taken to arrive at positive fitting perceptions.  
In this section we presented the research objectives of this specific chapter, which is a model to explain the 
dynamics of CSFs over the entire program life cycle. Next, we present the results of our case study and 
discuss the most relevant CSFs within the frame of our “Salient Group IS Success Model of Different 
Perceptions”. 
 Data Collection 
As interpretive researchers, we attempted to access other people’s interpretations regarding actions and 
events which took place during the ERP program at A1/TA and their views and aspirations of themselves and 
other participants. Consequently, interviews were the primary data source (Walsham, 1995). A(n) 
(interpretive) case study is particularly useful in identifying how perceptions and actions of stakeholders are 




the interview schedule and the roles of the interviewees within the ERP program at A1/TA. We conducted 
12 semi-structured interviews (beside internal conversations, and eight informal interviews) with an average 
duration of one hour. Our single point of contact was the program manager with whom we conducted our 
first and last interview. He proposed other representative participants for the program from different 
stakeholder groups. The concepts emerged through a continuous interplay between data collection and 
analysis, referred to as “constant comparison” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Urquhart et al., 2010). As the 
concepts emerged continuously, the interview questions were posed flexibly and the original guideline 
served primarily as an orientation device (find one version in the appendix). All interviews were fully 
transcribed and added to a hermeneutic unit of the computer program ATLAS.ti7, which we used for our 
qualitative data analysis. The interview data were supplemented with other sources as meeting protocols, 
presentations, risk registers, diagrams and public data as proposed by Walsham (2006). 
Role within the Program Time of the Interview 
Program manager (2 interviews) July 2013, April 2014 
Technical coordinator (BSAP, Reporting) September 2013 
Work package owner, member of IT-core team September 2013 
Member of IT-core team, member of program management office September 2013 
Stream lead, stream 1, functional area 1 September 2013 
Director, functional area 2 October 2013 
Project manager (CSAP, Change Management) October 2013 
Director, functional area 3 November 2013 
Technical coordinator program, project manager (ASAP, ERP Core) December 2013 
Consultant (ASAP, ERP Core) February 2014 
Consultant (BSAP, Reporting) March 2014 
Table 4-2 Program Roles of Interviewees and Interview Schedule 
 
 Data Analysis and Coding Procedure 
In line with the intent of our study, we use a less rigid, more interpretive approach as exemplified by Sarker 
et al. (2001), which still uses many elements of the three Straussian coding steps (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
but uses integrative memos for relationships instead of the coding paradigm. First, we begin with open 
coding and label data chunks referred to as open coding. Second, during axial coding we build major 




hierarchical, graphical representation of the concepts and b) describing their relationships in integrative 
memos. Third, during selective coding and further iterations in the continuously ongoing data analysis 
process, we identified that perceptions played an important role in the case and we chose the Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) as a meta-theory for interpreting the data and for creating the storyline 
(Sarker et al., 2001). Finally, we chose the category “stakeholder- and communication management” as our 
core category, as this category mainly impacts the perceptions of different stakeholder groups. Thus, we 
related the other categories to “stakeholder- and communication management” and checked how the 
perceptions of stakeholders changed (or remained constant) over the course of the program, thus shaping 
the CSFs. In order to accomplish this, we did further iterations and went back to open and axial coding with 
a particular consideration on perceptions. We looked in relation to which CSFs the perceptions changed and 
how and why this happened. This was followed by a new round of selective coding (See further details on 
the coding steps in Appendix B). All three steps of the coding process were discussed and aligned during 
several sessions between the researchers. In the next section we elaborate on SIT (Social Identity theory) 
and the interplay between CSFs and perceptions. 
 SIT (Social Identity Theory), Interplay between CSFs and Perceptions 
During the 3rd step in our coding procedure, selective coding, we realized that in relation to particular 
concepts, representing CSFS, different perceptions were evident. As these perceptions were typically shared 
by different individuals, the usage of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) was particularly 
useful to interpret our findings and for choosing the core category “stakeholder- and communication 
management” during selective coding. Group perceptions are shaping the outcome of a CSF and we defined 
the core category “stakeholder- and communication management” to explain how and why these 
perceptions changed. 
Based on SIT, a group is a collection of individuals who perceive themselves (and are perceived by others) as 
members of the same social category (a group). The members share some emotional involvement and a 
social consensus in relation to the evaluation of their group exists. As members of social groups, the 
individuals achieve an identification of themselves in social terms, their social identities (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986). “One's identity is an amalgam of loosely coupled identities” and one person might define him- or 
herself in terms of a most salient social identity (Ashfort and Mael, 1989, p. 30). This is what we refer to as 
in-group, and it seems that this most salient social identity was responsible for comparisons and different 




salient identity (or perceptions) in relation to a particular CSF and do not necessarily reflect a formal group 
within the organization. Salient groups are formed according to three main principles of SIT (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986, p.16): 
1. Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain a positive social identity.  
2. Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can be made between the 
in-group and some relevant out-groups; the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or 
distinct from the relevant out-groups.  
3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join 
some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct. 
We used SIT as a lens to interpret the different perceptions of in-groups in comparison to out-groups and 
their effects on particular CSFs. In the following, we present relevant CSFs, which were particularly important 
for our case, and show how the perceptions in relation to a particular CSF changed within the different 
phases of the ERP program. As a consequence, not only the CSFs are shaped, but also the salient groups 
themselves, since they are a product of the underlying perceptions. The study of Schwarz and Watson (2005) 
is the only study we know in the ERP context which explains intergroup relationships with SIT. They 
investigate the role of perceptions on IT-enabled change, and how affiliations to salient groups alter as the 
situation changes, but do not investigate explicitly CSFs. Their focus is rather on how salient groups 
constitute, how members of a salient group positively affiliate with other members, and how affiliations are 
reframed when the situation alters. Boonstra (2006), based on stakeholder salience theory9 (Mitchell et al., 
1997), investigates the change of perceived problems and interests of different stakeholder groups in 
relation to an ERP implementation. He finds empirical support for how these views change over time. The 
latter study focuses rather on dynamic power relations between stakeholder groups and not on CSFs. 
Lyytinen and Newman (2015) emphasize the critical influence that divergent actions of different stakeholder 
groups might have on the implementation process and outcomes. This view is consistent with the views of 
other authors (Bernroider, 2013; Besson and Rowe, 2002; Grainger et al., 2009; Markus et al., 2000b) who 
stress the importance of stakeholder actions and perceptions for a successful implementation. Sarkis and 
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Sundarraj (2003) emphasize the necessity to appropriately manage user expectations and satisfaction for a 
large-scale ERP implementation.   
However, it seems, regardless of the variety of different program settings and specifics, that the number of 
different stakeholder groups and the probability of different perceptions in a program is typically 
considerably higher than the number in a project setting. Therefore, we posit that stakeholder groups and 
perceptions are of particular importance for programs. 
ERP research has looked at the consideration of stakeholder perceptions in relation to CSFs, but are mainly 
limited to single stakeholder groups. Mostly perceptions of managers are investigated as this is the case in 
the account of Nah et al. (2003) for 11 CSFs, when they asked about the associated perceptions of CIOs. Only 
a few accounts deal with perceptions of different stakeholder groups.   A prominent account in that direction 
is from Amoako-Gyampah (2004), who tried to add to the (according to him) limited knowledge base on 
differences in the perceptions of decision makers and end-users10 on implementation factors. He 
investigates seven factors for potential differences in perceptions. The largest differences in perceptions 
exist with regard to shared beliefs and a shared sense about the project, whether the ERP system is better 
than the legacy system it is replacing (User satisfaction with technology), and project communications. 
Understanding differences in these perceptions are necessary to develop appropriate intervention 
mechanisms (e.g. training and communications which are perceived sufficiently by both stakeholder groups) 
leading to a successful implementation (Amoako-Gyampah, 2004). This lack of stakeholder perspectives was 
also emphasized in the work of Finney and Corbett (2007). Later, the study of Amoako-Gyampah (2004) was 
replicated and the results were confirmed for China (Lin and Rohm, 2009).   
Finney (2011) focuses particularly on communications and the perceptions of four stakeholder groups 
(managers, users, IT staff, consultants), thus responding to the prevalence of managerially focused studies. 
She claims that without engagement and acceptance by stakeholders, it is unlikely that any change 
associated with an ERP introduction will deliver the potential benefits promised. Furthermore, she concludes 
that particularly the communication strategy requires a tailored approach to meet the stakeholder needs 
(Finney, 2011). The empirical results of Nandhakumar et al. (2005) indicate that the understanding and 
perceptions of the ERP system by different stakeholder groups influence the malleability of the system and 
its technological components. While understanding the possible contextual forces and the triggers and 
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consequences of technology drift associated with an ERP system is not directly related to the ERP success, it 
influences the project trajectory (Nandhakumar et al., 2005). 
Although these accounts pay attention to the high importance of stakeholder perceptions in relations to 
CSFs and ERP implementations they are limited in three dimensions. They either (1) focus only on a limited 
amount of stakeholder groups (e.g. managerial perceptions), or (2) a limited number of critical success 
factors, and (3), most important, they neglect the probability that within a stakeholder group the views are 
not consistent and might be different.  
We are approaching this gap with the salient group concept taken from SIT, as the most salient identity (or 
perception) in relation to a CSF constitutes a salient group. We thus consider the likelihood of a higher 
number of stakeholder groups, and the potential of an increased number of salient groups in our model. 
With regard to the identified program characteristics, we provide novel insights, emerging from a rich 
interpretative analysis of the perceptions of the involved stakeholder groups. Such analysis considers the 
dynamics of CSFs through a view spanning the entire program life cycle. Furthermore, we consider the 
potential of different views within one stakeholder group. Thus, our approach and model is useful to answer 
the third central research question, which deals with the consideration of the dynamics of CSFs in a general, 
parsimonious phase model during all phases of the ERP life cycle (central research question 2 of the 
dissertation). 
In this section we provided an overview about SIT, as the meta-theory used, how salient groups are 
constituted and the current status of ERP research regarding perceptions of stakeholder groups in relation 
to CSFs. Next, we will turn to our case study at A1/TA. 
    
 The Case at A1/TA - The Salient Group IS Success (SGISS) Model of Different 
Perceptions 
In the next section we present the results of our interpretive case study. We start with contextual 
information before we elaborate on the social groups involved in the program, their social identities. Finally, 
we present different phases that were marked by different perceptions in relation to certain CSFs. During 
the pre-crisis phase, Implementation Attempt 1, was characterized by different perceptions leading to more 
than one salient group. After a consolidation (crisis) the perceptions in relation to the CSFs converged, and 




case which helps to explain how the different perceptions converged during Implementation Attempt 2. 
Lastly, we relate our model to general ideas and concept and present the general SGISS-model of different 
perceptions. 
4.6.1 Contextual Information 
We conducted our interpretive case study between July 2013 and April 2014 within A1 Telekom Austria 
(A1/TA), the Austrian subsidiary of the leading telecommunications provider in Central and Eastern Europe 
Telekom Austria Group. The group operates in eight countries, with almost 23 million customers, 16,000 
employees, and revenues of approximately 4 billion Euro in 2014 (Telekom Austria Group, 2015). The largest 
market operated by A1/TA has 5.4 million customers for mobile services and 2.3 million customers for 
landline services, 8,600 employees and revenues of about EUR 2.5 billion in 2014 (A1 Telekom Austria AG, 
2015). The industry is highly competitive and was marked by consolidations in the previous years. A1/TA 
was founded in 2010 as a full service provider when the previously independent sister company Mobilkom 
Austria AG (mobile services) was merged into Telekom Austria (landline services). A1/TA is solely responsible 
for the Austrian market and is a subsidiary of the Telekom Austria Group. The ERP program at A1/TA also 
served as a high priority post-merger integration initiative, sponsored by the board, since the two different 
organizational cultures of the merged companies were extremely visible. 
The ERP program at A1/TA encompassed several related projects (Table 4-3) and spanned a period of two 
and a half years. In total, 600 persons (including testing staff and 100 external consultants) were involved in 
the program. The ERP and reporting systems were intended to serve 5000 users with more than 700 
interfaces to other systems. The main goal was the development of a new ERP system where the processes 
of the legacy systems where either harmonized (e.g., in the functional area Financials, the total number of 
processes were reduced by 50%, from 1200 to 600) or technically consolidated (e.g., Logistics). The same 
procedure was intended in the reporting area with a new common user interface. A further harmonization 
was planned for later system releases, yet the conception of future releases was already part of the ERP 
program. The projects were accompanied by a separate change-management project and eventually a 
documentation project was also affiliated within the program. The numbers reflect how great the challenge 




Project Description Goals 
ERP Project ASAP 
(Core SAP ERP 
System) 
Two legacy systems were merged into 
one new system with nearly all 
modules. The new system includes 
partially new processes. Depending 
on the functional area, legacy 
processes were either harmonized or 
technically consolidated. The project 
was subdivided into streams. 
Harmonized and consolidated 
processes were implemented, tested, 
approved and ready-to-use, data 
cleaned, and migration completed, 
back to standard processes, IT 
training, documentation, securing 




& Data Warehouse 
Reporting) 
Two legacy reporting systems were 
merged into one new reporting 
system (BI/BW). Additionally, a data 
warehouse is part of the reporting 
infrastructure. The project was 
subdivided into slots. 
Running across all reporting 
requirements, appropriate reporting 
architecture under consideration of 





Since processes are affected, a change 
management project was created.  
Stakeholder engagement, 
communication, change enablement, 
end user training. 
Project ASAP+ 
(Release 2: ASAP & 
BSAP) 
A conception project for a 2nd release 
for topics which were not in included 
in the projects ASAP and BSAP. 
Further harmonization, cover 
functional gaps and change requests. 
Project Pro-SAP 
(Documentation) 
This documentation project was 
eventually included in the plan. 
Mainly included financial processes. 
Complete documentation, meeting 
the requirements of auditors. 
Table 4-3 The Program Structure at A1/TA 
 
4.6.2 Social Identities and Groups Shaping the ERP program 
Figure 4-1 depicts a hierarchical view of the formal groups in the ERP program at A1/TA. It shows a simplified 
view of the different formal groups involved in the program and assigned to a level; note that an individual 
is always part of different formal groups. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that a formal group may 
contain individuals sharing the same perceptions, but this is not necessarily the case. Salient groups in our 
model are characterized by the shared perceptions of individuals (representing their most salient social 
identities) in relation to a CSF.  As we will see, these perceptions of the different groups allow us to explain 






Figure 4-1 Formal Groups within the ERP Program at A1/TA 
 
We now want to describe the different levels, or formal groups, of Figure 4-1. The highest level of the internal 
view11 is considered at the organizational level, where internal stakeholder groups, e.g. groups defining the 
strategy and enterprise architecture, the portfolio group, and the program sponsors have an impact on the 
program. On the next level, we have the program itself, including the program management group (at A1/TA 
it includes, among a dedicated program team, the project managers) and the steering committee. Next, 
there is the project level, which consists of different streams/slots (depending on the functional area), the 
internal and external IT. Furthermore, due to the post-merger phase the organizational cultures of A1 and 
TA still played a role, mainly on the stream level. We also want to mention here that not all groups can be 
clearly assigned to one level, e.g. “External IT” (depicted as dotted box) is on the one hand part of the 
                                                          
11 Principally, the environmental level (external view), which has an influence on the entire organization and the ERP program could 
also be considered. Different groups, including shareholders, customers, competitors, implementation partners or the public 




project/program, but on the other hand not part of the environment, or the program sponsors which 
interface the program and the organizational level. 
To illustrate the difference between formal groups and salient groups we use one example: The salient group 
“Basis”, consisting of the stream, internal and external IT shared certain perceptions regarding the CSF 
“Realistic Planning of Time Schedule”. Thus, a salient group could consist of different stakeholder groups 
sharing the same perceptions in relation to a CSF. Furthermore, when different perceptions exist within one 
stakeholder group, the members of the stakeholder group could belong to different salient groups. Thus, 
the concept of salient groups considers the shortcomings of previous research in that area, as it considers 
all possible perceptions (regardless of the stakeholder group) and could be applied to all CSFs. This is exactly 
what we did in our study. 
T Time (Sub)-Phase Phase/Marked by 
 Oct/2010  Blueprint (Conception)   




Re-planning of Implementation, Different 
Migration Concepts, Corrective Actions  
B) Crisis & Reflection 
Jul/2012 - 
Dec/2012 
Implementation Attempt 2 C) Post-Crisis: High Positive 







Post Go-live  
Table 4-4 The Timeline of the ERP Program at A1/TA 
Table 4-4 shows the timeline of the ERP program at A1/TA. The program started in Fall 2010 with the 
blueprint phase followed by the first implementation phase. During our analysis we found that these phases 
were marked by a low fit of perceptions of salient groups with their relevant out-groups; we will illustrate 
the significant impact of these low fit of perceptions and relate them to several critical success factors (CSFs), 
particularly in those dimensions where we deemed the low fit of perceptions critically.  
We propose that a CSF is shaped by the underlying perceptions of the salient groups (in Table  
4-5 the columns with the headers “Salient Group 1” and “Salient Group 2”, although more than two groups 
are theoretically possible, as exemplified in Dimensions D 2, D 3) and the positive fit between the 
perceptions defines the overall success contribution of the particular CSF.  Our model was inspired by Hoehle 
and Huff (2012) who discuss possible models for their Task-Channel Fit conceptualization based on the work 





of Venkatmaran (1989) and finally conceptualize the perceived Task-Channel Fit as the deviation scores 
between the two variables. Similarly, we have different perceptions of salient groups in relation to a CSF in 
our deviation model, which were related to each other during selective coding. Our fit concept therefore is 
the level or extent of deviation between perceptions for a CSF over all salient groups and employs n fit-
dimensions for n CSFs. 
The investigated CSFs and the mainly low fit of perceptions of the salient groups (apart from Dimension 4) 
led finally to the cancellation of Implementation Attempt 1. During the extensive reflection phase, which 
included detailed re-planning and corrective actions, the path was paved for a successful Implementation 
Attempt 2. This new implementation attempt was marked by a high positive fit of perceptions and we will 
illustrate these changing perceptions for the same dimensions and CSFs as for Attempt 1.  
4.6.3 Pre-Crisis: Implementation Attempt 1 – The Pre-Crisis Phase Marked by a Low Fit of Perceptions 
In this section we present different CSFs marked by a low fit of perceptions in the pre-crisis phase. We use 
our model to relate the perceptions of salient groups to a particular CSF and identify the overall fit for this 
phase, which finally led to the failed Implementation Attempt 1. 
D CSF Salient Group 1 Perception 1 Salient Group 
2 
Perception 2 Fit 
1 CSF Ensure Realistic Planning 
of Time Schedule 
Believers Realistic Skeptics Unrealistic (-)  
Low Fit 
2 Alignment on 
Harmonized/Consolidated 
Business Processes 
Mobile Phones  
(A1 Division) 
Our view is right  Landline  
(TA Divison) 
 




Stream X Your 
Accountability 
Stream Y Your 
Accountability 
3 CSF Ensure Data 
Migration/Accuracy 




Business More data IT Less data 
4 CSF Flexibility of Program 
Components 
BSAP  Reporting 
Project 
We do it right  Remaining  
Program 
Groups 










4.6.3.1 Low Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 1 - CSF Ensure Realistic Planning of Time Schedule 
The intended goal of this CSF was the definition of an ambitious but realistic time schedule. It is not 
important to evaluate if the time schedule was in fact realistic, but rather we want to highlight the low fit of 
perceptions with regards to this CSF, which finally led to a low fit of perceptions for this dimension in the 
SGISS-model. Thus, the target of this CSF was not met during this phase.  
After the legal merger of the previously independent companies Mobilkom and Telekom to A1/TA in 2010 
the new company consisted of two different organizational cultures with two different ERP systems still in 
place. In this context the ERP program was, beside the technical aspects, a high priority post-merger 
integration initiative in which the program sponsors tried to define an ambitious but realistic time schedule. 
The program management and the project managers perceived this plan as doable and therefore committed 
to this goal, building the coalition of believers with a common perception regarding the time schedule, as 
Quotation 1 (Q1) indicates.  
Q1: The initial go-live date was defined strictly by the board, CTO and I think also CFO for the 1st of May 
2012. The program manager and I committed to this date, as well as the project managers. (Technical 
coordinator program, project manager ASAP, 206 ff.) 
The perception of the management coalition with respect to the feasibility of the time schedule was certainly 
not shared by all the other groups. The project implementation teams and stream leads (Skeptics) had 
serious doubts concerning the go-live date as the following statement by an ASAP stream leader reflects:  
Q2: But the original go-live date in May, which was initially planned...when I saw the plan the first time I 
thought anyway, this not realistic…. The [initial] go-live date was specified by the program sponsors, and the 
program manager tried to stick to this date. (Stream leader, stream 1, functional area 1, 1322 ff.) 
Similar perceptions obviously existed within the project BSAP and within the functional areas of the line 
organization, but, as the following statement indicates, the go-live date directed by the management 
coalition was tacitly accepted: 
Q3: The line management was too weak, right from the start...nobody could resist the unrealistic time 
schedule. The CTO wanted an unrealistic time schedule, that’s why he got one.... Because nobody could say 




Retrospectively, the management coalition (Believers) recognized the different perceptions of the different 
groups within the ERP program as seen in the citations below. During the pre-crisis phase of the program 
life cycle this was not as evident as it turned out ex post.  
Q4: Well, it was certainly ambitious, and in large projects it will be always like that, that not everyone is 
convinced at all times about the feasibility of the time schedule. Eventually, it turned out that it [the plan] 
was not doable, after all it was not wrong.... One has to draw on a planned assumption, and it was, according 
to a project plan and also the target of the sponsors. (Program manager, interview 2, 20 ff.) 
Q5: The basis [stream leaders and implementation teams, that is the skeptics] did not believe that this date  
is  feasible right  from  the  start. With basis, I mean stream leaders, work package owners and project staff. 
I mean  you  need  to  convey  this  plausibly  to  the basis, otherwise the date won't be accepted. And we did 
not manage to transport this properly. Therefore, we lost the basis for a certain time. That was one reason 
why we had to skip the first go-live date.  (Technical coordinator program, project manager ASAP, 210 ff.) 
Additionally, the negative perceptions of the Skeptics regarding the feasibility of the envisioned time 
schedule had a negative impact on the commitment of the relevant groups as the following statement of 
the change manager affirms: 
Q6: It is for sure negative.... When one loses trustworthiness. I mean, if you pick plans on the wall, and nobody 
believes that they are feasible...in the pre-crisis the [project] staff looked at the plans and they thought, 'nice 
plan, nobody believes that, we cannot do it, absolutely not realistic.’ ...[T]hen this has an impact on the 
motivation and the output...and the output declined before the crisis, the cancellation, significantly. (Project 
manager CSAP, 47:12 ff.) 
Furthermore, the line management also recognizes the negative effects of a time schedule, which is seen 
unrealistically by certain groups, on the program outcome. 
Q7: I believe it is a major mistake to make unrealistic time schedules…also in regard to the staff perspectives, 
and their motivation. If I say I will never make it, then I have a different engagement or non-engagement. I 




4.6.3.2 Low Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 2 - Alignment on Harmonized/Consolidated Business 
Processes 
One major goal of the ERP program was the definition of harmonized and technically consolidated business 
processes. Since the approach was to build a new greenfield system, the intended alignment was even more 
difficult to achieve. Also, in this regard, the perceptions of the salient groups (A1 and TA) with regards to this 
CSF resulted in a low positive fit of perceptions for this dimension. Thus, seen together with its perceptions, 
the target of this CSF was not met during this phase.  
From the management perspective it was still evident that within the program two different worlds still 
existed after the merger. Instead of the new post-merger group A1/TA, the pre-merger groups Mobilkom 
(A1) and Telekom (TA) were clearly dominant in many minds and thus the most salient groups. The strategy 
from an SIT perspective to positively differentiate the in-group from the out-group was a social competition 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986), which made process agreements more difficult. Such a retention of pre-merger 
identities and the maintenance of their values and practices were also stressed by Drori et al. (2013). 
Consequently, the perceptions were not compatible with each other and the future to-be processes. 
Q8: Indeed, two worlds collide, two worlds which are different also from their processes, but also different 
from the mindset of the people,...and those two mindsets one recognizes how they collide....  ...[A]ll [both] 
present their positions, all [both] are right, this is exactly the dilemma, all [both] are right, all [both] had good 
reasons in history to develop their processes in that way, and until they find themselves again in the new 
process, find themselves together, this is an effort one must not underestimate.  (Technical coordinator of 
BSAP, 182 ff.) 
Of course the situation for A1/TA was extremely context specific and by far not all companies would have 
faced similar problems in that intensity. Retrospectively, more effort should have been dedicated to this 
special situation as the statement of the change manager below illustrates. The roles of the pre-merger 
identities (Mobilkom A1 vs. Telekom TA) in the new post-merger identity and their reflections into the new 
system (Functional areas vs. IT) were not clear in the beginning.  
Q9: However, I believe that certain things would have been necessary earlier...bringing together functional 
areas and IT right from the start...you see? Because misunderstandings persisted for a long time...classic 
themes like ‘I don´t understand what you are telling me’ and the other way around...also cultural themes, 




what is the Telekom world, what is the Mobilkom world, how do your processes work, how do my processes 
work’...this cost us an incredible amount of time...we should have invested more in this common 
understanding. (Project manager, CSAP (Change-project), 2:8) 
The challenge to align on new common processes were was made more difficult because of a missing process 
ownership. As an integrated system this impacted harmonized and consolidated processes likewise, 
considering the end-to-end view (which can comprise harmonized and consolidated processes). 
Q10: Topics across Streams! This is related to process accountability, who is responsible, where does it [my 
accountability] start and where does it [my accountability] end? […….] In regard to process governance.... 
there is not really something defined, who is the process owner and mainly responsible? (E.g. in relation to 
the ANY-END-TO-END-PROCESS). Thus, we had nobody who really checked the [entire end-to-end] process. 
We had functional areas like WILLNOTMENTION1 and WILLNOTMENTION2, they checked everything [unit 
tests], but that the entire process across streams works...there we certainly had trouble. This was one of the 
main challenges. (Member of IT-core team, member of program management office 137 ff.) 
Thus, we conclude that this lack of a common understanding (in relation to the merger and the 
accountability) and the low positive fit of perceptions with regards to the harmonization and consolidation 
of business processes had negative effects on the program’s success. 
4.6.3.3 Low Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 3 – CSF Ensure Data Migration/Accuracy 
The major goal of the data migration was to provide a common database for A1/TA. Only necessary data 
(e.g. open items) should have been migrated so that harmonized and consolidated processes could run 
properly in the new system. This included the merging of master data including a new chart of account, data 
cleansing and a reduction of master data. A lot of conversion rules, interfaces and custom developments 
needed to be considered. For this CSF we also recognized the low fit of perceptions, which negatively 
impacted the ambitious goal and led to a low fit of perceptions for this dimension of our model. Thus, the 
target of this CSF was not met during this phase.  
The complex data migration was a huge challenge for the program team and it turned out very quickly that 
different perceptions regarding the data migration worsened the situation. During the first data migration 
test cycles, these different views had already manifested into a significant backlog. The migration tools which 




could not be sufficiently considered with the available data quality and the intended migration scenario. 
Thus, the functional areas were very insecure regarding the workability of the envisioned system setup. 
Q11: We were always one data migration test cycle behind.  The vendor expected a technical migration, we 
expected already a first test migration...these  two  perceptions  did  not  fit each  other...we  expected  that  
they  provide technically  mature  migration  tools,  which  was not the case.... The functional areas realized 
that not all the  data  will  be  migrated...and  they asked  themselves:  ‘how  can  I  work  with  that data?’  
(Technical coordinator program, project manager ASAP) 
Three months before the go-live was planned the situation did not change for the better. Again the ongoing 
data migration problems were stressed.12  
Q12: The expectations for Mock1 [Data Migration Cycle 1] were not met. The major reason for the thus far 
resulting delays in the data delivery, are attributed to not realized migration rules within the migration tools 
of Vendor 2. (Management meeting, minutes of 03-Feb-2012) 
Furthermore, it turned out that the amount of data intended to be migrated, was not sufficient to serve the 
business needs. The functional areas expected more data than the ERP groups initially intended to migrate 
into the new system. These two contrary positions of the two groups did not reconcile and contributed 
strongly to the problems regarding the data migration. 
Q13: The data migration, originally with only compulsorily needed data for the new fiscal year, respectively 
master data, we needed to extend it since more historical data was necessary to keep existing processes 
alive.... …[T]his was also the crux why we needed the postponement. We saw that the migration as required 
in the specification was not sufficient, and would have led to major problems. (Technical Coordinator of the 
program, project manager ASAP, 109 ff.) 
4.6.3.4 High Fit of Perceptions – Dimension 4 - CSF Flexibility of Program Components 
As seen in Table 4-5, not all dimensions during the pre-crisis phase were characterized by a low fit of 
perceptions. During our interpretive case study, we identified “Flexibility of Program Components” as a new 
program-specific CSF, which would not be applicable to a more traditional project level setup. In particular, 
it relates to separate methodological requirements for different projects as exemplified in this study. The 
                                                          
12 After the ERP program at A1/TA, the vendor published a public document about the implementation which again highlighted the 
data migration as one of the key challenges (CSFs) and the necessary postponement of the go-live date. This document corroborates 




project BSAP performed well from the beginning, and the program management granted BSAP certain 
tolerances as the statements below indicate: 
Q14: We have people who push things forward.... …[T]hat’s why we said we make our own documents...but 
we remained lean.... This was only possible because we  have  been  our  own project...and  the  program  
management  was happy  with  our  performance  right  from  the start. (Technical coordinator-BSAP, 610 
ff.) 
Q15: Well for BSAP I don’t know...this I did not track in that way…. ...[I]t was rather a little separated. They 
acted, I put it that way, more freely. Because it was a topic which was rather detached. The BI-side [Reporting 
Project, Business Intelligence] one can regard a little bit separated, they managed it by themselves. (Member 
of IT-core team, member of program management office, 108 ff.) 
The flexibility of program components illustrates that perceptions in relation to a CSF must not necessarily 
change over the program life cycle. Certainly this was also the case at A1/TA and the salient groups in relation 
to this CSF were formed through a tacit in-group/out-group relationship rather than through different 
perceptions as exemplified for the other dimensions. We could therefore see the perceptions of the different 
groups as “mutually supportive perceptions” as a special manifestation of a high positive fit of perceptions. 
4.6.4 Crisis and Reflection 
Due to the problems appearing in the Implementation Attempt 1, the originally intended go-live date in May 
2012 had to be cancelled. During an extensive re-planning and reflection phase several corrective actions 
took place. The data migration was seen as the main challenge and therefore the migration team was 
reinforced with additional team members and an external migration manager. Furthermore, quality gates 
for the data migration test cycles were established. An issue-tracking tool was introduced and program 
rooms were established. All these actions should have improved the collaboration between the groups and 
the communication flow. Different data migration and cut-over scenarios were prepared and presented 
during a large buy-in meeting with 26 relevant stakeholders (CFO, CTO, the program management and the 
project managers, directors of functional areas and stream leaders). The common alignment resulted in a 
strengthened commitment, converging perceptions and paved the path for a successful Implementation 




Q16: The crisis had a positive effect on the complete program. We used the time to reflect what went wrong, 
what do we need to improve, where do we need to change the structure, how must we change our 
collaboration.... A new quality of collaboration.... The team found together…. (Project manager CSAP, 6:1) 
Actions Description CSFs influenced 
Buy-in Meeting Securing the commitment of stakeholders. Decisions 
made on data migration and deployment scenarios 
(including new go-live date) 
Top Management Support, Establish 
Commitment of Key Players, Ensure 
Data Migration/ Accuracy, Define 
Program Methodology, Realistic 
Timeframe 
Reinforcement of 
Data Migration Team 
The data migration team was reinforced with additional 
workforce, most notably at the management level. The 
program management realized that the collaboration 
between functional areas, IT, and the implementation 
partner needed to be improved. 
Ensure Data Migration/ Accuracy 
Quality Gates 
introduced 
For data migration, end-to-end tests, Integration Tests 
Percentage of executed test cases, percentage of 
priority 1 errors.  
Define Program Methodology  
Issue Tracking Tool  An issue management tool was introduced to prioritize 
tickets and generate reports. 
Secure Issue Management, Defining 
Stakeholder & Communication 
Management 




Convey management decisions to all stakeholders, 
(decisions made in decision workshop). Ensure 
commitment of all stakeholder groups (e.g. in relation 
to the new go-live date) 
Secure Change Management, Define 
Stakeholder & Communication 
Management, Realistic Timeframe 
Project Rooms 
established 
Separate project rooms were provided to strengthen 
the communication and collaboration, and to improve 
decision making. 
Establish Collaboration and Decision 
Making, Ensure Business Process 
Management, Realistic Timeframe 
Table 4-6 Most Important Corrective Actions During the Crisis 
Table 4-6 depicts the corrective actions, which we deemed most important during the crisis. These actions 




4.6.5 Post-Crisis: Implementation Attempt 2 – The Post-Crisis Phase Marked by a High Positive Fit of 
Perceptions 
In this section we present different CSFs that were marked by a high positive fit of perceptions in the post-
crisis phase. We use our model to relate the perceptions of salient groups to a particular CSF, which finally 
led to high-fit scores and a successful go-live. We use the same dimensions (CSFs) as we did for 
Implementation Attempt 1 and illustrate the changing perceptions and salient groups (Table 4-7).  
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Table 4-7 The Salient Group IS Success (SGISS) Model of Different Perceptions at A1/TA, Post-Crisis  
 
4.6.5.1 High Positive Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 1 - CSF Ensure Realistic Planning of Time Schedule 
Implementation Attempt 2 was also very ambitious. Compared to Implementation Attempt 1, this 
implementation attempt was generally seen as realistic by all program groups. As the following statements 
illustrate, the perceptions regarding the feasibility of the time plan converged and led to a high positive fit 




groups. Thus, the targets with regards to this CSF were met in the post-crisis phase (Implementation Attempt 
2). 
Q17: And it was clear that we have another chance, we have a new go live date but this time we must not 
fail.... …[O]ne aligned on a new go-live date, a date to which we really stuck to, and we were really convinced 
that we will make it. We really did everything that we could make it. (Project manager CSAP, 16:41,2) 
It seems also that the common goal, and the feasibility of the time schedule strongly impacted the 
commitment of all program-groups, as the following two statements indicate. This lack of engagement and 
motivation (commitment) was strongly emphasized as a factor of failure during Implementation Attempt 1. 
Thus, the perceptions regarding the time-schedule (which was seen as ambitious but realistic) contributed 
to converging perceptions in relation to other CSFs13, which all together contributed to the ERP program 
success.  
Q18: I believe in the last two or three months we were in a phase where we said: ‘Yes, we know that we can 
make it, we know it might be difficult and some things will not work.’ But we were absolutely committed to 
the new go live date. ‘We will make it, we will,’ and I have to say from the peoples’ perspectives, who spent 
nights and holidays in the office, it was really great.... (Director, functional area 2, 1029 ff.)   
Q19: And the [second go live] 7th of January, 2013 was a date nobody wanted to shift back or put into 
question. 7th of January, 2013 was in all heads, we need to make it...also this Big Bang, that everyone has a 
common goal was one responsible factor for the success…when everyone says: ‘I support it, I fight for it, it 
needs to be accomplished.’ (Technical coordinator of BSAP, 402 ff.) 
4.6.5.2 High Positive Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 2 - CSF Alignment on Harmonized/Consolidated 
Business Processes  
The time factor also played an important role in the definition of harmonized and consolidated processes, 
as the first of the following two statements indicates. Certain areas, such as finance processes, were reduced 
significantly from 1200 to 600, a new chart of account was defined and master data were cleaned. In other 
areas, such as logistics, a consolidation of processes was intended in this phase since a further harmonization 
was planned within the second release of the program. Whereas it seems that for harmonized processes the 
pressure led to converging perceptions and concessions between the functional areas A1 and TA (Q20), for 
                                                          
13 Due to space constraints and for reasons of readability we do not cover each CSF separately in this chapter. In the comparative 




consolidated processes the reconciliation was mainly between functional areas and their ERP counterparts, 
followed by a reconciliation of the ERP consultants as the second statement (Q21) indicates. Yet, during 
Implementation Attempt 2 the perceptions regarding this CSF converged and led to a high positive fit of 
perceptions for this dimension in our model. Thus, seen together with its perceptions, the target of this CSF 
was clearly met during this phase. 
Q20: Only when the pressure was so high, and they had no other choices, all of a sudden it worked at the 
touch of a button. And I mean simply from the time factor we underestimated it. One needs the time factor, 
exemplary said, this friction energy.... This get-together and generating of friction which results in such high 
pressure, then the accruing heat effects that the two melt into each other. And precisely this time, as 
stated...needs them, [the two salient groups] to be given.... One can try to increase the pressure, but both 
need to be willing to accept this friction point. (Technical Coordinator of the program, project manager ASAP 
769 ff.) 
Q21: I know the green [Telekom, TA] functional area well and we came to common agreements. 
WILLNOTMENTION [consultant]...knows the black [Mobilkom, A1] functional area very well and coordinated 
with them. And then WILLNOTMENTION and I agreed on the lowest common denominator. But for 
discussions between the functional areas in a large round, for that, I have to admit honestly, the time was 
too short. (Consultant ASAP, logistics, 426 ff.)   
As the program was also a post-merger initiative, we see some indications for converging perceptions of the 
different groups. However, we cannot say if these effects were mainly caused by concessions due to the 
enormous time pressure (likely this was the case for consolidated processes, since reconciliations in larger 
rounds were not really necessary) or if the pre-merger identities Telekom and Mobilkom began to build a 
new post-merger identity A1/TA, as intended in the initiative and the change project, and therefore the 
perceptions converged. It seems that all of these variables had an impact on the perceptions of the different 
groups and led to the high positive fit of perceptions for this dimension. Furthermore, the establishment of 
project rooms, and the empowerment of smaller teams contributed to collaboration and decision making, 
also in regard to the alignment on business processes. 
4.6.5.3 High Positive Fit of Perceptions - Dimension 3 - CSF Ensure Data Migration/Accuracy 
It was extremely beneficial that all stakeholder groups were involved in the buy-in meeting as the next 




positive fit of perceptions for this dimension in our model. Thus, the target of this CSF was clearly met during 
this phase. 
Q22: Absolutely yes, it was an important audience, in particular with all directors of the impacted areas...in 
principle migration variants were presented with the alignment on one...and it was in this respect an essential 
topic, since also the postponing was mainly situated in the migration...to create the awareness, that one 
reduces the migration risk, if one takes with him less data.... …[A]nd to find the balance...that also the 
processes work.... It was an essential meeting and also a key to the subsequent successful outcome of the 
project, since one could show it to the sponsors, stakeholders, directors and to create again certainty...that 
it was a very clear approach and very well planned...that we could present and reconcile there. (Program 
manager, interview 2, 345ff) 
The common awareness, alignment on a common approach and recreation of certainty was very helpful for 
the subsequent migration cycles, as they were still far away from the final state for which they wished. The 
following statement from a consultant, in replying to a question regarding the atmosphere before the final 
go-live, illustrates this point: 
Q22: In the meantime, it [the atmosphere] was once again tense for the migration didn’t work as well as 
expected...it was the second and third migration which also didn’t look so good. In reality, just the last 
migration, where one only should have validated the data, it was the first time that one could allege, ‘ok, 
with that, we can get it, to go live.’ (Consultant Project ASAP, 668 ff.) 
4.6.5.4 High Fit of Perceptions – Dimension 4 - CSF Flexibility of Program Components 
Also, during post-crisis phase the perceptions regarding the flexibility of the project BSAP were mutually 
supportive and marked by a high positive fit. The program component BSAP flourished largely independent 
from the program. Thus, this CSF contributed to the overall success of the program during all phases. 
4.6.6 SGISS Model of Different Perceptions 
To summarize the results of the three phases we depict the results in Figure 4-2 with three main 
propositions. In each of the phases the salient groups were defined through the perceptions with regards to 
the particular CSFs, which were the main drivers for the program success. The groups were dynamic, based 
on the fit of perceptions and were only partially impacted by formal program groups as we exemplified for 




In the pre-crisis phase, the perceptions of the salient groups with regards to the CSFs were marked by mainly 
low fit of perceptions, which arguably led to the failure in Implementation Attempt 1. This we exemplified 
for three dimensions where the low fit of perceptions with regards to each CSF formed salient groups. If 
there is a large extent of deviation (low fit of perceptions for each CSF), this indicates potential failure and 
calls for a consolidation phase (condition is the low fit of perceptions). At the consolidation phase (crisis and 
reflection), corrective actions are taken to stimulate converging perceptions, dissolvement and the 











Efficient stakeholder- and communication management was arguably (among others, Table 4-6) the most 
important CSF in relation to converging perception, thus we defined it as core category. Regarding the 
timeframe an ambitious timeframe was approved by all stakeholder groups and appropriately 
communicated. Regarding data migration. different scenarios were presented, and aligned. Thus, the 
business people knew which data to expect and the IT shared these perceptions regarding to the timeframe. 
In relation to data migration tools, the issues were clearly communicated to the external integrator. Actions 
were aligned and the data migration team enhances. Thus, all stakeholder groups shared perception with 
regard to the data migration. Regarding business processes, 20 core processes were communicated and 
project rooms established. Thus, the two divisions A1 and TA, the functional areas, and the consultants could 
A) Pre-Crisis B) Crisis and Reflection C) Post-Crisis 
Perceptions regarding 
CSFs define salient groups. 
Proposition 1: Low Fit of 
Perceptions in regard to: 
-Time Schedule 
-Business Processes 
-Data Migration   
 










Corrective actions led to 
converging perceptions between 
the groups, blurring group borders 
and define new salient groups 
 
Perceptions regarding 
CSFs define new salient groups. 
Proposition 3: High Fit of 




-Data Migration   
Led to Program Success  
 





improve their collaboration and align on common business processes. These business processes were 
implemented and finally end-to-end tested. Regarding the flexibility of program components, the 
communication was sufficient throughout the three phases, as   BSAP performed well right from the start. 
Thus, the new salient groups in the post-crisis phase were marked by a high positive fit of perceptions, which 
led arguably to a success of Implementation Attempt 2. 
As a last step, we apply the principle of abstraction and generalization, which is the abstraction of categories; 
unique instances (A1/TA context, the principle of contextualization) are related to ideas and concepts that 
apply to multiple situations (Klein and Myers, 1999). Thus, we increase the theory scope through integration 
of the substantive theory in a more formal theory (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
We propose that beside the CSFs the underlying perceptions are influencing the dependent (success) 
variable in our model.  Our model (Figures 4-3, 4-4, 4-5) was inspired by Hoehle and Huff (2012) who discuss 
possible models for their Task-Channel Fit (TTF) conceptualization based on the work of Venkatmaran 
(1989). In particular, Hoehle and Huff (2012) want to conceptualize the user’s perceived fit of a particular 
electronic banking channel (internet banking) to support a particular banking task (account inquiries vs. loan 
application). Finally, they choose the “fit as matching”-option14 which is characterized by no reference to a 
criterion variable and they conceptualize the perceived Task-Cannel Fit as the deviation scores between the 
two variables.  
The number of phases, CSFs and salient groups is defined by the context and the underlying perceptions 
with regards to the CSFs (n fit-dimensions for n CSFs). In this way, the model can be adapted beyond the 
case at A1/TA. Figures 4-3 to Figure 4-5 present the abstracted SGISS-model of different perceptions with 
two steps and two possible scenarios in step 2. Note that this model has to be applied regularly during all 
phases of the ERP program and for each CSF separately. As such, it could be a valuable tool to accompany 
an ERP implementation and additionally an interesting new avenue for action research.  
At this stage, we want to recall our definition of CSFs, and the conceptualization of our fit concept, and state 
that the SGISS-model of different perceptions is a valuable tool to regularly assess the CSFs. 
                                                          
14This is a major departure from other options, as e.g. “fit as mediator” (Hoehle and Huff, 2012; Venkatmaran, 1989), where a 
relationship to the criterion exists. Similarly, in our deviation model we have two parallel variables which were related to each other 





Definition: CSFs in the ERP program context are the underlying guiding principles and activities, in certain 
key areas, that must be regarded by managers to reach the goals of the ERP program. To ensure that CSFs 
are proceeding sufficiently well in each area, CSFs are continually assessed during all phases of the ERP 
program life cycle. 
Definition: The applied fit concept is the level or extent of deviation between perceptions in relation to a 
CSF over all salient groups (1….m)15, and employs n fit-dimensions for n CSFs. 
 
 
Step 1) The first step (Figure 4-3) is always to assess if different perceptions in relation to a CSF exist or not.  
Thus, it must be defined if only 1 salient group or different salient groups (2-n) exist. 
 
Figure 4-3 SGISS-Model Step 1. Assessing Perceptions in Relation to CSF. 
 
 
                                                          




Step 2) Consisting of two different scenarios, based on the outcome of step 1. 
In scenario 1 (Figure 4-3) only one salient group is identified, meaning that in relation to a CSF the same 
perceptions existed for all stakeholders. Now it is important to assess whether the result is a positive fit 
(scenario 1a, CSF met) or negative (scenario 1b, CSF not met). In 1b corrective actions towards the CSF must 
be set.  
 
Figure 4-4 SGISS-Model Step 2. Scenario 1 with 1 Salient Group 
 
In scenario 2 (Figure 4-5) different salient groups are identified (at least 2 but theoretically any number 
greater than 1 possible), meaning that different perceptions existed for different stakeholders during step 1 
constituting different salient groups. Thus, it is necessary to set corrective actions towards the CSF. 
 
 






Considering our model, we propose for each Scenario of step 2: 
1a) If only one salient group exists and the targets of the CSFs are met (positive perception of a salient 
group towards CSF exist) the CSF contributes to the ERP program success. 
1b) If only 1 salient group exists and the targets of the CSFs are not met (negative perceptions of a salient 
group towards CSF exist), the CSF contributes to ERP program failure (corrective actions towards the CSF 
are necessary). 
2) If different (2 or more) salient groups exist, the CSF contributes to ERP program failure (corrective 
actions towards the CSF, considering perceptions of salient groups, are necessary). 
We want to close the result section with a quotation which perfectly illustrates that the managerial 
perceptions are not always determining if a CSF is successful. This quotation underlines the need to consider 
the perceptions of all salient groups, as the perceptions of a non-dominant subgroup (in our case “the basis” 
can push the program into failure, even when the dominant group (in our case the “management” has an 
opposing view. 
Q23: The estimation that one has a problem popped up earlier in the basis [workstream-leads and 
implementation team] than in the management [team], but also the other way around. The perception that 
the project success is feasible and that the go-live will work, popped up earlier in the basis than in the 
management. Apparently, a realistic estimation about the project success, is earlier available for the basis 
than for the management team. (Program Manager, Interview 2, 267 ff.) 
In this section we presented the results of our case study. We started with contextual information about 
A1/TA and the case. Then, we highlighted the ERP program over its life cycle. We presented the pre-crisis 
which was characterized by a low fit of perceptions which led to the cancellation of Implementation Attempt 
1, followed by the crisis with corrective actions, and lastly the post-crisis (Implementation Attempt 2) which 
was characterized by a high fit of perceptions leading to a successful ERP program. Finally, we presented the 
SGISS-model of different perceptions, for the specific instance at A1/TA as well as the generalized, 
abstracted model which is applicable to other contexts. 
 Discussion 
We emphasized that it is important to view an implementation over the complete program life cycle and to 




et al. (2009) stress the importance of when an implementation is judged to be a success or failure. If our 
observation had stopped after Implementation Attempt 1 the ERP program could have been classified as a 
failure. As we can see in our case study, the CSFs and the corresponding perceptions changed in 
Implementation Attempt 2 and in the end the ERP program was certainly a success and perceived as such 
by all key stakeholders. This is in line with Grainger et al. (2009) who present consistent results. As a 
consequence, we conclude that the pure capturing of the antecedents and static elements (Lyytinen and 
Newman, 2015; Markus and Robey, 1988) is not sufficient to get a complete picture of the ERP program and 
the dynamic process of stakeholder changing perceptions (Boonstra, 2006). Thus, the investigation of the 
complete life cycle is warranted. 
As many stakeholder groups are involved in an ERP implementation, and particularly programs, the 
perceptions are of major importance since they form salient groups that are not necessarily identical with 
the formal program groups. We illustrated that those perceptions could change over the program life cycle, 
impacting the fit in relation to a particular CSF. The importance of perceptions was stressed by several 
authors in the past: in the ERP context (e.g., Besson and Rowe, 2001; Bernroider, 2013; Drori et al., 2013), 
in relation to mergers (Schwarz and Watson, 2005), and as a relevant factor for success and failure of an ERP 
implementation (Grainger et al., 2009).  
Previous research, explicitly dealing with CSFs and the different perceptions of stakeholder groups (Amoako-
Gyampah, 2004; Finney, 2011; Lin and Rohm, 2009) failed to consider (1) all relevant stakeholder groups (2) 
considered only a limited number of CSFs and (3) they neglect the case that within a stakeholder group the 
views are not consistent and might be different. The SGISS-model of different perceptions closes these gaps. 
First, it considers all relevant stakeholder groups through consideration of different perceptions towards a 
CSF. This is important as in previous CSF research mostly managerial views were considered (e.g. Nah et al. 
2003), not considering that opposing views (of only one salient group) towards a CSF can lead to an 
implementation failure. Amoako-Gyampah (2004) mentioned communication as one example where the 
views of managers and end-users strongly differed. Finney (2011) further elaborated on the importance of 
communication. Second, the SGISS-model calls for regular application for all CSFs, thus paying attention to 
the dynamic nature of CSFs within ERP programs. Third, salient groups are constituted through different 
perceptions, as such considering different views within a stakeholder group, and provides an avenue for 
dealing with it (Step 2 /Scenario 2). We pay attention to the prominent view in previous accounts (e.g. 




important. As such, and under consideration of SIT, we defined stakeholder- and communication 
management as core category as the major CSF impacting perceptions in relation to other CSFs.  
Recalling our second central research question “How can the dynamics of CSFs be considered in a general, 
parsimonious phase model”, the SGISS-model exactly provides and answer to this question. This was not 
done in previous studies in the ERP program context which emphasized the importance of perceptions, e.g. 
in the account of Chang et al. (2014) for goal commitment and in the account of Jiang et al. (2014) dealing 
with conflict management.  The lack of a model considering the dynamics of CSFs over the implementation 
life cycle is also evident in the studies dealing with different perceptions in relation to CSFs (Amoako-
Gyampah, 2004; Finney; 2011; Lin and Rohm, 2009), and in CSF studies in the ERP program context (Ribbers 
and Schoo, 2002; Seidel, 2009). We developed a deviation model which is grounded in data, and can be 
applied to other contexts (Klein and Myers, 1999), as we theoretically integrated as proposed by Urquhart 
et al. 2010) following the “fit as matching” option developed in previous accounts (Hoehle and Huff, 2012; 
Venkatraman, 1989). 
 It was not our intention to judge if, for example, the time schedule was indeed too ambitious. It is much 
more important that a low fit of perceptions in relation to this CSF existed (abstracted SGISS-model, scenario 
2), and that those perceptions converged (following corrective actions) over the course of the program 
leading to a high positive fit during Implementation Attempt 2 (abstracted SGISS-model, Scenario 1a. Our 
SGISS-model of different perceptions emphasizes the interrelations between the CSFs and the fit of 
perceptions of the salient groups in the best case blurring the borders between groups in relation to their 
perceptions leading to a high positive fit (abstracted SGISS-model, Scenario 1a), as opposed to a high 
negative fit (abstracted SGISS-model, Scenario 1b), which warrants further corrective actions. 
The example of the CSF “Flexibility of Program Components” illustrates the context in our model. In our case 
the in-group BSAP has a positive perception regarding their flexibility and independence compared to other 
program components and the applied methodology. Since the out-groups (in regard to the salient group 
BSAP) have mutually supportive perceptions and accept the special status of the program component BSAP, 
this CSF contributes to the overall program success. The effective use of tolerances is also stressed in the 
program management literature (e.g., Cabinet Office, 2011; PMI, 2008). In a different context, i.e., different 
program settings, it could easily be the case that different groups have a low fit of perceptions with regards 
to the flexibility of certain program components. In that case this CSF might not contribute to the overall 




perceptions are not only a shaping variable for the underlying CSFs, but also consider the context in our 
model.  
As we follow the interpretive tradition, we did not intend to generate universal laws (e.g., Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991; Lee and Baskerville, 2003), but we believe that our model is general and parsimonious enough 
to serve as a general reference model. As such, it could be extended to other settings (Lee and Baskerville, 
2003). Lee (1991) proposes a model in which interpretive and positivist research supplement each other, 
including different studies and different researchers; perhaps our model could also be extended in this 
direction. This view is in line with Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) as they describe interpretive research in 
the viewpoint of the weak constructionism as a means to generate hypotheses for further positivist 
investigation. Consequently, although we believe that the context is particularly important and a good way 
to measure context and perceptions is case study research, we see a variety of usages and possible 
extensions of our model, not necessarily limited to interpretive research. Positivist researchers, for example, 
could conceptualize the model as illustrated by Hoehle and Huff (2012) and test it with the deviation score 
analysis, but within one context. By successive refinement and testing, a theory could emerge that is 
generalizable across these different settings, but again, not beyond those cases (Lee, 1991).  
 Implications 
Gregor (2006) distinguishes between five types of theories depending on four intended goals. In this phase 
the goal of our theoretical model is to explain how, why, and when the occurrences happened and therefore 
promote greater insight into our phenomena of interest, in Gregor´s terms a Type II Theory for explanation. 
Following the interpretive paradigm, it was not our aim to develop a predictive or deterministic theory 
(Gregor, 2006), but we see our theory as a ‘sensitizing device’ to view the world, in our case ERP (IS) 
implementations, in a certain way (Klein and Myers, 1999). As such, our theoretical model has implications 
for researchers and practitioners alike. On the one hand it can inform other real-life settings and on the 
other it can be extended and adapted to these settings, serving as a Type IV Theory for explanation and 
prediction or even a Type V Theory for design and action (Gregor, 2006).  
For research, our study provides a perspective to integrate the group and perception concept into an IS 
success deviation model which considers the perceptions of salient groups in relation to critical success 
factors over the implementation life cycle. The few, previous accounts in relation to perceptions within ERP 
implementations were limited to (1) certain stakeholder groups (mostly managerial), (2) a limited number 




concept inherent in the model closes all those gaps, and is and easily applicable. Although it was developed 
in a specific context, the abstracted model is grounded in data, and can inform other settings and be adapted 
and used according to the needs of these settings (e.g. other ERP and IS programs). The model could be used 
for predictions and explanations during different points in time. For example, through an application-
reflection cycle, perhaps with shared responsibilities during action research (Robey et al. 2000), 
practitioners’ problems could be solved and at the same time the theory refined (Lee and Baskerville, 2003). 
Fourth (4), the SGISS-model was developed particularly within the ERP program context. In a program the 
number of salient groups is potentially higher, since typically more stakeholder groups are involved than in 
a traditional project setup. Furthermore, the interdependence of projects and the competition could worsen 
contribution to a larger number of salient groups. Thus, the potential implications for ERP programs are 
particularly high. The SGISS-model could help to mitigate these potential tensions. Fifth (5), we assume that 
the SGISS-model could be used in larger ERP projects (which are not established as programs) too, as well 
as in IS programs beyond the ERP context. We encourage other researchers to investigate this assumption. 
Lastly (6), we provide an instance of a rarely observed phenomenon in previous SIT accounts (Augoustinos 
and Walker, 1995). They claim that tensions “are only likely to diminish or disappear when the dimensions 
and outcomes of intergroup comparisons are judged, especially by the unfavoured group, to be legitimate” 
(Augoustinos and Walker, 1995, p.117), and the dominant outgroup will be resistant to attempts of the 
negatively valued in-group to alter its status. “A group does not relinquish its favoured position easily or 
voluntarily - for political reasons as well as reasons of maintaining a favourable social identity” (Augoustinos 
and Walker, 1995, p.117). In our case, after the cancellation of Implementation Attempt 1, the dominant 
group “Believers” became “Skeptics”, thus altering their social identity and salient group. SIT could build on 
that observation and further elaborate in which cases the leaving of a dominant subgroup (or allying with 
the unfavoured group, with a lower status) is likely.  At this moment we provided the first general deviation 
model which addresses different stakeholder perceptions (salient groups) in relation to CSFs over the entire 
life cycle, providing hints for possible extension- and operationalization variants. 
The implications for practice are potentially great; the SGISS-model could, and probably should, be used 
during different (potentially all) phases of the ERP implementation life cycle. For practitioners, our model 
could help to increase the likelihood of ERP success and mitigate risk of failure over the complete life cycle. 
Active participation, indifference or resistance regarding the ERP system can be caused by group interests 




(Boonstra, 2006). Our model can help to manage exactly those potential different salient group perceptions 
in relation to specific CSFs.  
 Conclusion 
Programs are contemporary phenomena and more and more used for large-scale ERP implementations in a 
rapidly changing global economy. The emergence of the program phenomenon leads to more stakeholder 
groups being involved in the implementation process. As these groups, their expectations, interactions and 
perceptions have an increasing impact on the successful outcome of an ERP implementation, and particularly 
on programs, a new fresh look has to be taken on this phenomenon. The SGISS-model of different 
perceptions does exactly that. It pays attention to the potentially high number of different perceptions of 
salient (program) groups, thus providing a new solution for dealing with the dynamics of CSFs in ERP 
programs. In this section we presented our case at A1/TA. Next we turn to a case in multisite environment, 





5. The Case at Pantheon – An Organizational Learning Model in the ERP Program 
Context 
In this section we present our second case study at Pantheon (a pseudonym). We start with elaborating how 
Pantheon met the predefined criteria relevant to the case selection. Second, we present the research 
objectives of this specific chapter, which is a model to explain the dynamics of CSFs over the entire program 
life cycle. Next, we highlight the data collection. We continue with the data analysis and the coding steps. 
As organizational learning played a crucial role in interpreting the data we briefly elaborate on organizational 
learning in the ERP context, and what we know about multisite ERP implementations. Then, we present the 
results of our case on the basis of the derived “Organizational Learning Model in the ERP Program Context”, 
which is based on the organizational learning interpretation model of Daft and Weick (1984). Finally, we 
discuss the results and provide implications for research and practice, before we close with the conclusion. 
 Case Selection   
We established the primary contact with the leader of the SAP Competence Center Jupiter via a professional 
contact, and conducted our interview. Pantheon met all the predefined criteria and we deemed it as a 
suitable case (Table 5-1). Furthermore, the multisite perspective and the phased approach were predicted 
to bring further insights into the program phenomenon, and the interrelations between sites with specific 
underlying laws were particularly interesting.  
No Criteria Definition 
1 Program 
involved 
A group of related projects was coordinated through a form of overarching program (e.g. PMI, 
2008), which clearly demarcated the implementation from a traditional project setup with an 
individual project as subject to the implementation.   
  Subject to the subprogram was the implementation of an ERP system. The subprogram Saturn-
Jupiter (program cluster), as part of the larger program Saturn at Pantheon consisted of one 
development project and nine rollout projects rolled out at the different sites. All rollout 
projects used the common template, which was developed in the development project, and 
were hosted on the same technical platform. The common platform effected the sharing of 
resources and the necessity to consider performance issues as the number of users grew over 
the course of the rollouts. Many links existed to other software applications, what was 
considered in the larger program. 
2 Processes 
affected 
The way the business conducts was affected. ERP systems are involved at the core and 




focus on outcome, that is a change in how the organization operates. Contrarily ERP projects 
focus on outputs; that is, a functioning ERP system (Seidel, 2009). 
  The ERP system implementation covered three different settlement areas for the different 
partner groups. Only one site had a legacy SAP system in place, only covering one settlement 
area, reflecting the local law which was relevant for this site. The two other settlement areas 
were built from scratch as a replacement for legacy host systems. As such the processes, at 
least the reflection in SAP, were mostly new for the majority of stakeholder groups. This 
includes the business people at the local sites, but also the SAP competence center. The 
(virtual) competence center consisted of three internal IT groups, and only the largest group 
had previous SAP experience as it was the service provider for the site which had the legacy 
SAP instance in Settlement Area 1 in place. 
3 Full life cycle The ERP program was subject to a full life cycle implementation, including the different phases 
(e.g. design, implementation, operations) to address the process perspective of CSFs and to 
evaluate them over the program life cycle. In the case of a multisite ERP program a significant 
number of sites needed to be in the operations phase. 
  The program cluster followed the ASAP-methodology for implementation (Accelerated SAP) 
consisting of  
Phase 1-Project Preparation, Phase 2-Blueprint, Phase 3-Realization, Phase 4- Final 
Preparation, Phase 5-GoLive Support, Phase 6-Operate (SAP AG, 2016; Sullivan 2014).  
The ASAP methodology was mainly applied to the development project, and to a certain 
extent (beside other company-specific methodologies) to the rollout projects. Nevertheless, 
all projects of the program cluster spanned the full life cycle. 
4 Time 
perspective 
An appropriate case recently executed an ERP program or the case has been in and advanced 
phase of the ERP program life cycle. This prerequisite was relevant to better grasp the 
interpretations of the interviewees about relevant actions and events.    
  When we started our interviews in July 2013, eight sites of the subprogram (program cluster) 
were already in the operations phase (Phase 6 ASAP-methodology) and used the ERP system. 
The last site was in the preparation phase. The last interviews we conducted in November 
2014, just after a common major release, including the ERP system and software applications 




It was possible to conduct a sufficient number of interviews (>5) in sufficient detail (60-90 
minutes), with key informants who know most about the program (Myers, 2009). Interviews 
are the primary source of evidence as they allow best to gather interpretations of the 




  We had the opportunity to conduct 6 interviews (average duration 90 minutes) with 6 key 
players, who were identified by our single point of contact leader of the SAP competence 
center for the ERP system. The interviewees included key players at the product- (ERP system) 






As additional data source, a suitable case site needed to provide the opportunity to analyze 
official program documents, or as Walsham (2006) proposes that in an interpretive case study 
the interviews should be supplemented by other forms of field data. Apart from internal 
documents this includes public media, press, and informal talks.   
  As documents we had the opportunity to sight and code a magnitude of documents: 
- Minutes of kick-off meeting, specifications of the software, concepts, description of roles and 
responsibilities. 
- Several status reports (at least 1 per year), results from the program steering committee 
which included milestones, risk evaluations, issues 
- Separate time schedules for the program cluster and the larger program, illustrating 
dependencies, milestones, status 
- Documents about the used methodology, company-specific, and the change request process, 
templates, common release management, testing 
- A document concerning the nomination for an SAP quality award. The company won 3rd 
place in the category “business transformation”, including a very detailed questionnaire 
developed by SAP. 
- Public documents 
The number of documents was very high and the content was very comprehensive. Overall, 
the documents consisted of more than 700 pages. Thus, given the high granularity of 
documents, they were a major source of evidence strongly corroborating the interview results. 
Table 5-1 Suitable Cases: How the Program at Pantheon Met the Predefined Criteria 
In this section we elaborated how Pantheon met the predefined criteria relevant to the case selection. In 
the next section we present research objectives of this chapter, and how it can help to answer one of the 
central research questions of our research. 
 Research Objectives of this Chapter 
The main objective of this chapter is to build a theoretical model that helps to clarify how organizational 
learning and critical success factors (CSFs) are interrelated and have evolved throughout the life cycle of a 




which was embedded in a program, to understand how the program facilitated organizational learning and 
helped to overcome a crisis situation. We interpret the role of the program as an organizational knowledge 
base that is continuously enriched through constant interpretation of action-outcome relationships. In this 
way, it preserves valuable learning for leveraging the critical success factors of ongoing projects. Our 
perspective extends prior work with a dynamic perspective on the success factors of multisite 
implementation programs, which is grounded in organizational learning theory. 
Special conditions of multisite ERP implementations emphasize the need for an overarching entity like a 
program. Multisite ERP implementations typically include several interrelated projects. Often a variety of 
partially independent stakeholder groups is involved in pursuing interdependent goals (Chang et al., 2014, 
Jiang et al., 2014). Also, ERP implementations at multisite environments have to involve multiple 
organizational levels (Van Fenema et al., 2007).  
Recent research has expanded on the investigation of ERP programs (Chang et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014; 
Seidel, 2009) and their implementation success with a perspective on process events (Lyytinen and Newman, 
2015) and organizational learning (Van Fenema et al., 2007). With respect to CSFs, Bullen and Rockart (1981, 
p. 3) emphasize that managers need to “determine whether events are proceeding sufficiently well in each 
area.” With reference to such a dynamic perspective, Lyytinen and Newman (2015) find evidence that the 
often believed success factor of participation appears to be less critical than assumed before. Their two case 
studies focused on a single university for each case – a setting arguably less complex than a multisite 
implementation requiring cross-site communication and coordination (Van Fenema et al., 2007).  
We believe that organizational learning could be of specific importance for understanding the success of a 
program that supports the ERP implementation in a multisite environment. First, as Robey et al. (2002) 
argue, an incremental program approach could help with learning from one implementation site for the 
subsequent one. As Sullivan (2014, p. 172) puts it: “mistakes made in one wave become lessons learned for 
any following waves.” Second, several cases have been reported where ERP programs have run into a crisis 
situation (Grainger et al., 2009; Mueller et al., 2014) and eventually turned into a success. Those cases have 
in common that decisions had been taken on the program level that helped to re-plan and reschedule the 
ERP implementation appropriately. Third, multiple sites are isolated with their implementation projects if 
an overarching program entity is missing. This bears the risk that mistakes that occurred at one site are 
repeated at another (PMI, 2008). The program defines governance structures that hinder such repetition of 




and the business processes it is meant to support (Somers and Nelson, 2004). We know from research on 
expertise in system analysis that such specific knowledge is built up by experience (Vitalari, 1985). Then, 
defining persons on the program level who are involved with the ERP implementation at multiple sites 
appears to be more effective to build up specialized knowledge than letting isolated teams handle their site 
implementation alone.  
Against this background, the research objective of this chapter is to investigate the dynamics of CSFs 
throughout the course of a multisite ERP implementation that is managed by a program. We conducted an 
interpretive and in-depth case study of a complex multisite ERP program, which consisted of one 
development project that was followed by nine rollout projects. The program used an incremental approach 
and was structured in waves with an overall duration of seven years. We conducted interviews and used the 
grounded theory method with organizational learning as a meta-theory. To this end, we chose the prominent 
organizational learning interpretation model by Daft and Weick (1984). For our case, we found that the 
phased approach facilitated organizational learning through the program, such that acquired knowledge was 
applied in subsequent implementation waves. This was achieved by each implementing organization after 
each wave added to the knowledge base of the program by interpretation of action-outcome relationships. 
In this way, our case highlights the role of ERP programs as a facilitator of organizational learning in relation 
to various critical success factors, thus answering (for the case at Pantheon) one of our central research 
questions posed in the initial chapters: 
Central research question 2: How can the dynamics of CSFs be considered in a general, parsimonious phase 
model?    
In this section we presented the research objectives of this specific chapter, which is a model to explain the 
dynamics of CSFs over the entire program life cycle, particularly in relation to organizational learning.  In the 
next section we elaborate on the data collection.  
 Data Collection 
We collected our data at different points in time over a period of 16 months. After eight of nine rollouts 
were completed, we conducted the initial interview with the leader of the Jupiter Competence Center, who 
was our single point of contact. After this first semi-structured interview, which lasted two hours, he sent us 
a magnitude of documents (over 700 pages in total), including meeting minutes at the program level, 




additional interviews, including two program managers (program level – shaded rows in Table 5-2), and key 
players (e.g., rollout project leaders) from the ERP competence center (at both product and project level). 
We immersed ourselves in the data to prepare questions. We had sufficient time to pose all our questions. 
On average, the interviewees were available for 90 minutes, which was highly effective. We collected a 
thorough case database on the observed phenomenon via these interviews. The final interviews were 
conducted when all sites were live and shortly after a major release package went live successfully. The 
results of the interviews were strongly corroborated through the high number of documents. 
 Interview Partners and Responsibilities 
Lead of ERP Jupiter Competence Center 
Rollout (ERP Jupiter project) leader for several rollouts 
Senior program manager, responsible for the program cluster implementing the ERP system Jupiter 
ERP expert, work-package responsible, participated in all rollouts 
External senior consultant, Rollout (ERP project) leader for several rollouts 
Junior program manager, for the program cluster implementing the ERP system Jupiter 
Table 5-2 Interview Partners at the Program (shaded) and Product Level 
In analyzing the data, we followed a grounded theory approach, with a continuous interplay between data 
collection and analysis. All interviews were fully transcribed leading to 180 pages of interview transcripts, 
and together with a magnitude of documents (including periodic meeting minutes, schedules and 
milestones, program, program and project documents, methodological and public documents) they formed 
our case database (hermeneutic unit) in ATLAS.ti7. 
 Data Analysis and Coding Procedure 
The accounts of Berente and Yoo (2012), Boudreau and Robey (2005), and Orlikowski (1993) are three typical 
examples in which the grounded theory method was applied in studies with underlying interpretive 
philosophical assumptions. Seidel and Urquhart (2013) stress that the grounded theory approach has been 
interpreted in idiosyncratic ways and flexibly deployed. One variant is exemplified by Sarker et al. (2001), 
which follows the same coding steps (open-axial-selective) as the Straussian approach (Strauss and Corbin, 




hierarchical network view (see Appendix C) reflecting the relations between the concepts. Next we detailed 
these relations by writing integrative memos (see Appendix C), including as many concepts as possible. 
Finally, we performed selective coding (Sarker et al. 2001; Strauss and Corbin; 1998) which is the relation of 
categories, resulting from axial and open coding to the core category (in our case “Lessons Learned - 
Continuous Improvement”, see Appendix C). 
The selection of the proper core category is particularly important for building the storyline over the course 
of the ERP program life cycle (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Sarker et al., 2001). The main categories of axial 
coding reflect CSFs in many cases. Relating them to the proper core category “Lessons Learned - Continuous 
Improvement” helps us to answer how the program approach facilitates organizational learning over the 
course of the ERP implementation and shaped the CSFs. This was accomplished through several iterations 
in which we investigated how the CSFs changed as a consequence of the learning program. Furthermore, as 
interpretive researchers, we put particular consideration on the context of our multisite ERP implementation 
and followed an interpretive, but rigid procedure to analyze our data, in which the coding process was 
discussed regularly between the researchers. In the next section we elaborate on existing research and the 
challenges of multisite ERP implementation environments and what we know about organizational learning 
in this context. 
 Multisite Environments & Organizational Learning in the ERP Context 
The immanent levels of uncertainty and risk (Reiss and Paul, 2013) need emphasis and require a dynamic 
learning capacity of programs. Thus, while the development of programs can be grounded in strategic 
development concepts, their delivery is linked into organizational learning concepts (Thiry, 2004).  ERP 
implementations at large multisite environments in many ways reflect the above requirements of programs.  
A multisite ERP implementation has the potential to integrate data, systems, and processes across 
geographic locations and business units (Markus et al., 2000a). Establishing standards and process 
harmonization were seen to provide a profound positive competitive impact, e.g., by supporting rollouts in 
a standardized way via templates (Huber et al., 2000). These multisite rollouts, however, are often exposed 
to unexpected problems as local sites may resist the new system or insist on local adaptations (Gulla and 
Mollan, 1999; van Fenema et al., 2007), or need to fulfill different statutory and regulatory requirements 
(Sullivan, 2014). This would threaten the integrative nature of an ERP system (van Fenema et al., 2007) and 
the ability to coordinate and monitor their performance in real-time over geographic boundaries (Rajagopal, 




coordination than smaller scale or single-site implementations, e.g., in regard to business strategy, software 
configurations, and applied rollout strategies, either big bang- or phased rollout (Markus et al., 2000a; Umble 
et al., 2003).  
Multisite ERP implementations are especially challenging, uncertain, and complex (Markus et al., 2000a). 
Sullivan (2014) stresses that such large-scale implementations, especially across multiple locations, often 
require additional financial resources implemented through a centralized program management office 
(PMO). Depending on the size the PMO, its functions can be performed by one or several individuals. The 
functions may involve integration management, financial control, risk management, resource management, 
scheduling, and tracking (Sullivan, 2014). According to Blick et al. (2000), the organization of a PMO in a 
public sector ERP project is difficult and should include small business teams to effectively address the actual 
business process requirements. Such insights, however, are largely restricted to the public sector, where 
governments demand PMOs for awarding the contract and managing the ERP implementation (Wagner and 
Antonucci, 2009). 
ERP implementations can last several years and involve investments of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars 
(Sullivan, 2014).  Consequently, research has devoted a lot of effort to investigate its CSFs. Many accounts 
present taxonomies (e.g., Bingi et al., 1999; Holland and Light, 1999; Sumner, 2000), assigning them to 
multiple phases (e.g., Al-Mashari et al., 2003; Markus and Tanis, 2000; Parr and Shanks, 2000; Somers and 
Nelson, 2004; Umble et al., 2003) or summarizing the concepts of such taxonomies (e.g., Finney and Corbett, 
2007; Nah et al., 2001).  While presenting a lot of CSFs and the consideration of phases, the multisite 
perspective of ERP implementations is missing in these accounts (van Fenema et al., 2007). One of the rare 
exceptions is the account of Umble et al. (2003) who present multisite issues as one of their CSFs. In this 
account, they stress the proper definition of the degree of autonomy, additional communication and 
coordination demands, and learning-curve benefits as relevant issues for multisite ERP implementations. 
Particularly, in relation to learning-curve benefits, they emphasize the superiority of a phased rollout 
compared to a big bang approach (Umble et al., 2003). Nevertheless, possible strategies (as programs) to 
meet these challenges and issues were not clearly defined in those early accounts. Furthermore, we see 
multisite issues as more of a contextual condition than as a CSF. 
Learning effects, as a result of strategic learning, were also reported by Grainger et al. (2009) and Robey et 
al. (2002). They are consistent with program management goals (Cabinet Office, 2011; PMI, 2008). The 




performance during its life based on experience. Lessons learned that focus on identifying project and 
program successes and failures are stored through the life cycle to improve the performance of future 
programs and projects (PMI, 2008). Robey et al. (2002) highlight knowledge barriers of two types associated 
either with the configuration of the ERP package or those associated with the assimilation of new work 
processes. It is a strength of multisite implementations or phased approaches that they facilitate 
organizational learning (Davenport, 2000; Robey et al., 2002; Newell et al., 2006; van Fenema et al., 2007; 
Sullivan, 2014). Although widely recognized, the storage of this knowledge and its application in the ERP 
context is insufficiently considered in the existing literature (Ebrahimi, 2012). 
The above discussion has shown that ERP implementations can be conceptualized as programs, which help 
to control and deliver the usually interrelated projects, particularly in complex multisite environments and 
may also provide effective mechanisms for adaptations and learning. Furthermore, insufficient accounting 
of the changing or different conditions in the environment has been repeatedly identified as a major 
problem in ERP implementations (e.g. Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001; Hong and Kim, 2002). The extant 
literature on CSFs has paid considerably less attention to the dynamic and context-specific nature of CSFs 
(Boonstra, 2006; Lyytinen and Newman, 2015; Markus and Robey, 1988). Taken together, there is hardly 
any conceptual and even less empirical work that considers multisite ERP implementations as programs and 
the dynamic role of CSFs in this regard. As programs allow for learning, program management has to consider 
different CSFs according to the accumulated learning experiences. 
We lack an understanding of how to achieve program management goals and learning based on experience 
(Cabinet Office, 2011), and how this learning experiences are stored for application in future programs and 
projects (PMI, 2008; Ebrahimi, 2012). We further lack understanding of the aforementioned proposition that 
phased approaches facilitate organizational learning in multisite environments (Umble et al., 2003). In 
particular, we need to better understand how the utilization of an ERP program can lead to a more effective 
knowledge transfer (Lycett et al., 2004) in multisite-environments.  
The analysis within this chapter seeks to address this research gap. In investigating a multisite ERP 
implementation, embedded in a large-scale program environment, we create a parsimonious model of 
organizational learning in the ERP program context (based on the organizational learning interpretation 
model of Daft and Weick, 198416). Thus, our approach and model is useful to answer the central research 
                                                          
16 For the sake of better readability, we come back to the organizational learning interpretation model of Daft and Weick (1984) 




question, which deals with the consideration of the dynamics of CSFs in a general, parsimonious phase model 
during all phases of the ERP life cycle (central research question 2 of the dissertation). 
In this section we provided an overview about existing research and challenges in multisite ERP 
implementations. Additionally, we provided an overview about organizational learning in the ERP program 
context. Next, we will turn to our case study at Pantheon.    
 The Case at Pantheon 
This section presents the findings of our case study at Pantheon (a pseudonym). We start with contextual 
information as the settings of the case are particularly important for an interpretive study. Next, we illustrate 
the different projects of the ERP implementation, which were structured in a program and rolled out in 
waves (phased or incremental approach). We present some typical reference quotations, which illustrate 
the process of open and axial coding, and the typical problems that arose during the different phases. We 
illustrate how organizational learning took place throughout the course of the program by applying an 
interpretation model originating from organizational learning theory. Finally, we will present a list of CSFs 
grounded in data, based on observed action-outcome relationships, and a general model of organizational 
learning in the program context. 
5.6.1 Contextual Information and Governance Structures 
Pantheon is a European company operating in the insurance sector. Pantheon consists of nine subsidiaries 
that conduct business autonomously within their markets. Their business processes were partially similar 
but differed significantly in certain areas (henceforth, Settlement Area 1, 2 and 3) complying with different 
laws. Each subsidiary had its own IT department and a custom-made legacy host system to execute the 
settlements and disbursements for its business partners. The maintenance of the old fashioned legacy 
systems was very costly and not very efficient. The stakeholders of Pantheon had a strong interest that the 
company operates efficiently. Therefore, Pantheon is subject to ongoing discussions and efficiency 
initiatives. Due to the suboptimal situation with regard to their legacy settlement/disbursement systems, 
Pantheon decided to introduce an SAP ERP system called Jupiter. At the final stage of the Jupiter 
implementation, it included around 15 million master data records. Moreover, more than 10000 business 
partners started their settlements and received their payments via this product. For example, in Settlement 
Area 1, 8.5 million settlements, 40 million line items, and a volume of 450 million Euro are settled quarterly 




The ERP system implementation was only one of various improvement initiatives. Besides 25 standard 
products (products which need to be implemented by all subsidiaries (sites) within a given period of time), 
the Pantheon runs around 200-250 different applications in its central data processing service center. New 
releases and products are continuously rolled out. As a consequence, the ERP system initiative had to 
consider a multitude of implications due to related projects and products, leading Pantheon to decide to 
embed the rollout series into the program Saturn. As quotation Q1 indicates, this was a very good decision. 
Q1: As part of my history with other SAP tools, I was looking forward to being part of a program, since for 
PRODUCT1 and PRODUCT2 [standard products] these negotiations, when do we deploy which release, which 
components in which intervals [...] were always bilateral conversations....17 different projects and every time 
I had to find an alignment about something with the finance, logistics or personnel director....and during the 
Jupiter implementation it was clear to me, that it doesn´t work only as Jupiter alone, Jupiter depends on the 
STANDARDPRODUCT4711..... STANDARDPRODUCT4712 needed to be deployed for the subsidiary, and it was 
clear to me that all these bilateral reconciliations, at least those I don´t need anymore.....and the program 
management monitors the dependencies to other standard products, data processing service center projects, 
consolidation projects....in the master-plan of Saturn one sees also,....where am I on the critical path,.....when 
I postpone one Jupiter rollout, what other projects and products are negatively impacted. After all, this was 
really a very, very good support. (Lead of ERP Jupiter Competence Center, 1509 ff.) 
Open codes: Dependencies to other products/projects visible; no bilateral reconciliations necessary 
anymore. 





Figure 5-1 The Program Structure “Saturn” at “Pantheon” 
  
We labeled the various stages of our program structure based upon ancient Roman mythology. The 
Pantheon (Figure 5-1) in ancient Rome was blessed to all gods. Jupiter was the king of the gods and is 
equated in our case study with the standard product, the ERP system Jupiter (shaded), which was subject to 
the implementation at Pantheon. 
Saturn was the father of Jupiter and represents the implementation program governance structure, 
including the product Jupiter and other standard products. The connotation Saturn/Jupiter represents the 
program cluster (subprogram), which is the cluster relevant for the rollouts of product Jupiter (ERP system). 
The program cluster Saturn/Jupiter provided assistance and guidelines and reported to the program steering 
committee of the program Saturn (consisting of the IT directors of all sites, central representatives of Saturn, 
and from the standard products). Although the relevant committee at Pantheon was the program sponsor 
and the sites had to implement the product Jupiter within a certain time, neither the program cluster nor 
the Jupiter Competence Center had the authority for directives regarding the rollout projects. 
The Jupiter Competence Center was responsible for the product development and standard product owner 
of Jupiter and consisted of teams located within three different sites, including Apollo1 as a lead. As the 
general service provider, the Jupiter Competence Center implemented the product at the sites with support 




The nine sites are represented by other Roman gods and the number of the wave in which they were 
implemented. Lastly, the box contains the size information of a site in + (small), ++ (medium), +++ (large), 
which were not a predictor for the implementation success, as we will see. All sites have on the one hand 
their own duties and are autonomous, but on the other hand are connected through the Pantheon.  Figure 
5-1 illustrates the autonomy of the sites. The rollout projects had their own governance structures according 
to the needs of each site. As Figure 5-1 illustrates, the governance structure was extremely complex, but it 
was exactly this structure that helped to secure the unity and the success of the ERP implementation.   
 
Figure 5-2 Plan vs. Actual Go-Live Dates 
 
Figure 5-2 depicts the time schedule (go-live milestones) of the Jupiter development and rollout projects. 
The schedule was embedded into the overall master plan of Saturn, considering dependencies to projects 
and products and their relevant sub-schedules in the Jupiter environment. The overall master plan and its 
sub-schedules were subject to permanent adaptations, either due to overall requirements or reasons 
stemming from its parts. The rollout projects of Jupiter were integrated into the program cluster 
Saturn/Jupiter, which was also the case for other products within Saturn. The master plan depicted the 
interdependencies of projects within a cluster, but also in relation to the products, projects, and other 
clusters within the overall program. To illustrate the dynamic nature of the schedule of Jupiter, Figure 5-2 
depicts the planned go-live dates at the beginning of the rollout series (11/2010) compared to the actual go-
live dates. As two rollout projects were mostly implemented at the same time, we subdivide the rollout 




5.6.2 A Model of Interpretation  
As an incremental approach allows us to draw on experiences from previous waves (e.g., Robey et al., 2002; 
van Fenema et al., 2007), we present a model (Daft and Weick, 1984) on how a program could facilitate 
organizational learning (Figure 5-3). We will use this model as a lens for interpreting our data. Therefore, 
organizational learning theory acts as a meta-theory, constituting “Lessons Learned - Continuous 
Improvement” as the core category in our grounded theory approach (Sarker et al., 2001). 
We define organizational learning as the process by which knowledge about action-outcome relationships17 
between the organization (in our case, the program) and the environment (in our case, the changed context, 
which experiences major changes through the start of new rollout projects at new sites) is developed 
(Duncan and Weiss, 1979). 
Daft and Weick (1984) distinguish between three stages: 
1. Scanning is the process of monitoring the environment and includes data collection. 
2. Interpretation: Data are associated with meaning, by the human mind, cognitive maps are constructed, 
and perceptions are shared. This process of translating events leads to shared understanding and conceptual 
schemes. 
3. Learning: This stage includes the action taken based upon interpretation by applying the developed 
knowledge to the new environmental conditions. This means that new action-outcome relationships are 
developed based upon the learning experience.   
All three stages are interconnected in a feedback loop. The feedback of the action-outcome relationship in 
stage 3 generates new data (knowledge base) for interpretation, followed by choosing a new action (Figure 
5-3). 
                                                          
17 We are well aware that many definitions and views regarding organizational learning exist (e.g. Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 
1988). A good overview of organizational learning in the IT context can be found in Robey et al. (2000). They posit that the process 
of organizational learning provides direction for organizational actions, thus increasing its repertoire for actions. For our purposes 
the consideration of action-outcomes relationships fits best (Duncan and Weiss, 1979). This view is consistent with learning from 
experience (e.g. Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988) or the application of previous knowledge gained from earlier projects to 





Figure 5-3 Relationships Between Organizational Scanning, Interpretation, and Learning (Daft and Weick, 1984) 
 
In our case, we will apply this model to the implementation waves, as this breakdown better enables us to 
trace the process of organizational learning between the stages (although we admit that the process is 
iterative and learning also takes place within the waves). During each wave, the program (through its actors) 
applies data from its knowledge base, interprets it, and chooses a new action-outcome relation. By 
remembering and assessing the outcomes of each wave, the program adds to the knowledge base through 
interpretation, which can be applied during the next wave by the program cluster and the Jupiter 
Competence Center. This view is consistent with definitions of organizational memory in organizational 
learning theory: “Rules, procedures, technologies, beliefs, and cultures are conserved through systems of 
socialization and control. They are retrieved through mechanisms of attention within a memory structure. 
Such organizational instruments not only record history but shape its future path” (Levitt and March, 1988, 
p. 326). In this paper we use the term knowledge base. They furthermore emphasize that inferences can be 
drawn from experience and are recorded, e.g., in documents, files, standard operating procedures, rule 
books, and shared perceptions. Those means are readily available in a program, as a temporary organization 
(Cabinet Office, 2011; Turner and Müller, 2003), thus enabling the program organizational learning. 
 
In the following sections, we exemplify our three-step coding procedure on the basis of reference quotations 
for each wave. We start with labeling data chunks referred to as open coding, followed by axial coding, which 
leads to our main categories. Finally, we use our interpretation model of organizational learning as a lens to 
relate the main concepts to the core category “Lessons Learned - Continuous Improvement.” 
5.6.3 The Development Project and the First Rollout (Wave 1) at Apollo1 (2007-2011) 
The development project was started in 2007, and the gathering of user requirements and the writing of a 




visited all nine sites to define common processes as a basis for the development phase. Table 5-3 depicts 
the main difficulties within those phases. The root cause of these difficulties stems from the different laws 
that underlie the settlement areas and the multitude of legacy applications that were used by the different 
sites. Consequently, the blueprint and the development project needed to consider significant changes in all 
settlement areas. 
Settlement 
Area - SA 
Contracts based on Legacy applications Jupiter challenge 
SA 1 
 
Nine local laws Apollo1 already used a SAP 
application. 
All other sites used different 
host applications. 
Rebuilding and enhancing the legacy 
application. Meeting the 
fundamentally different process 
requirements. 
SA 2 One common law Different host applications Building the new area from scratch, 
representing minor process variations. 
SA 3 One common law – 
different local 
settlement rates  
Different host applications 
Table 5-3 The Development Project and its Challenges 
Over a period of four years (2007-2010) the Jupiter Competence Center spent a lot of time meeting the 
requirements of the blueprint and a first development project which was planned to be rolled out at Apollo1. 
Apollo1 was chosen since it was the only site that already had a legacy SAP implementation in place (for 
Settlement Area 1). Also, the SAP department of Apollo1 was the standard product owner of Jupiter and 
leading the Jupiter Competence Center. Furthermore, the business experts at Apollo1 were the only ones 
who had SAP experience and could articulate their processes and requirements sufficiently, whereas this 
was significantly harder for the business experts of other sites who were used to their custom-made host 
applications. Therefore, although it should have been a comprehensive and general document, the blueprint 
also strongly reflected the processes of Apollo1 as Q2 illustrates. 
Q2: Apollo1 was the site which was most straightforward...as there was greatest understanding of the 
content [of the blueprint].....We wrote the blueprint over a long time and sent it to quality assurance....then 
someone was sitting opposite me who had no idea about SAP, sometimes not even from IT, since they are 




9 sites, 6 said 'Yes!', only since they didn´t know it better....and here Apollo1 had of course an 
advantage.....since we used a language which they knew already... A) they scrutinized it better and B) the 
blueprint was weighted heavily towards Apollo1...since we of course had only the experiences of Apollo1, 
that´s why a lot of processes reflected the processes of Apollo1....therefore it [the blueprint] was ok for 
Apollo1, at least in the SA1 (settlement area 1). (Rollout (ERP system project) leader for several rollouts, 437 
ff.) 
Open codes: Blueprint weighted towards Apollo1; phases of the development project; different perceptions 
regarding blueprint and template 
Axial codes: Business process management; perceptions; methodology 
For Settlement Area 1 the rollout for Apollo1 went smoothly. But the development of Settlement Areas 2 
and 3 were major challenges for the project team. This was mainly because the ERP representation of the 
settlement areas had to be developed from scratch since the legacy systems were different custom-made 
host applications. Nevertheless, the rollout team managed to get Settlement Area 2 live according to the 
date specified in the initial time schedule, whereas the go-live date for Settlement Area 3 had to be 
postponed (see quotation Q3). Yet, this was the only time when the go-live of Settlement Area 3 had to be 
postponed. We conclude that the Apollo1 rollout had difficulties, but was completed successfully.      
Q3: It was the only time when Settlement Area 3 was problematic, and was also postponed….. As it was a 
new process, not running on SAP before. And as it was a general process [based on 1 law] it was sufficient 
that Apollo1 1 said that it is ok, after long discussions. All the others, apart from a few settings or 
deviations...., run in principle the process the same way. Indeed, Apollo1 1 was a pioneer.... with two 
settlement areas tackled the first time, and accordingly it was relatively exhausting and also time-consuming. 
(Rollout (ERP Jupiter project) leader for several rollouts, 471 ff.) 
Interpretation of Wave 1: No significant actions (adaptions of the original plan) were taken for the 
preparation of the rollouts in Wave 2 because the outcomes of Wave 1 were interpreted positively. The 
difficulties and the postponement of the go-live in Settlement Area 3 were attributed to the newly 
introduced processes in the SAP ERP system. Nevertheless, the knowledge base was increased and the 




5.6.4 Wave 2: Vesta2 and Neptune2 – The Watermelons (2011-2012) 
The first rollouts after Apollo1 were turning points in the program. Vesta2 was a small site with project 
management issues and had some exclusive processes in place. Neptune2 was also facing project 
management issues and was, therefore, supported by members of the program cluster and external experts. 
Quotation 4 illustrates the major project management issues at Neptune2 and the escalation procedure 
followed by the program cluster. 
Q4: Well, time and time again there was the necessity for an escalation. For example, at Neptune2 where we 
realized that with the existing project leader and project team it does not work. .... together [with people 
from Neptune2] we made an investigation about the current situation of the project, ....and we could suggest, 
that it will not work that way, and that one has to exchange the project management and the project leader, 
and then we organized a [new] project leader for Neptune2, and presented it to the program steering 
committee. This was a hefty escalation. (Senior program manager, 615 ff.) 
Open codes:  Escalation level for hot topics; Neptune2 
Axial codes: Program governance 
Quotation 5 underlines the major project management problems that contributed to missing deliverables, 
missed deadlines, a lack of overall direction, and a crisis.  
Q5: They [Vesta2, Neptune2] were partially called watermelons, since the projects looked so green and as 
we cut them, sliced them and looked into them, we realized that they are deep red and essential deliverables 
were simply missing, not there......typically for a project which is in danger of facinga crisis. It was not clear 
which direction one should take, plans were missing, the test management was also not clear......well, this 
was indeed a critical phase, where one had the first no-go decisions or delays, and where one need to 
reschedule the whole program, also postponing the rollouts of other sites. (Junior program manager, 1:10) 
Open codes: Missing deliverables lead to more involvement of the program cluster; rollout plan of program 
cluster needs to be adapted 
Axial codes: Project governance; program governance; time management, Vesta2, Neptune2 
The schedules had to be adapted by significantly extending the envisioned implementation times for the 
remaining rollouts. At Neptune2, Settlement Areas 1 and 2 went live at a later stage, whereas Settlement 




of the major improvements in Settlement Area 3 within Wave 1 (quotation Q3 illustrates this). At Vesta2, 
the go-lives for all settlement areas were entirely shifted by one quarter. 
Furthermore, during Wave 2, the implementation team realized that the blueprint and product Jupiter were 
not matching the requirements of Vesta2 and Neptune2. This was particularly true for Settlement Area 1 
where the contracts with business partners were based on different laws. During the blueprint-phase of the 
development project, the business experts at Vesta2 and Neptune2 (presumably also the other sites apart 
from Apollo1) could not articulate their process needs sufficiently, as they did not have SAP know-how. 
Consequently, the blueprint and the product met only the requirements of Apollo1. Additionally, there was 
a considerable time-gap of more than three years between the start of the blueprint and the envisioned 
rollout project, which could have led to “moving targets.” As quotation Q6 indicates the mismatch between 
blueprint/product Jupiter and the requirements was a major reason for the delays.    
Q6: Vesta2 postponed the entire Jupiter go-live by one quarter, and this confounded the entire rollout-
schedule and the maintenance- and the rollout-team, as the next rollouts Mars3, Mercurius3 [3rd wave]… 
the rollout-phases already started, the planning [phase was started]. Initially, the rollout-phases were six 
months, but one [steering committee of the program] extended the rollouts-schedules slightly, and for Juno5, 
Minerva5 [5th wave]... [the timeframe of] the rollout project was 15 months. After all, one recognized very 
early, during the rollouts of Apollo1, Neptune2, Vesta2 that the [envisioned] rollout-time 6 months was too 
short termed, and that the sites need considerably longer for the rollout, or need considerably more time, 
since the sites were asked in the business blueprint what they want.....but only during employment of the 
[test] system we recognized that the sites understood the blue print differently as we understood what we 
should develop, and indeed the product was tailored to the need of one site only during the rollout. (Lead of 
ERP Jupiter Competence Center, 1044 ff.) 
Open codes:  Different perceptions regarding the blueprint and the template; different perceptions; rollout 
plan of program cluster needs to be adapted 
Axial codes: Business process management; perceptions; time management, Apollo1, Vesta2, Neptune2, 






Minutes, Steering committee, 10-Aug-2011 – Tasks of the Program cluster Saturn/Jupiter 
 Conducting of project reviews at Neptune2 and enhancing of the rollout project at Neptune2, together 
with Jupiter CC and external co-workers to assure the go-live date 
 Creation of a detailed template-plan together with Jupiter CC to support the rollout projects, 
 Analysis of breakdown scenarios in Jupiter environment (currently interrupted because of Neptune2 
rollout), 
 Coordination and support of integration projects, ongoing coordination and reconciliation concerning 
critical topics (data center, data quality of central business partners...) 
 Supporting Jupiter CC in regard to install change request management 
 Execution, coordination of the bi-weekly conference call (regular rollout meeting for all sites) as the 
central information and communication platform for all Jupiter rollout projects 
 Updating environmental architecture, with central release-calendar, integrated planning, support of sites 
to meet entry-criteria [central methodology], Jupiter-process architecture 
 Providing central program cluster documents within the Jupiter portal, issue info regarding integrated 
product-architecture  
Table 5-4 Minutes, Steering Committee, 10-Aug-2011, Tasks, Program Cluster (shortened) 
Table 5-4 depicts task and responsibilities of the program cluster Saturn/Jupiter as they were recorded in 
the meeting minutes of the steering committee in August 2011. At that time, it was still not clear that the 
go-live dates of Neptune2 and Jupiter2 would be shifted (although already likely) by one quarter, but the 
strong involvement of the program cluster in the rollout projects indicates that this possibility already 
existed. In the same document, the traffic-light status of the rollout projects was partially red. Furthermore, 
the tasks indicate the integration functions of the program cluster, including cross-project responsibilities 
for the Jupiter rollouts and with the environment of Jupiter. Additionally, the responsibility for creating best-
practices templates and methods, which were stored in the Jupiter portal, enlarging the knowledge base for 
the remaining rollout projects.  
Open Codes: Program cluster as coordinating; leading force in relation to other standard products; rigid 
change request process; dynamic lessons learned; best practice list program cluster; synergy effects through 
common release management 
Axial Codes: Lessons learned - continuous improvement; solution architecture-integration management; 





Interpretation of Wave 2:  The extension of the time-frames reflected better the project needs and the 
needs stemming from the mismatch between the blueprint/product and site requirements. Project 
Management issues were tackled. Best practice methods of the program were enhanced, as well as the test 
management, and tests could subsequently be better monitored. Consequently, the rollouts at Vesta2 and 
Neptune2 had impacts on the remaining rollouts within the program cluster Saturn/Jupiter and on the larger 
program Saturn. 
5.6.5 Wave 3 – First Rollouts with Complete Scope – Performance Problems (2012) 
The difficulties with rollout projects at Vesta2 and Neptune2 led to actions regarding the time schedule, 
project management issues, and methods of best practice. These provided significant improvements in 
Wave 3. Generally, the project management performance was judged positively by the senior program 
manager, although an additional resource was needed at Mercurius3 in order to back up the part-time 
project manager. The improved best-practice methods and the extended time-frame allowed a better 
coverage of the site-specific requirements, as well as the improvement of the product quality of Jupiter. At 
Mars3 a serious complication was tackled shortly before go-live (quotation Q7). Consequently, the rollout 
projects at Mars3 and Mercurius3 were the first that went live on time and with the complete scope. 
Q7: At Mars3 we had real problems with various topics...which could be repaired, shortly before go-live we 
had a big problem, which did not work properly, which, thankfully, could be solved. And the director of Mars3 
is a very, very straightforward thinking guy, who took the problems seriously and pushed them through and 
escalated and so on. Well, this was stressful at this level. I also have to emphasize that it is better to discuss 
and solve the problems before go-live than afterwards, and major problems suddenly pop up in the 
stabilization phase (Senior program manager, 800 ff.) 
Open Code:  Mars3 
Axial Code: Mars3 
However, this wave was also characterized by major performance problems, leading to long processing times 
for the settlement scenarios, although the calculation was correct. These shortcomings required actions on 
behalf of the program cluster, which initiated a performance task force. 
Q8: Performance issues, that settlements for certain business partners ran several days, which usually take 




did some actions to increase the performance. Some [custom] coding was not optimized, but finally 
solved....and we did certain actions in the data center, with the database and similar things to reduce the 
time. (Senior program manager, 809 ff.) 
Open Codes: Consideration of environment has positive effect; program cluster as coordinating and leading 
force 
Axial Codes: Solution architecture - integration management; program governance; reasons for usage of 
programs   
Interpretation of Wave 3: This wave resulted in a further enhancement of product quality as a response to 
existing functional problems. Upcoming optimization requirements regarding performance issues were 
identified and addressed by the program steering committee. Furthermore, mitigation actions started 
through the creation of a performance task force. 
5.6.6 Wave 4 – First Go-live Without Functional Problems – Ongoing Performance Problems 
Eventually, Diana4 became the first rollout project without any functional problems reported, as quotation 
9 illustrates. The senior program manager emphasized the degree of product maturity, as a consequence of 
the requirements and actions in previous waves, and the collaboration at Diana4. From the perspective of 
products in the environment, the program cluster managed certain data-warehouse requirements, which 
were an important but a unique requirement of Diana4. The performance problems were still evident, such 
that they were added to the risk register as high-priority risk and expected to get worse, because the 
remaining Jupiter rollout projects would increase the size of the common database. For Diana4, as a large 
site with a high data volume, the problems were intended to be solved before the next large settlement 
scenario took place one month later. From a functional perspective, the rollout project at Diana4 was very 
successful and the persisting performance problems were addressed. 
Q9: And then three months later [after Mars3, Mercurius3] we went live at Diana4, and this was the first 
rollout where everything worked perfectly, with complete scope and also the user knew their stuff, it was 
wonderful and it worked. (Lead of ERP Jupiter Competence Center 1074 ff.)  
Open Codes:  Increasing learning curve over the course of the rollouts; Diana4 




Interpretation of Wave 4: No actions regarding the functional requirements of the ERP system were needed 
anymore, apart from the specific requirements of products in the environment. The performance problems 
became a topic on the agenda of the steering committee meeting in August 2012; the program cluster was 
intended to lead further investigations with the inclusion of external support. 
5.6.7 Wave 5 – Continuous Improvement, High Product Quality (2012, 2013)  
The actions in relation to the performance issues significantly improved the situation and cycle-times of the 
settlements. However, the performance topic was still on the agenda of the steering committees and subject 
to regular monitoring and improvement. Apart from the mitigated and improved performance issues and 
some transparency issues reported from the Jupiter Competence Center for Juno5, the rollout projects at 
Juno5 and Minerva5 were excellent examples of smooth implementations. The teams at the sites seemed 
to be well prepared, and so was the project management as quotation Q10 shows.   
Q10: Certain sites, for example Minerva....they really did an excellent job regarding test management. They 
had a test team, sitting in a separate room during the rollout, and recorded all the test cases, they tested 
everything, really in all the different variations, and monitored everything. The reporting was excellent. They 
did it in their own interest, they realized it and then the test management was supported and the conditions 
created, to assure it. (External senior consultant, 406 ff.) 
Open Codes: Different perceptions regarding the necessity of testing; Minerva5 
Axial Codes: Testing; Minerva5 
At this stage, we want to address the product quality over the course of the rollouts, as this was a main 
consequence of organizational learning and emphasized in relation to these rollout projects as compared to 
Apollo1 (see quotation Q11). At the start the product quality of the ERP system was not very high. For the 
Apollo1 rollout, however, this was somehow manageable since they already had a legacy SAP 
implementation in place and, therefore, experienced SAP users. Additionally, the blueprint and the 
development project were tailored towards Apollo1 as they had SAP experience. Their SAP department was 
the lead of Jupiter, and they were intended to be the first rollout. Nevertheless, the product quality also led 
to certain problems during the rollout of Apollo1, but which only became evident to the full extent during 
the rollouts of Vesta2 and Neptune2. This turned out to be a huge challenge, particularly for the Jupiter 




experience, the situation changed for the better. In the end, the ERP system Jupiter was a very mature and 
flexible product as the quotations Q11 and Q12 indicate. 
Q11: At that time, when we went live in Apollo1, the product was certainly full with errors. Errors, which you 
simply don’t realize [during development and testing], but which you realize when the system is 
productive....The system,...during the rollouts of Juno5 and Minerva5 was certainly much more stable and 
containing fewer errors than the one we implemented when we went live with Apollo1. Definitely! (ERP 
expert, work-package responsible, participated in all rollout, 894 ff.) 
Open Code: Product quality increases over the course of the rollouts; Apollo1, Juno5; Minerva5 
Axial Code:  Increasing product quality; Apollo1, Juno5; Minerva5 
Q12: Basically, we have one process. But I mean that the single processes are flexible enough, that everyone 
[functional experts at the different sites] can live with it. Partially flexible enough, since the standard solution 
of SAP is already flexible enough, and that, what we wrote [developed/coded] ourselves is flexible enough 
too....So many customizing options and such flexibility. And eventually we realized that it can work with SAP, 
and that´s why it is working! ...Of course it can happen that a site makes new contract....then we just add 
this new thing. But I simply believe, that we have a magnitude, a huge pool of options which we can offer, 
that we can deal with it flexibly. And if not, then we have the change request process.  (ERP expert, work-
package responsible, participated in all rollouts, 1271 ff.) 
Open codes: Flexibility although standard packaged software; established change request process: 
perceptions 
Axial codes: Increasing product quality, methodology, perceptions 
Interpretation of Wave 5: Very smooth rollout projects, acknowledged in all interviews and minutes of the 
steering committee. No actions in relation to functional requirements were required because of the very 
mature and flexible product. Ongoing performance optimizations were reported in the steering committee 
meeting minutes in August 2013 although to a lesser degree compared to previous waves. Partially, it was 
reported as a risk mitigation in response to the growing number of users of the shared database. In the same 
document, the program cluster was intended to support the last rollout project as Ceres6 due to a lack of 




5.6.8 Wave 6 – Sourcing Out of External Consultants 
Apart from small issues, the rollout project at Ceres6 was very successful. The program cluster supported 
the site in project management- and test management issues and the general impression of all stakeholders 
was positive. Also at this stage, there was not a negative note with regards to performance issues. However, 
performance issues seemed to be a topic in the larger program, which is consistent with performance dips 
frequently reported in the ERP literature (e.g., Hitt et al., 2002). 
At the start of the development project, a kind of ‘duality’ was established as a strategic decision. When it 
was decided to use SAP, the internal Jupiter Competence Center staff were not yet proficient with the 
software. This was particularly the case for locations Neptune2 and Mars3, where there was no SAP 
experience, which were assigned to develop Settlement Areas 2 and 3 of the Jupiter product within the 
Jupiter Competence Center. Beside external SAP trainings for the internal staff (including Apollo1 as the 
standard product owner), all work packages were supported by an internal and external owner. As Q13 
shows, this duality helped to secure transfers of knowledge and allowed the stepwise reduction of external 
team members. Finally, at Ceres6 the rollout could be managed largely with internal experts as intended in 
the initial plan and considered in the business case. 
Q13: The mix was always an external and internal work-package owner [acted together].... the reduction of 
the externals actually works only now, after the rollouts, since simply the quantity of staff members was 
necessary. During the development we needed EXTPARTNER1, since the internals didn’t have the skills and 
the know-how. During the rollouts, after the 2nd rollout, parts of the maintenance already could be done by 
internals. But EXTPARTNER1 still supported the rollouts and only now during the 8th rollout, and the 9th 
starts soon, I mean with the 1st of October the 9th site, the 9th rollout will be the only rollout where we will 
get along almost without any external support. (Lead of ERP Jupiter Competence Center, 662 ff.) 
Open codes: Continuous learning curve over the course of the rollouts; defined duality between externals 
and internals with know-how transfer; Ceres6 
Axial codes: Lessons learned - continuous improvement; human capital management; implementation 
partner; Ceres6 
Interpretation of Wave 6: This wave was characterized by a mature project team, a mature product, and a 
smooth go-live. The program cluster assisted during project setup and realization for Ceres6. The operations 




request process were subject to this wave. This resulted in a successful major release in November 2014 of 
Jupiter (and products in its environment), although heavily customized (different as reported previously in 
ERP literature, e.g., Parr and Shanks, 2000). 
5.6.9 Critical Success Factors in Relation to Organizational Learning- Selective Coding 
In the previous sections, we provided an overview of the ERP implementation and illustrated organizational 
learning based on the model of Daft and Weick (1984). We presented several instances during several waves 
as the level of analysis where organizational learning took place through continuously interpreting current 
environments and action-outcome relationships (feedback loop), leading to an increased knowledge base. 
The results suggest that the program served as a knowledge base and a means for organizational learning, 
therefore influencing CSFs over the course of the implementation life cycle. Whereas a number of CSFs (and 
sites) were presented on a descriptive level as axial codes, we now present the CSFs as more abstract 
categories and relate them to more general ideas and concepts to apply to multiple situations (Klein and 
Myers, 1999). Please note that we ran all concepts through our interpretation model. They are grounded in 
data and have to be seen in the context of organizational learning as a dynamic process, based on action-
outcome relationships.   Table 5-5 depicts the CSFs related to the core category (“lessons learned-continuous 
improvement”) during selective coding. During each wave actions were taken, based on the interpretation 
of outcomes of a previous wave. The program continuously increased its knowledge base, thus meeting 
increasingly the CSFs as underlying guiding principles. As a consequence, the later waves could benefit 
significantly as more and more CSFs were met.  
CSF in Organizational 
Learning Context 
Anticipated Outcomes Actions 
Program Governance & 
Project Governance 
Up-to-date program governance structure 
with the ability to govern time schedules, 
dependencies of all products/projects in the 
larger program, a group of projects on 
product level is represented via a program 
cluster (subprogram), program should have 
the ability to issue directives to single rollout 
projects on site-level (questionable how to 
do that best in a matrix organization) 
Adapting governance structures and 
decision-making structures and 
processes (PMI, 2008) on all levels 
(program, product, project) in 
accordance of current environments and 
as a result of previous experiences, issue 






Support on all levels (program, product and 
site), sponsorship secured over the program 
(product) life cycle, commitment, awareness 
and visibility 
Engaging top management, involving 
with decisions, considering in 
stakeholder- and communication 





Stakeholder- and communication 
management is meeting current 
requirements of the program, updated 
stakeholder register, communications plan, 
meeting schedule, engagement until single 
rollout level, consideration of task force 
meetings resulting from contingencies 
Adapting stakeholder register, 
communications plan, meeting schedule 
permanently in accordance with current 
problems and challenges 
Comprehensive Time 
Management 
Up-to-date version of the time schedule of 
all rollouts at product level, considering the 
requirements, dependencies, schedules of 
the projects/products in the environment, 
therefore fitting into the overall schedule of 
the program, ambitious but realistic time 
schedule for the single rollout project 
Adapting time schedule permanently 
considering changing environments, 
defining ambitious and realistic time 
schedules for single rollout project. 
Financial Management Financial funds secured over the course of 
the rollouts, including products in the 
environment, performing within budget, 
reducing cost/site because of learning and 
meeting business cases 
Permanent controlling of actual costs 
versus targets, using resources 
efficiently over the course of the rollouts 
Scope Management Optimal alignment of process varieties and 
efficient implementation in the system 
under consideration of existing processes, 
efficient change request process with 
thresholds 
Using existing (implemented) processes 
or standard processes, implementing 
and developing new processes as flexible 
as possible to meet new requirements, 
optimize change request process, 
securing learning curve over the course 
of the rollouts 
Comprehensive Risk 
Management 
Permanent adapted version of overlapping 
risk-management (e.g. risk matrix with the 
dimensions’ impact/probability), including 
Reinterpreting the risks of particular 
products in relation to the 




the products/projects in the environment; 
mitigation of risks for the program through 
treatment at senior management level 
(committee) with the option to escalate it to 
the board, groups of projects are 
represented by members of the program 
cluster 
adapting versions of overlapping risk 
management, risk matrices at all levels 




Blueprint consists of valid requirements, 
new business processes developed in the 
system match with site requirements and 
show (continuously growing) high fit 
Facilitating understanding (training, test-
system, prototyping), ensure proper 
timing of requirement evaluation and 
flexible adaption of blueprint and system 
ERP Strategy within IT 
Strategy 
The same software package for each site 
with a common interface, harmonize 
processes as much as possible in accordance 
with local laws, common support structure 
for ERP with mainly internal experts, 
efficient interplay between ERP systems and 
other products, synergy effects through 
common release management with other 
products, efficient change request process 
with different rules for different thresholds 
Developing a high quality ERP system, in 
accordance with Solution Architecture 
with processes which allow flexible 
reaction to new requirements, creating 
common support structure, release 





Consideration of overall architecture of 
products in the larger program, 
consideration of project and product 
dependencies, group of projects are 
program clusters for appropriate integration 
management and conversations with other 
program clusters in the environment, new 
releases rolled out together and governed by 
a common release management 
Tracking and maintaining dependencies 
in overall-document and meeting 
minutes, adapting product architectures 
to fit in the overall program, adapting 
time schedules, introducing & optimizing 
common release management 
Data Management Effective and accurate migration of data and 
interplay with (central) interfaces under 
consideration of system performance. 
Improving data entry procedures and 
system performances, building the right 




reacting with aligned workarounds 
where appropriate and necessary 
Methodology Permanent usage of existing tool-supported 
methodologies (product specific e.g. ASAP, 
from associations e.g. PMI, IMPA, Cabinet 
Office, or company-specific), usage of best-
practices templates, which are readily 
available 
Continuously developing and optimizing 
best-practice templates, making the 
latest version available on company 
platforms, conveying information to 
stakeholders, choosing and 
implementing appropriate tools (e.g., 
SAP Solution Manager, Tosca etc.) 
Implementation  
Partner 
A sufficient (but not more than needed) 
number of skilled external senior consultants 
who secure rollouts, system adaptions, 
incident (issue) management, and allow the 
know-how transfer to internal experts, 
usage of the same consultants for several 
rollouts to maintain and increase the 
knowledge-base 
Contracting a sufficient number of 
external experts (if possible for several 
rollouts, assigning them efficiently to 
tasks (sites), reducing the number after 
successful know-how transfer 
Human Skills & 
Competencies 
Skilled implementation teams with emphasis 
on know-how transfer of internal experts, 
skilled key-users and business people, skills 
match current and changing requirements of 
the product and its closer environments 
Securing know-how transfer from 
external consultants to internal experts, 
facilitating cross-site communication, 
ongoing training on all levels, staffing 
and training of new members (IT and 
business) 
Training Adequate training plan and training 
documents covering general system-topics, 
special processes and project preparation, 
training paths for IT and business people, 
skilled trainers 
Planning of trainings, building of training 
capabilities, keeping documents and 
records up-to-date   
Collaboration Efficient collaboration between central and 
local teams (at site) with sufficient degree of 
transparency, and consideration of 
responsibilities and roles 
Assigning and respecting responsibilities 
and roles, standardizing of work 
processes (link to methodology) with 




Solution Manager), facilitating exchange 
of information on all levels (meetings, 
social events) 
Commitment Ongoing commitment and positive 
association with assigned roles and 
product/project, informal exchange of 
information multiplies positive associations 
and commitment 
Presenting the possibilities of learning 
something new and to grow personally 
(job enrichment), showing opportunities 
to participate during the re-definition of 
business processes in relation to new 
systems, actively disseminating relevant 
information and facilitating informal 
information exchange, training the staff 
End-to-End Testing Overlapping, up-to-date testing, which 
encompasses the products in the 
environment, the testing process is 
standardized (templates) and documented, 
later in operations phases a common release 
management allows end-to-end testing, 
therefore minimizing integration- and 
regression testing efforts 
Supporting and facilitating testing 
through a dedicated test manager, 
adapting the testing process 
permanently to current needs 
(methodology) with the adoption of 
best-practices templates, integrating the 
test management of projects and 
products in common release 
management 
Table 5-5 Selective Coding, Concepts Related to “Lessons Learned-Continuous Improvement” 
 
During selective coding we dropped the concept “organizational vision,” which comprises the business 
strategy, as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Thus, the concept is not part of Table 5-5.  The concept 
hardly appeared in the data or overlapped with other concepts like “ERP strategy within IT strategy.” 
Furthermore, there was little evidence that this concept was subject to organizational learning. This could 
either be a consequence of the organizational form, which is a matrix organization, or because we did not 
interview the business people at the local sites, who were also responsible for change management. In other 
settings, “organizational vision” might be the subject of organizational learning, therefore we mention it for 





Figure 5-4 Organizational Learning - Continuous Improvement in the Program Context 
 
In Figure 5-4, we present a general model grounded in our data that is consistent with the model of Daft and 
Weick (1984) and organizational learning theory. As such, it can be applied to other settings following a 
phased or incremental program approach, foremost, but not necessarily exclusively, in the ERP context. The 
program scans all the data available from previous waves and interprets it. Through its dedicated governance 
structure (dotted shaded box), the actions are applied to a wave and its projects based upon experience of 
previous waves, and stored in the programs knowledge base as temporary organization. Through feedback 
manifested in outcomes, the program adds to its knowledge base through each wave, facilitating continuous 
organizational learning. Please note that the projects within a wave are part of the program, but have their 




governance. Nevertheless, the individual projects of a wave are subject to the program governance through 
the application of constantly improved actions repeated for n waves. Every wave could contain any number 
(x=1..m) of projects. 
In this section, we presented the findings of our case study, including contextual information, followed by a 
sequence of the projects structured in waves. On the basis of reference quotations, we illustrated the first 
two steps of our coding process (open, axial) and created, in a third coding step (selective coding) the 
storyline by applying the interpretation model of Daft and Weick (1984) to the concepts, illustrating the 
organizational learning process over the course of the rollout projects. Finally, we presented a summary of 
all CSFs, evident in the program, in relation to the core category “Lessons Learned - Continuous 
Improvement,” thus applying the interpretation model again during selective coding. Next, we will discuss 
our findings to answer our second central research question and highlight the implications for research and 
practice. 
 Discussion  
In this chapter, the case study at Pantheon investigates the beneficial impact of a program structure for a 
complex ERP implementation with an overall duration of seven years. The complex enterprise structure and 
the relatedness of the various projects and products within Pantheon led to the decision to include the 
rollout series for the ERP implementation in a larger program called Saturn. Saturn included a program 
cluster dedicated to the specific ERP solution (Jupiter). The steering committee of the program comprised 
representatives of all sites in order to be able to make critical decisions with impact on all sites, such as 
adaptions of time schedules. This constellation only partially mitigated (e.g., via escalations) the missing 
directive power over the rollout projects, which has been observed for matrix organizations in the past (Daft, 
2007). The missing directive authority of the Jupiter Competence Center and the program cluster appeared 
to be challenging and made the implementation difficult. This is an example of the importance of contextual 
conditions, in our case the challenges of a matrix organization, which were addressed in the governance 
structure of the program and beneficial for the rollout of the ERP system Jupiter.  
During the three-step coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Sarker et al., 2001), we identified concepts 
in the first two steps (open and axial coding) and realized that the program structure facilitated 
organizational learning, a goal mentioned in the program management literature by, e.g., Lycett et al. (2004). 
Therefore, we decided to apply an interpretation model of organizational learning (Daft and Weick, 1984) 




the CSFs through organizational learning. This view is consistent with the view of van Fenema et al. (2007), 
who found that standardization and experience from sites implementing the technology in an initial phase 
of a global project became relevant to sites that implemented the same ERP package at later stages. 
Similarly, Newell et al. (2006) stress, in relation to ERP systems, that knowledge integrated at one stage 
affords the integration of knowledge at later stages. Thus, the organizational learning process can guide 
organizational action and the acquired knowledge increases its repertoire of actions (Robey et al., 2000). 
Therefore, these actions led more and more to successful outcomes, providing feedback to the program, 
and leading to an increased knowledge base for further implementations. 
 
Figure 5-5 Implementation Success Increased at Later Stages Through Organizational Learning 
 
Figure 5-5 illustrates the life cycle of the ERP implementation and the increased success, which is in our case 
associated with the dynamics of CSFs, facilitated through a learning program and the improved product 
quality. The program cluster consisted of one development project and nine subsequent rollouts (referred 
to as waves, as they were partially implemented in pairs), which improved continuously after Wave 2. The 
first two waves were only partially successful. With certain corrective actions (based upon anticipated 
outcomes, Table 5-5) the consideration of CSFs also changed and the program continuously increased its 
knowledge base, thus meeting the CSFs as underlying guiding principles. The subsequent waves benefited 
from this increased knowledge base, as well as daily operations. This change in importance is what we refer 
to as dynamics and its relevance is emphasized by our case as complementing the dynamic process 
perspective of (Lyytinen and Newman, 2015; Markus and Robey, 1988). Our case also suggests a connection 




(Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Seidel 2009) alone appear to draw an incomplete picture of success of an ERP 
program. This implies that research on ERP implementation programs should explicitly account for temporal 
dependencies, as e.g., suggested by (Grainger et al., 2009).  
Organizational learning processes, such as in our case, are difficult to be investigated with a static view on 
CSFs. Indeed, Robey et al. (2000) emphasize organizational learning as a process that enables the intentional 
and unintentional acquisition of, access to, and revision of knowledge, which becomes embedded as 
organizational memory. It is the merit of our case to extend this point of Robey et al. (2000) towards 
organizational learning theory according to the action-outcome links of Duncan and Weiss (1979). 
Considering the nature of a program as a temporary organization (Cabinet Office, 2011; Turner and Müller, 
2003), the interpretation model of Daft and Weick (1984) highlights the organizational learning process in 
the ERP program context in a plausible way. This view has implications for research and practice, which we 
present in the next section.  
 Implications  
The implications for research are manifold. First (1), our study extends prior research (e.g., van Fenema et 
al., 2007; Lyytinen and Newman, 2015), with a dynamic perspective by emphasizing the organizational 
learning processes for multisite implementations. This perspective emphasizes the program concept as a 
powerful tool to manage interdependencies between projects and products over the complete life cycle of 
a large multisite ERP implementation. Second (2), we adopted a model taken from the field of organizational 
theory (Daft and Weick, 1984) and exemplified its particular strength for understanding the dynamic 
perspective of the program concept. From this perspective, programs can be regarded as a temporary 
organization that is adding to its knowledge base through interpreting action-outcome relationships in a 
permanent feedback loop. This facilitates learning, which becomes applicable to other sites scheduled at 
later stages (e.g., Robey et al., 2002; van Fenema et al., 2007). Third (3), we provide a set of CSFs as a result 
of these action-outcome relationships and organizational learning manifested in a temporary organization, 
the learning program. All CSFs are grounded in data, with corresponding action-outcome relationships in the 
program context. The CSFs are dynamic with a fluctuating importance and leveraged by organizational 
learning. As a consequence, this perspective also emphasizes the need to take a process view over the 
complete life cycle, particularly in the program and multisite context.  Considering the limitations that arise 
from a single site case study, we observe the need for quantitative future research in (a) program 




consider (b) the dynamic nature of ERP implementations and its CSFs with an emphasis on (c) the integrative 
nature of programs and its relation to organizational learning. Furthermore, it seems promising to 
investigate (d) possible forms of program structures, including power relations and integration needs. Lastly 
(e), action research (Robey et al., 2000) might be one possible research avenue which could provide valuable 
insights.  
For practitioners it is important to realize the benefits a program structure offers in certain contexts (e.g., 
multisite and integration needs), and to utilize its dynamic leveraging functions for CSFs, particularly the 
learning perspective, which determine the implementation success in the long run. It is important to provide 
implementation structures that facilitate learning considering the bonding perspective, that is, knowledge 
sharing and collaboration with implementation team members, but also the external bridging perspective 
and information sharing with other stakeholders (Newell et al., 2006).  By paying attention to the dynamics 
of CSFs, its underlying action-outcome relationships, and the leveraging effect of organizational learning, 
facilitated through a program structure, an organization can increase the probability to obtain the desired 
outcomes. This helps to efficiently use resources and prepares the capabilities and capacity for further 
change programs.  
 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reported on an interpretive case study of a complex multisite ERP program with a 
dedicated program cluster supporting the implementation. We adopted the adapted grounded theory 
approach by Sarker et al. (2001), which has its roots in Strauss and Corbin (1998). For selective coding, we 
took our inspiration from organizational learning theory and employed an interpretation model developed 
by Daft and Weick (1984). The case emphasizes the function of the program as a catalyst for organizational 
learning by means of interpreting action-outcome relationships. These benefits would not have been 
expected with a traditional project structure. Thus, we believe that the establishment of this program 
structure was essential for the successful multisite rollout of Jupiter. The case also highlights the evolution 
of CSFs over the course of the rollouts and the benefits of considering a dynamic perspective for investigating 






6 Cross-Case Analysis and Discussion 
In this section we want to compare the two cases and will use several dimensions to do that, in the context 
of our initial posed research questions. First (1), as interpretive researchers, we start with some important 
parameters of the two cases and we highlight in brief the contextual characteristics of the two ERP programs. 
Second (2), we list the critical success factors of the two ERP programs, and put them in relation to our seed 
concepts in the literature review. Third (3), we put our definition of the dependent variable success in 
relation to our two ERP programs. Fourth (4), we apply the outcomes of our first case at A1/TA, and the 
resulting “SGISS-Model of Different Perceptions”, to our second case at Pantheon. Fifth (5), we apply the 
outcomes of our second case at Pantheon, and the resulting “Organizational Learning Model in the ERP 
Program Context”, to our second case at A1/TA. Thus, we perform a first “test” if the models could have 
been applied to the second context as well. Sixth (6), we compare the results of our case study in relation to 
the categorization of program management goals and benefits (Lycett et al., 2004). Consequently, we 
highlight if the expected goals and benefits could be generated. Finally, we close this chapter with a 
summary. 
 Comparison of Contextual Characteristics of the Programs 
In Table 6-1 we highlight the most important characteristics of the two ERP programs. Although they differ 
in terms of number of sites, and implementation approach, they share characteristics as high integration 
complexity, various projects in parallel, shared resources and a change in business processes. These shared 
characteristics are the determinants that a program approach is beneficial (PMI, 2008; Cabinet Office, 2011). 
The implementation complexity is very high in both cases, which warrants a program approach, according 
to Ribbers and Schoo (2002). In the terms of Seidel (2009), an ERP program is a change how the business 
operates. Thus, from a theoretical perspective a program made sense in both cases: Later in this chapter, 
we will turn to the concrete benefits of the program approach in the ERP context at A1/TA and Pantheon 
(Lycett et al., 2004). 
 
Company A1/TA Pantheon 
Industry: Telecommunications Insurance 
Scope: 5_projects: 
- New ERP system replacing two legacy ERP-
stems 





- New reporting system with new user 
interface replacing legacy reporting systems 
- Change project accompanies the projects 
- Preparation and conception of a second 
release 
- Documentation project for auditors 
- New ERP system replaces various host-
legacy systems. The system includes three 
settlement areas, with partially different 
underlying laws. Two settlement areas need 
to build from scratch. 
 




Program board, strong program manager, 
project managers reported to program 
manager 
Program board and project boards, sites 
(projects) independent in different terms 
(e.g. limited directives from program, change 
management in site-responsibility) 
Implementation 
approach 
Big bang Phased (waves) 





Highly integrated, >700 interfaces. Business 
processes spanning different functional 
areas. Business processes harmonized in 
certain areas in certain areas consolidated. 
Further harmonization in release 2. 
Highly integrated with other products and 
projects, partially rolled out in parallel. 
Consideration of milestones and 
dependencies. Business processes 
redesigned within the new software 
package. Common future release strategy. 
Shared resources Mostly shared human resources. Separate IS 
experts for the reporting project and for the 
change project. ERP program as high priority 
initiative in relation to other initiatives in the 
portfolio. 
The same implementation teams used for 
development, all rollouts and maintenance. 
Other competing initiatives needed to be 
considered (larger program).  
Further 
characteristics 
Existing ERP knowledge within business and 
IT. Different legacy processes reflecting pre-
merger states of the company. New central 
sourcing strategy and new implementation 
partner. 
No existing ERP knowledge in 8 of 9 sites. ERP 
knowledge only in 1 of 3 sites forming the 
ERP Competence Center. Large initial 
dependency on external consultants. High 
initial training efforts within business and IT. 





 Comparison of CSFs and Relation to Seed Concepts 
In this section we compare the critical success factors of our two cases over the program life cycles, similarly 
to Parr and Shanks (2000). Next, we relate them to the seed concepts of the literature review. This is basically 
a new round of selective coding for each case, as we put the CSFs, gained during axial coding, in relation to 
the program concept. In Table 6-2 we start (in the second column) with the A1/TA case, followed by the 
Pantheon case; then we try to link the CSFs to the seed concepts, where possible.  Some CSFs could not be 
linked, and other CSFs appeared the first time in our cases and thus have no corresponding seed concept 
(shaded in Table 6-2). The sequence (starting with the CSFs and linking them to the seed concepts, and not 
the other way around) reflect the grounded theory principles in our coding process. First (1), it reflects that 
all the concepts are grounded in data, and second (2), it means that no coding scheme guided our coding 
process. As such, the seed concepts were used to create sensitivity and to make comparisons with the 
concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Additionally, we follow the principle of contextualization (Klein and Myers, 1999) and relate unique instances 
to ideas and concepts that apply to multiple situations. After comparing the instances of CSFs with the seed 
concepts we build propositions, thus we theoretically abstract and generalize the concept. Based on the 
insights of this chapter we use new refined labels of each CSF18, which are at the same time depicting the 
headlines of the subsections.  This is done by carefully maintaining the chain of evidence, and readers can 
follow how we arrived at our theoretical insights (Klein and Myers, 1999).   
Our approach principally could lead to different outcomes. First (1), when the axial codes can be directly 
linked to a seed concept, the expected outcomes (from the literature review) are principally confirmed. 
Furthermore, the labels need refinement, based on the insights. Second (2), when we cannot link the axial 
codes to a seed concept, this means that new CSFs in the ERP program context are identified. Third (3), when 
an axial code cannot be linked directly to a seed concept, then the axial code can (a) either be a sub-category 
and linked to a meaningful higher-level category; or (b) the seed concept can be integrated into a meaningful 
higher-level category. Lastly, if no axial code and no open codes can be identified for a specific seed concept, 
the relevant seed concept need to be dropped for our contexts. In the following, we further elaborate on 
this.  
                                                          





# CSF A1/TA CSF Pantheon Associated Seed 
Concept - Literature 
Rev. 
Description of Seed Concept 
1 Top management support Top Management 
Support 
A) Securing top 
management support 
Securing sponsorship and commitment during the whole program, 
appointing program/project champion who promotes the 
program/projects actively 
2 Vision Organizational vision B) Establishment of a 
business case and a 
vision 
Comparing additional costs for managing the change within a 
program against the additional benefits, defining the intended 
future state, communicating vision, defining and updating 
regularly program and project business cases 










Identification and categorization of all stakeholders affected by 
the program, deciding how and when information will be 
distributed, ensuring ongoing commitment from all relevant 
stakeholders 
4 Change management Training D) Securing change 
management 
Ensuring that target business environment meets requirements of 
the new business model, organizing training and education, 
ensuring appropriate resources, managing transition into 
operations 
5 ERP strategy ERP Strategy within IT 
Strategy 
E) Establishment of a 
company-specific ERP 
strategy  
Defining the ERP strategy (minimum customization, phased 
implementation approach vs. big bang strategy, 
rolling out a template, release and upgrade strategy), aligning the 
program goals with strategic goals 
6 Governance structure Program Governance 
& Project Governance 
F) Establishment of a 
program-governance 
structure 
Defining management structure, establishing program office, 
defining decision making, reporting requirements, roles, 
responsibilities, interfaces and communication to project 
representatives, formal closure 




G) Business process 
reengineering 
Redesigning business processes in accordance with the ERP 
strategy and envisioned target business environment 
8 Risk and issue management 
(Tracking and Tools) 
Comprehensive Risk 
Management 
I) Risk and issue 
management 
Identifying and tracking of risks and defining the risk strategy, 
ensuring that actions taken succeed 
9 Integration management Solution Architecture, 
Integration 
Management 
J) Definition of an 
integration management 
strategy 
Identifying interdependencies and interrelations and defining how 
to manage them, considering shared processes, managing 











K) Time and scope & 
financial management 
Including scope management (defining what is inside the program, 
managing change requests), time management (program 
schedule, planned duration and sequencing projects, analyzing 
performance against the plans, milestones) and financial 
management (cost estimation and budgeting, performing within 
budget, early paybacks, ensuring funds) 





L) Definition of a 
program-methodology 
Securing all quality aspects, regression testing, end-to-end testing, 
ensuring that the results meet expectations, planning and 
conducting of audits and reviews, securing knowledge 
management 
12 ERP implementation partner Implementation  
Partner 
M) Proper use of 
consultants 
Choosing consultants, managing them, building stable relations 
13 Data migration Data Management N) Ensuring data 
migration/ 
Accuracy & management 
Ensuring that data is migrated accurately to the ERP system, 
establishing appropriate data entry procedures, data governance 
14 Collaboration and decision 
making 
Collaboration N/A (no seed concept) N/A (no seed concept) 
15 Human capital management Human Skills & 
Competencies 
N/A (no seed concept) N/A (no seed concept) 
16 Flexibility of program 
components 
N/A (not identified in 
case) 
N/A (no seed concept) N/A (no seed concept) 
17 Commitment key players and 
team  




Identification and categorization of all stakeholders affected by 
the program, deciding how and when information will be 
distributed, ensuring ongoing commitment from all relevant 
stakeholders 
18 Reflected in axial code: Change 
Management 
N/A, no separate axial 
code, open codes 
O) Readiness of 
organizational culture 
Considering organizational culture, readiness of sites, national 
cultures and legal requirements 
19 N/A (not identified in case as 
axial code) 
N/A (not identified in 
case axial code) 
P) Realization of benefits Identifying and realizing key benefits, ensuring that key benefits 
meet objectives, reviewing benefits with stakeholders  
20 N/A (not identified in case) N/A, no separate axial 
code, open codes 
H) Appropriateness of 
the ERP vendor 
Choosing the appropriate ERP vendor and package, ensuring 
ongoing vendor support 





6.2.1 Top Management Support 
A1/TA (Top management support): 
The program was supported throughout the life cycle by the program sponsors. Officially, the CFO was the 
sponsor, but it was a joint effort, and perceived as such by all stakeholder groups, between CFO and CTO. 
The program structure should emphasize the management attention of the board. Sometimes, the 
importance and the increased management attention were not perceived as such, during Implementation 
Attempt 1. After the crisis and the buy-in meeting, top management support was more visible. This was 
reflected through regular attendance of the sponsors at the steering committees, blocking of other 
endeavors, and support in terms of resources. For example, program members worked full-time and the 
business case was dynamically adapted. Through the program structure, the program manager was 
empowered to make certain decisions, like prioritization of projects, what was backed up by the program 
sponsors. The steering committee (in a less strict form, and sometimes managers tended to send their 
deputies) was still in existence at the time we conducted our interviews, which underlines its proven 
appropriateness and importance during the implementation. 
Pantheon (Top management support): 
The program steering committee backed up the introduction of the ERP system. The program steering 
committee consisted of the IT directors of the sites, who backed up the central service providers 
(competence center and program cluster). However, the central service providers still had no authorization 
for directives, and the implementation responsibility remained at the sites. The need for top management 
support at local sites was already emphasized in the initial program cluster concept. Thus, the IT directors 
and the central service providers needed to rely on the good-will of the sites.  
The program cluster acted as a mediating 3rd party, and was seen as being more neutral by the sites. An 
escalation procedure existed to report missing deliverables and necessary actions to the program steering 
committee. This cost more time and was less powerful than a direct authorization for directives would have 
been. This autonomy of the sites remained a challenge throughout the life cycle of the program cluster, and 






Relation to seed concept (Top management support): 
In both contexts, the need for continuous top management support is clearly evident. The contribution to 
the program success manifested in the increased perceived top management support at A1/TA during 
Implementation Attempt 2. At Pantheon the challenge of the limited top management support, due to the 
local autonomy of sites, strongly supports the need of top management support at the program level.  
As a seed concept, top management support was emphasized and we could directly link the axial coded of 
the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we propose: 
P1: In the ERP program context, top management support throughout the entire life cycle contributes to 
program success. 
6.2.2 Establishment of a Vision, a Dynamic Business Case and Associated Benefits  
Vision (A1/TA): 
The vision for the program was defined initially. This included system mergers, process harmonizations in 
certain areas, in the best case using the standard process of the package. The definition of further 
harmonizations was treated in a further release, in areas where processes were initially consolidated. 
Furthermore, a new sourcing-model for vendors, a detailed documentation, sensitizing of stakeholder 
through the program and the change-project as a post-merger initiative, and the maintenance of positive 
public appearance were part of the vision at A1/TA. 
The associated costs and the payoff were depicted in a dynamic business case, as a consequence of efficiency 
gains. During the program, certain adaptations had to be made. This included adaptations of the initial vision 
and the prioritization of targets. Furthermore, adjustments within the dynamic business case were made. 
As a consequence, the most important targets were achieved and the program was also rated successfully 
in relation to the (dynamic) vision.  
Organizational vision (Pantheon): 
For both, the program cluster (ERP system) and the larger program, the vision and the targets were clearly 
defined in the beginning and pursued throughout the life cycle(s). The coordinated definition of targets 
within the larger program was beneficial in regard to the implementation of the vision and targets within 




integrative nature of the ERP system beyond its borders, and the necessity of viewing the entire picture to 
meet the initially defined vision and its associated targets. 
The ERP system should replace legacy host systems used at nine different sites with three different 
settlement areas. The processes should be harmonized to the highest degree possible, and maintained 
centrally from the ERP system competence center. New developments should be treated in common 
releases (together with other products of the larger program) to save costs on regression- and integration 
testing. Lastly, the ERP system should sensitize sites in regards to future contract negotiations. All those 
targets were highlighted initially in a (dynamic) business case and a TCO (Total Cost of Ownership) calculation 
and consistently adapted. The vision and the targets could be met efficiently through the bundling of 
projects in program clusters and the larger program.   
Relation to seed concept (Establishment of a business case and a vision): 
In both contexts, the need to define and initial vision with associated targets, and a business case is clearly 
evident. A1/TA and Pantheon, both contexts show strong interrelations of the project visions which can be 
managed efficiently via an overarching entity; that is, the program. Furthermore, adjustments in a dynamic 
business case are visible. 
As a seed concept, the establishment of a business case and a vision were emphasized and we could directly 
link the axial codes of the cases to our seed concept. 
Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we propose:  
P2: In the ERP program context, the establishment of a vision, a dynamic business case and the pursuing 
of associated benefits contribute to program success. 
6.2.3 Stakeholder- & Communication Management 
Stakeholder- & communication management (A1/TA): 
In the beginning not all stakeholder groups were sufficiently identified and involved. The functional areas, 
apart from the functional areas Financials and Controlling, thought that they are only impacted to a minor 
extent. Furthermore, the implementation was perceived as an IT endeavor. At a later stage, after the 
program and the project got more experience in relation to proper communication, the change impact, 
expected issues were communicated via different communication channels (e.g. meetings, newsletter, 




conveying necessary information from managers to co-workers. The expectations of users toward the users 
were sharpened, through user involvement. This included the proper communication of the system design 
and change impacts, the approval of the design and the migration scenarios and the introduction of small 
task-groups. The task groups worked closely together and were empowered to make decisions. Other 
parties, such as the portfolio management and the software architecture group were involved too. As a 
consequence, the program and its associated change-project, succeeded in identifying all relevant 
stakeholder groups and to facilitate proper communication. 
Comprehensive stakeholder- & communication management (Pantheon): 
The program cluster could use and benefit from the established communication structures of the larger 
program. At the beginning, all roles and responsibilities, and meetings were described in a general 
document, to generate a common understanding. Different periodic meetings were established (e.g. 
program steering committee, regular telephone conferences, including the central service providers and the 
site rollout leaders, project steering committees). A key-user concept was established, and these key-users 
were the single point of contact for 1st level support and interface with the support organization. 
Furthermore, they trained users at the local sites. The stakeholder management at the local sites remained 
in the responsibility of the sites. At the program level, the sites significantly benefitted from each other 
through information exchange, facilitated through the learning program. Organizational learning was mostly 
visible at sites implementing during later implementation waves. It was also beneficial that the program 
clusters reported issues to the larger program, thus representing all sites and the ERP system standard 
product in relation to other projects/products within the larger program. 
Relation to seed concept (Definition of stakeholder- & communication- management strategy): 
In both contexts, the need to identify all stakeholder groups and the definition of a proper communication 
strategy is clearly evident. The contribution to the program success manifested in the improved stakeholder- 
and communication management at A1/TA during Implementation Attempt 2. At Pantheon the early 
definition of all roles and responsibilities and a very complicated but well elaborated communication 
structure contributed to the successful rollouts. Moreover, organizational learning through the learning 
program was facilitated and the program cluster benefited from the larger program. Also, in terms of 




As a seed concept, top management support was emphasized and we could directly link the axial codes of 
the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we propose:  
P3: In the ERP program context, efficient stakeholder- and communication management, including the 
early identification of all relevant stakeholder groups and the definition of a communication strategy, 
contribute to program success. 
6.2.4 Securing Change Management  
Change management (A1/TA): 
In the beginning, during Implementation Attempt 1, the change management efforts were not well 
perceived by the stakeholders. They had instead the impression that the change management project 
focuses on training and not so much on identifying relevant stakeholder groups, the change impacts and 
managing expectations and resistance. Some functional areas, therefore, were not aware what the new ERP 
systems means for them and how their daily work is impacted. These shortcomings, and a delayed start of 
change management actions (at the end of the blueprint-phase) were also admitted by the project leader 
of the change project. The pre-merger groups should have been better prepared for the project, which was 
not easy given the resource constraints of the change project. 
The change management and communication were perceived to be working more efficiently after the crisis, 
and contributed to a successful go-live. This was achieved through the buy-in meeting and the actions in 
regard to the communication strategy, creating smaller teams, and co-locating team members. The training 
started very late. It was partially automated, and created and conducted by external training consultants. 
The training was further institutionalized after go-live and issues associated with the go-live were 
communicated. Although, the workstreams conducted certain change management efforts by themselves, 
and the reporting project (BSAP) largely seemed to be flexible on that matter, the creation of a separate 
change project within the program was seen as important. 
Training (Pantheon): 
Training efforts within Pantheon were exhaustive. This included training for the central service providers (in 
relation to SAP), product-, end-to-end process trainings, including products in the environment of Jupiter 
(part of the larger program), for the business experts of the sites. Lastly, training as preparation for the 




worked on a project before. From a program cluster perspective, it was beneficial that certain trainings were 
bundled, including participants from different sites, and that the learning effect with respect to this CSF was 
transferred from one site to another. Training for rollouts in later stages (waves), could be adapted based 
on the experience of earlier rollouts and through regular information exchange, e.g. during the periodic 
telephone conference. As such, training at all levels remained very important over the entire life cycle. The 
change management at the local sites, remained in their responsibility, and differentiated in terms of 
transparency. 
Relation to seed concept (Securing change management): 
In both contexts, the necessity of preparing the staff for operations is clearly evident, but is limited to 
training in the second case, which can be seen as a subcategory of change management, and is in line with 
the view of Nah and Delgado (2006).  At A1/TA change management was perceived that it worked better 
after the crisis situation and contributed as such to the program success. Additionally, change management 
actions started too late. 
At Pantheon, the change management remained in the responsibility of the sites, so we could only identify 
the CSF training in that context. However, the importance of the exhaustive training efforts was traceable. 
Although in the second case only the seed concept´s subcategory training could be identified in the data, we 
could directly link the instances to the seed concept. As a consequence, we propose: 
P4: In the ERP program context, securing change management throughout the entire life cycle contributes 
to program success. 
6.2.5 Establishment of a Company-Specific ERP Strategy 
ERP strategy (A1/TA): 
A1/TA wanted to merge the systems due to the legal mergers of two previously independent companies. 
This endeavor structured in a program, included the ERP but also the Reporting Systems. The 
implementation strategy followed a big bang approach. The ERP project, with all its streams, was intended 
to go live at the same time, as well as the most important reports. Some reports with lower priority could 
go live one or two months later. Additionally, not all areas were harmonized in Release 1, so a second release 




as well as a documentation project for auditors. All projects within the program were accompanied by a 
change project. 
The ERP system was built from scratch, not merging one system into another. The reporting systems 
included a BI-system, a data warehouse, and the introduction of a new user interface. All systems should 
make the life easier at A1/TA, streamline processes, and remove redundancies in certain areas. Over 700 
interfaces needed to be considered. The program was sponsored by the CFO, so it was officially a business 
project. Nevertheless, it was a joint effort with IT as CFO and CTO acted together, and the business case was 
calculated including efficiency gains, and saving costs in both areas. This included a sourcing model focusing 
on one central vendor and the reduction of maintenance costs. At this stage, a group rollout was not 
planned. 
During the life cycle of the program plans needed to be adapted. First, all projects of the program were 
postponed, after cancellation of Implementation Attempt 1. Later, during Implementation Attempt 2, the 
conception-project for the second release was postponed for the sake of meeting the main project 
deadlines. Thus, from the program perspective, it was surely beneficial to comprise the projects in a 
program, which allowed to account for interrelations, prioritize and allocate competing resources. 
ERP strategy within IT strategy (Pantheon): 
Subject of Jupiter was the development and implementation at nine sites of Pantheon. Jupiter as an ERP 
system should replace existing legacy host applications and Pantheon should benefit from harmonized 
processes. Harmonized, to the highest possible extent, as the processes needed to comply with laws, which 
were partially different. SAP was chosen, also because of its exhaustive product portfolio. 
Pantheon followed a phased rollout approach, with an initial development project, followed by nine rollouts 
which were partially started as pairs (waves). The rollouts included the implementation of the template. The 
template comprised three settlement areas. Settlement Area 1 needed to cover nine different laws, whereas 
Settlement Areas 2 and 3 were built from scratch. The template did not fit the requirements of all sites so a 
need for improving the template was identified early in the project.  
The ERP system included a lot of interfaces with other products in the larger program. This was one reason 
why a common release management was set up. This should reduce testing efforts for future releases, and 




was beneficial that the projects were comprised in a program, as the projects were closely related to each 
other, and for the products within the program, program clusters (subprograms) were introduced. That was 
also the case for the ERP system Jupiter. 
The know-how transfer from external consultants to internal project members were one part of the strategy 
and reflected in the business case. The maintenance of the system should be done mainly by internal experts 
in one central (virtual) competence center, thus following a central support strategy. As a consequence, 
maintenance costs, compared to the maintenance of the legacy host-applications, should be reduced. 
Relation to seed concept (ERP strategy): 
In both contexts, the necessity of an appropriate ERP strategy is clearly evident. At A1/TA a big bang strategy 
was chosen, surely also caused by the single-site implementation and the urgent need. At Pantheon, in a 
multisite-setting, a phased approach was chosen, which contributed to organizational learning and 
continuously improved the product quality. In both contexts, the importance of considering systems in the 
environment, and their integration with the ERP system, (which is already integrated by itself) is clearly 
visible. 
As a seed concept, ERP strategy was identified in the literature review and we could directly link the axial 
codes of the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we propose:  
P5: In the ERP program context, an appropriate ERP strategy within the IT strategy throughout the entire 
life cycle contributes to program success. 
6.2.6 Establishment of a Governance Structure 
Governance structure (A1/TA): 
The program consisted of five projects which were led by the project managers. The program manager had 
the overall responsibility in terms of time, scope, and quality of the program and aligned himself with project 
managers and a representative of the implementation partner, forming the program management. The 
program management office assisted the program manager in relation to central topics like planning of 
schedules, resources, and change requests.  
For questions which were not solvable at the program management level the program manager reported to 
the steering committee, which consisted of the board members and board representatives of the group, and 




Implementation Attempt 1, the approval of the go-live date and the approval of the cut-over scenario of 
Implementation Attempt 2 were taken there. 
Below the projects, the ERP project consisted of streams, the reporting project of slots, which represented 
functional areas. Those entities were led by a stream(slot)-leader. At all levels (program, project, stream, 
slot), the business leader was assisted by a technical coordinator, which is common within A1/TA. 
Furthermore, the integrator had a representative at each level. This constellation was seen very positively, 
as every manager had assigned counterparts and they could supplement each other. 
The reporting project acted slightly separated, and the streams had certain flexibilities. They needed to 
deliver certain deliverables but could act freely within their streams. This situation led to additional 
structures within the streams. Although certain flexibilities existed, the program was responsible for an 
overall integrity. Changes of personnel happened at all levels (board, project, stream, slot) over the long life 
cycle of the program. No negative impacts caused by changes of role owners were perceived by the 
interviewed stakeholders. The line managers were more strongly involved within Implementation Attempt 
2, as their input and support was more extensively needed. As a consequence, they were invited to the buy-
in meeting during the crisis and regular meetings afterwards. 
Governance structure (Pantheon): 
The ERP system was one standard product of a larger program. Exactly as most of the other products, the 
rollout of the ERP system comprised multiple projects. Thus, program clusters were introduced to bundle 
the related projects. The representatives of the program clusters represented the interests of their products 
in relation to other products. Furthermore, the program cluster provided assistance, guidelines and reported 
to the program steering committee (consisting of the IT directors of all sites, central representatives of 
Saturn and from the standard products).  
The competence center of the ERP system got the order to develop and implement the ERP system. The 
competence center worked closely together with the program cluster and reported to the program steering 
committee. Although the relevant committee at Pantheon was the program sponsor and the sites had to 
implement the product Jupiter within a certain time, neither the program cluster nor the competence center 




The sites have on the one hand their own duties and are autonomous, but on the other hand are connected 
through Pantheon. The rollout projects themselves had their own governance structures according to the 
needs of each site. The governance structure was extremely complex, but well elaborated and served the 
purposes of the program. Roles were defined early in the program, and well described. 
However, the nonexistent authority for directives was sometimes perceived (by the competence center and 
the program cluster) as an obstacle which made the successful rollouts more difficult. A defined escalation 
procedure, escalating to the program steering committee could only partially mitigate this situation, and 
had impacts on the time schedule. Finally, the program cluster was a mediating force between the 
competence center and the sites, but also the program cluster depended on the goodwill of the sites. 
Relation to seed concept (Establishment of a program-governance structure): 
In both contexts, the high importance of the program governance structures is visible. At A1/TA, the ERP 
program as a post-merger endeavor had high priority. The awareness and the importance were visible during 
Implementation Attempt 2. Further resources and commitment could be generated, and the program 
management could prioritize projects and block other changes. At Pantheon, from the perspective of its 
context a proper program structure is difficult to achieve. Pantheon did the best possible under the given 
constraints. Nevertheless, this missing authority for directives was difficult to manage for the central service 
providers (program cluster and competence center). A sponsor which is hierarchically above the 
participating organization with complete authority over them is stressed by Yu and Kittler (2012) for an ERP 
program, as an example for centralized program management. Our results suggest that, in the case of 
Pantheon, this structure would have been beneficial, yet difficult to achieve. 
We could directly link the axial codes to our seed concept and propose: 
P6a: In the ERP program context, a well-defined governance structure throughout the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
P6b: The authorization to give direct directives increases the actionability of a governance structure. 
6.2.7 Business Process Redesign 
Business process harmonization/consolidation (A1/TA): 
The post-merger phase of A1/TA was a difficult starting condition for A1/TA. In the blueprint phase, not all 




achieve a common understanding regarding future end-to-end processes, particularly in areas where 
processes should be harmonized. The missing process governance partially worsened the situation, and 
business processes were only unit-tested during implementation Attempt 1, without the integrated end-to-
end view. Furthermore, it was difficult to grasp the business processes as sufficient data was missing, due to 
the poor results of the data-migration test-cycles. During Implementation Attempt 2 the establishment of 
project rooms, to locate small teams for fast decision making contributed to an alignment and shared 
perceptions regarding business process harmonization. Moreover, this led to an increased commitment and 
a better data quality. Certain goals, such as bringing custom-business processes back to the standard could 
not be achieved due to time constraints. 20 core processes were end-to-end tested successfully before go-
live and passed the user acceptance tests. The majority of users had positive perceptions towards the new 
business processes after go-live. They made life easier, particularly in the harmonized areas. For accounting, 
business processes could be reduced from 1200 to 600, and a common chart of account created. 
Consolidated areas were planned to be further improved with the “Release 2”-program. 
Business process redesign (Pantheon): 
The general business blueprint and the development of the template were not met sufficiently and weighted 
towards Apollo1. Afterwards, the blueprint was improved within the flexible blueprint phases during each 
rollout. In general, it was a huge challenge to develop a comprehensive template which covers all envisioned 
consolidated and harmonized business processes in sufficient detail. Particularly, when too much time 
passes between the blueprint and the rollout, and the requirements and surroundings change (“moving 
targets”). The results suggest that a blueprint phase with a fit-gap analysis should be done at the start of 
every rollout-project, which details the outcome of the general blueprint. Furthermore, it seems that the 
more the business processes differentiate (e.g. more local laws) the longer this flexible blueprint phase will 
last.  Of course, this proposition needs further investigation and we see here a potential for further research. 
For Pantheon, it might have been one reason that the scheduled rollout implementation times had to be 
extended.  
Overall, the program contributed to an effective business process redesign, although the missing directive 
power made process harmonizations more difficult. First, the global blueprint and the integrated view with 
respect to other products paved the path for increased awareness (also for future contract negotiations) at 
the site-level. Second, although the blueprint could not meet the envisioned targets, the case at Pantheon 




the program cluster and the competence center. Third, a strict change process prevents the development 
of unnecessary process varieties. Fourth, the development of a common release management (with 
inclusion of Jupiter and other products) secures common and integrated end-to-end processes. For all those 
reasons, this CSF was strongly leveraged by the program. 
Relation to seed concept (Business process reengineering): 
In both contexts, the importance of an efficient business process redesign is clearly evident. At A1/TA the 
missing process ownership made agreements and shared perceptions more difficult. The necessity to initially 
define process owners with appropriate power and responsibility is emphasized from Žabjek et al. (2009).  
Furthermore, the post-merger phase was a difficult starting condition. At Pantheon, it seems that a 
comprehensive blueprint and template are very difficult to develop, when so many different laws need to 
be considered, and requirements are changing. The results suggest that a blueprint phase with a fit-gap 
analysis should be done at the start of every rollout-project, which details the outcome of the general 
blueprint. Both cases illustrate the need to sufficiently define the processes before the implementation 
phase (realization in the system) is started. 
As a seed concept, business process redesign was emphasized and we could directly link the axial codes of 
the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we propose:  
P7: In the ERP program context, an efficient business process redesign strategy over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success.  
6.2.8 Risk and Issue Management (Tracking and Tools) 
Risk and issue management (tracking and tools), (A1/TA): 
At A1/TA risks and issues were tracked in sufficient detail. The risk tracking consisted of an 
impact/probability matrix including a traffic-light system and response strategies. Scope adjustments and 
various approaches were evaluated with regards to the associated risk. Before go-live mitigation actions and 
workarounds were planned to reduce the risk and the probability of a negative public appearance. 
Issues were tracked and prioritized according to business impact. The issue tracking was supported via a 
dedicated tool during Implementation Attempt 2, already in use for the test- and quality systems, which 
made the issue tracking process more efficient. Certain target values were defined, which needed to be 




included in the cut-over plan. The detailed process and the tool-support helped to reduce issues during the 
implementation and after-go-live quickly (partially for high priority issues with promotion to production at 
the same day) and the issue tracking and the whole process was rated very efficiently. 
Particularly during Implementation Attempt 2 supporting tools were used heavily. Most, but not all (e.g. 
testing tool), strongly supported the methodology and made the process more transparent. This was 
primarily the case for the ERP project within the program. The reporting project was more flexible in that 
regards and could partially manage issues more easily due to their leaner structures, lower gravity of the 
issues and shorter communication channels. Some tools had to be used mandatorily also for the reporting 
project.  Overall, the tool support fostered the efficiency and transparency of the risk- and issue 
management process. 
Risk management (Pantheon): 
Pantheon’s risk management process was set up at the level of the larger program and across all projects. 
Additionally, separate program clusters, as the ERP system, central business partner, were highlighted in a 
separate section. A risk matrix, with traffic light system, depicting the impact and the probability was used. 
Accordingly, risks were allocated to the proper category in the risk register. General risks were described 
early in the life cycle. The exhaustive tracking of risks, within a cluster (product) and across projects and 
products reflects the integrative aspect of the ERP system also beyond product borders. Major actions in 
response to major risks could be approved directly at the program level.    
The issue tracking process for the ERP system was initially not very transparent. The different groups within 
the virtual ERP competence center treated their issues differently (e.g. no formal ticket for minor issues). 
Early, after the first rollout, a tool was introduced which standardized this process. Additionally, the tool-
support increased the efficiency and transparency of the issue-tracking process, likewise for new rollout and 
for operations.   
Relation to seed concept (Risk and issue management): 
In both contexts, the necessity of risk- and issue management were evident. Both concepts can be treated 
as one CSF as they are closely intertwined with each other with strong linkages to the used methodology. A 
risk could become an issue and vice versa, thus risk- and issue management is often treated together as 




tracked properly across projects and supported by tools. The tracking of risks on program- and project level 
was empirically emphasized from Pelegrinelli et al. (2007), opposed to predominant treatment in the past 
on single project risk management. 
As a seed concept, risk and issue management were emphasized and we could directly link the axial codes 
of the cases to our seed concept. Thus, we propose: 
P8a: In the ERP program context, efficient risk- and issue management over the entire life cycle contribute 
to program success.    
P8b: In the ERP program context, appropriate tools foster efficient and transparent risk- and issue 
management. 
6.2.9 Integration Management 
Integration management (A1/TA): 
Overall, at A1/TA with a multitude of systems, different departments are involved in product/system 
changes, e.g. the project management office, portfolio management, or the software architecture group. 
The ERP program had many integration points, and environments were depicted early in the life cycle, which 
comprised systems and products and stakeholders (internal/external). Partially, legacy systems were 
replaced by the ERP system. A greater challenge was the integration of more than 700 interfaces.  
Within the ERP system, reflecting the nature of this kind of systems, the degree of integration was very high 
and processes impacted different modules. This was particularly challenging when integration tests with an 
end-to-end view needed to be conducted. This situation was worsened due to no clear assignment of 
process ownerships. Furthermore, functional areas do not exactly overlap with SAP modules. Harmonized 
processes had also an impact on consolidated processes as they had interfaces due to the highly integrated 
nature of the ERP-System. Also the reporting project was not limited to SAP, but needed to integrate other 
products as well, yet not encompassing such high degree of integration as the ERP system. ERP and Reporting 
needed a coordinated approach as well, with a design fitting to each other (ERP in the lead). 
Integration points were considered throughout the program, and particularly during the cut-over period. 
This included partially “freeze-periods” which means a development stop (respectively only necessary 
developments) of integrated systems. For integration tests 3rd party systems needed to be interfaced with 




During Implementation Attempt 1 integrative end-to-end tests were not conducted sufficiently. This bore a 
high risk and was one reason for the cancellation of Implementation attempt 1. Also during Implementation 
Attempt 2 the integration testing, in certain areas, was conducted very late. One focused on 20 core end-to-
end processes which needed to be tested to mitigate the risk of the go-live. 
Integration management – software architecture (Pantheon): 
The ERP system was integrated with a variety of interdependent products. These interrelations were 
reflected in the introduction of the larger program. The ERP system was a standard product within the 
program and needed to be implemented within a certain time-frame, considering the interdependencies to 
the other products. For the ERP system a program cluster (subprogram) was introduced. The program cluster 
represented the interests of the ERP system and the implementing sites towards other products (with their 
own program clusters) and projects. 
Initially, for the ERP system a software architect was occupied to meet the overall programming guidelines, 
quality aspects and the software architecture. This role was cut at a later stage due to cost restrictions. 
However, the integrated nature of the ERP system with the variety of interfaces was extremely visible 
throughout the program life cycle. The interrelations were recorded in the meeting minutes of the steering 
committee and a common risk management across all products and programs was introduced, as well as an 
IT-map encompassing all interfaces.  The integrated nature was extremely visible in relation to the interface 
to retrieving master records of business partners and the ongoing performance issues. This situation 
changed for the better over the course of the rollouts. Yet, in the end interfaces and performance were 
mentioned as points which could have worked better. 
For future releases a common release management was introduced. As a consequence, the testing efforts 
for integration- and regression tests should be minimized. During the time of our interviews the first 
common major releases went successfully live, thus warranting a common release management. The 
common release management could be seen as an extension of the larger program, which was definitely 
beneficial due to the highly integrated natures of the product.  
Relation to seed concept (Definition of an integration management strategy): 
In both contexts, the importance of an efficient integration management strategy is clearly evident. At 




interfaces to other products. The missing process ownership made contributed to difficulties during the 
integration testing of end-to-end processes. At Pantheon, a larger program comprised the highly integrated 
products, the products were represented through program clusters. Afterwards, a common release 
management was introduced. This constellation perfectly illustrated the beneficial impact of a program in 
integrated environments encompassing related projects.   
As a seed concept, integration management was emphasized as an important CSF and we could directly link 
the axial codes of the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases we 
propose: 
P9: In the ERP program context, an efficient, and well elaborated, integration management strategy over 
the entire life cycle contributes to program success. 
6.2.10 Time and Scope & Financial Management 
Realistic timeframe and scope management (A1/TA): 
The initial go-live date was defined by the CFO in collaboration with the CTO and approved by program 
management. Early during Implementation Attempt 1 certain stakeholder groups (implementation teams, 
line management) put the feasibility of the go-live date in question. These doubts had an impact on the 
engagement, commitment and motivation of these stakeholder groups. It turned out that the envisioned 
time schedule could not be met and implementation Attempt 1 had to be abandoned. During the crisis 
Implementation Attempt 2 was planned. Different options were discussed and approved by all stakeholder 
groups during the buy-in meeting. The new schedule was ambitious but realistic. All stakeholder groups 
strongly committed themselves to the new go-live date. Finally, although tightly and under pressure, the 
new schedule could be met. 
The scope was initially defined, but not broken down sufficiently within the blueprint phase. Thus, the exact 
scope was not always clear during the implementation phase. The scope needed partial adjustments or was 
postponed. A change request process tracked scope adjustments and its financial impacts. The results 
suggest that although the scope was initially defined the ambitious timeframe caused some trade-offs. Thus, 






Comprehensive time management, scope management, financial management (Pantheon): 
The development project of the ERP system and the subsequent rollout projects were initially defined in 
relation to other milestones and dependencies to other products and projects within the larger program. 
The program steering committee decided about adjustments of the time schedule and the impacts on other 
products and projects were considered. This was also the case as adjustments in relation to the ERP system 
needed to be done. As a consequence, the time schedules of single projects were fitting into the overall 
schedule and all program stakeholders were on one page. 
Originally, the entire scope of the ERP system should have been defined in a common blueprint for all sites. 
As it turned out that not all requirements could have been grasped (due to different underlying laws, 
processes and changing regulations), scope adjustments were necessary. A change request process was 
established, but it was not always easy to differentiate between original requirements (original scope) and 
changes (scope adjustments). Nevertheless, the clear, strict and tool-supported change request process was 
very important in relation to scope changes. As a consequence, the targets of scope management were 
partially met, although the complex context could have been partially mitigated with e.g. flexible blueprints. 
The original budgets were confirmed and approved by the highest committee of Pantheon, consisting of the 
chairmen of all sites. This included internal development costs, external consulting costs, license fees, 
maintenance and compensations for initial product developments performed within Apollo1. These costs 
were allocated to all sites. Apart from these development costs, additional funds e.g. covering program or 
site costs was secured. Costs versus benefits were highlighted in a dynamic business case and in a TCO (Total 
Cost of Ownership) calculation. Possible adjustments were considered in the initial funding plan. 
Adjustments and prioritization, how to allocate human resources, were subject to the program, particularly 
in the beginning when the rollout projects did not perform as expected and time schedules needed to be 
stretched. As a consequence, it seems that the funds were secured over the entire life cycle and the program 
could allocate them properly. 
Relation to seed concept (time and scope & financial management): 
In both contexts, the importance of efficient time and scope and financial management is clearly evident. As 
all three concepts are interrelated and directly impact each other we treat all three together as one major 
concept. Adjustments needed to be done in both contexts, at A1/TA and Pantheon, reflecting the views of 




view of the program life cycle. As such, we could directly link the axial coded of the cases to our original seed 
concept. Thus we propose: 
P10: In the ERP program context, the initial definition of a strategy and the dynamic and flexible 




A concrete methodology was used during the program. Nevertheless, particularly for Implementation 
Attempt 1 it was problematic that one continued with the implementation, although the blueprint phase 
was not sufficiently finished. This contributed to the problem, that the users did not know what process with 
what data to expect. From a conceptual perspective, this was improved during Implementation Attempt 2, 
as during the buy-in meeting (during the crisis phase) different, concepts (particularly for the data migration 
and cut-over were presented) and approved. 
A general risk register at a program level existed, as well as the tracking of issues with tool support. The 
reporting project was a little bit autonomous from methodological requirements, as it performed well. For 
Implementation Attempt 2 a detailed, continuously refined, cut-over scenario and a planning of the 
hypercare phase existed. Also in that direction the program improved compared to Implementation Attempt 
1. A shortage of the program was that not all the developments were documented as initially planned. From 
a program perspective, it was beneficial that the program could flexibly react to the changing environment 
during the life cycle of the program, granting tolerances to projects but securing integrity at the same time. 
Testing (Subcategory methodology - A1/TA): 
Different tests were part of the methodology. Development and unit tests, end-to-end testing (including 
interfaces), user acceptance tests. During Implementation Attempt 1, the unit tests were in many cases 
completed successfully, but without an integrated end-to-end view, bearing a high risk. During 
Implementation Attempt 2, the end-to-end testing was conducted successfully, but could only be sufficiently 
tested after the last test migration test-cycle. Here, the program management put the priority on 20 “core” 




gates. For important and urgent tests of the reporting project the program released sufficient resources. 
Thus, from the prioritization perspective testing benefitted from the program approach. 
Methodology (Pantheon): 
Within Pantheon an appropriate methodology was used extensively at the level of the program cluster, as 
well as for the ERP implementation itself. The Jupiter Competence Center used a well-established method 
developed by the ERP vendor.  Moreover, the methodology was adapted and improved over the course of 
the rollouts. Furthermore, also a rigid change process and a common release management strategy secures 
the integrity of the ERP system over all sites and with respect to other products. Certainly it helped that 
quite a few members of the program cluster and from the competence center have been experienced and 
certified users. One shortage of the ERP system implementation was that not all developments were 
appropriately documented as initially planned. This shortage was planned to be improved during the 
operations phase. All in all, we conclude that the use of appropriate methodologies contributed to the 
overall success.  
Testing (Subcategory of methodology) – (Pantheon): 
Early in the implementation phase, for the 2nd and 3rd rollout (wave 2) the central service providers realized 
that deliverables in regard to testing are missing. Thus, the program reacted and the program cluster had 
the responsibility to get more involved in testing. The new role was a staff position, and should support the 
test manager staffed from the local sites (with two exceptions due to resource constraints where the staff 
position solely filled the role of the test manager). The program cluster assisted in the definition of test-
cases (targets/non targets), status of testing, what resulted in best-practice lists for usage within later waves. 
However, for unit testing, and user acceptance testing the program-character had no significant influence.  
Due to the missing authorization for direct directives towards the sites, the central service providers had to 
rely on the goodwill of the sites. For integration- and regression testing (also later for common releases) a 
certain pressure existed for local sites, as a delay would have had negative effects on the entire program 
and other sites. The testing was supported through continuous increase in the usage of tools. Nevertheless, 
testing remained a challenge and the degree of cooperation differed between the sites. Consequently, the 





Relation to seed concept (definition of a program-methodology): 
In both contexts, the importance of an appropriate methodology throughout the whole life cycle is clearly 
evident. At A1/TA it seems that particularly the decision to go into one phase without finishing the previous 
phase caused problems, as stressed by Markus and Tanis (2000). At Pantheon, all aspects of an appropriate 
methodology were considered, although transparency was partially missing from the perspective of the 
central service provider regarding the sites. 
As a seed concept, appropriate methodology (including testing) was emphasized and we were able to 
directly link the axial codes of the cases to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two 
cases we propose:  
P11: In the ERP program context, the usage of an appropriate methodology (including testing) over the 
entire life cycle contributes to program success. 
6.2.12 ERP Implementation Partner 
ERP implementation partner (A1/TA): 
At A1/TA a new strategic sourcing concept was implemented. This included the replacement of existing 
partners against a new central partner. This decision was not regarded as popular by all stakeholder groups 
or parts of it (e.g. certain perceptions in the local IT group), but supported by the program management also 
with regard to implement “new” processes. After the conception phase the new central partner was 
replaced (an invitation to tender was initially planned), due to cultural, methodological, technical and 
communicative reasons, and a more appropriate offer of a competitor. 
A new central implementation partner took over the responsibilities with the premise to bring the historic 
vendors on-board. This change was generally perceived positively. However, it was not so easy for the new 
implementation partner to make himself familiar with the business processes (often custom-made) within 
a short time, and without extension of the initial schedule. In regard to the migration processes different 
perceptions between the implementation partner and A1/TA existed. Particularly in relation to migration 
the performance increased during Implementation Attempt 2. After all, the cooperation with the new 
central implementation partner was perceived positively. The onboarding of historic vendors might have 





Implementation partner (Pantheon): 
As the ERP systems was an implementation of a rather new package not so much internal know-how existed 
and also the pool of external resource was not that high. Pantheon hired a lot of very experienced senior 
consultants from SAP, and from SAP partners at a later stage when the program needed more resources. 
Furthermore, some project management experts were hired. 
All roles were staffed with an internal and an external project member, to secure know-how transfer. During 
the initial rollouts many resources were bounded, what was an enormous cost factor. Due to program nature 
the resources could be allocated efficiently. At the end of the implementation many external consultants 
could be sourced out, and internal project members took over more tasks, after the successful know-how 
transfer. Nevertheless, it seems that external consultants played an important role during the entire life 
cycle. This fact was partially leveraged through the novelty of the ERP system package. 
Relation to seed concept (Proper use of consultants): 
In both contexts, the importance of the ERP implementation partner throughout the whole life cycle is 
clearly evident. At A1/TA it seems that the knowledge of historic partners must not be underestimated, and 
that a strategic change should be executed smoothly (Sullivan, 2014). This warrants the premise of building 
stable relations (e.g. Somers and Nelson, 2004). At Pantheon the “pioneer” know-how of the consultants, 
particularly in relation to a new software package, plays an important role. Furthermore, the know-how 
transfers to internals and the efficient management of the external partner(s), including the allocation to 
sites, is an important factor too. 
As a seed concept, the proper use of consultants was emphasized and we could directly link the axial codes 
of the cases to our seed concept. We adopt the label to “ERP implementation partner”, to attribute better 
for the implementing company to assure the system reliability (Soja, 2010). Thus, when we interpret the 
results of our two cases we propose:  
P12: In the ERP program context, the efficient cooperation with an ERP implementation partner over the 






6.2.13 Ensuring Data Migration/ Accuracy & Management 
Data migration (A1/TA): 
Data migration was a main challenge for A1/TA and thus a major CSF within the program. The scope included 
the consideration of more than 3800, partially comprehensive, custom developed objects and more than 
700 interfaces. A new chart of account was introduced which included a reduction of accounts by 80%. 
Additionally, vendor and customer accounts were reduced by 70% and only 10% of transactional data was 
migrated. Many mapping and conversion rules had to be followed and it turned out that the new processes 
need to be regarded together with the data. As this CSF was particularly not met during Implementation 
Attempt 1, this mismatch strongly contributed to the abandonment of the initial envisioned go-live date. 
Certain issues needed to be improved in regards to data migration before Implementation Attempt 2 
started. The migration tools did not work as expected, and the amount of data which could be expected in 
the new system was not clearly communicated to the stakeholders. The big bang approach worsened the 
situation, and end-to-end processes could not be tested. During the crisis different migration approaches 
were prepared, and presented to the stakeholders during the buy-in meeting in the crisis situation. The 
migration scope was slightly enlarged and approved by all stakeholders. Additionally, a high-level data 
migration manager was appointed, and the migration team restructured. Very late in the project, during the 
last data migration test cycle, the end-to-end processes could be tested sufficiently. Partially, data were 
migrated directly to the reporting-system, and replaced the migration to the ERP system. Thus, the ERP 
migration could benefit from another project within the program. The improvements during 
Implementation Attempt 2 led finally to a successful go-live. 
Data management (Pantheon): 
Early in the definition of the to-be-state of the ERP system, central targets were listed. This included a central 
business partner repository, standardized interfaces to other standard products within the program and an 
improved data quality. It turned out that these ambitious targets needed more time than originally 
scheduled. Data cleansing was not finished in time during the first rollouts and workarounds were 
established to meet the targets of the central business partner repository. Furthermore, the extraction of 
legacy data in an appropriate format remained an issue. As a consequence, time schedules were stretched 
and data cleansing started earlier in the preparation phases of the single rollout projects. Interfaces to 




sites´ legacy applications and the central business partner repository. The positive results, as a consequence 
of organizational learning, were strongly driven through the central consideration of the issues by the 
program cluster responsible for the ERP system. Thus, the initial defined targets could be met successfully.  
Relation to seed concept (Ensuring data migration/ accuracy & management): 
In both contexts, the importance of data management, including the definition of proper formats, data 
cleansing, mapping and the integrative aspects of interfaces are clearly evident. The relevant definitions 
should be made early in the implementation and consistently followed throughout the whole life cycle to 
accurately meet all the targets of data management. A1/TA, as well as Pantheon, needed to sharpen their 
strategies over the life cycle although they were initially defined. Additionally, the results suggest that the 
integrative aspects of data management across projects and products is stronger in an ERP program context 
than in a traditional project setup. 
As a seed concept, the ensuring of data migration, its accuracy and management was emphasized and we 
could directly link the axial codes to our seed concept. Thus, when we interpret the results of our two cases 
we propose:  
P13: In the ERP program context, the early definition and the adherence to a data management strategy 
(including migration and accuracy) over the entire life cycle contribute to program success. 
  New CSFs – No Coverage in Seed Concepts 
In this section we present new CSFs that were not identified during the literature review as seed concepts. 
As such, they are new in the ERP program context. 
6.3.1 Collaboration and Decision Making 
Establish collaboration and decision making (A1/TA):  
Another CSF, which unfolded over the different ERP program phases at A1/TA is collaboration and decision 
making. During Implementation Attempt 1 too many people participated in diverse meetings, hindering 
effective collaboration and decision making. Some of them were only involved to a minor extent. The many 
salient groups which existed worsened the situation due to different perceptions. Furthermore, it is not that 
easy that perceptions converge when a large audience is involved. This CSF significantly improved in the 
post-crisis phase, also through the corrective actions (e.g. separate project rooms introduced, alignment of 




necessary, since the outcomes of earlier phases became starting conditions for the next phase, and thereby 
either increased or decreased the likelihood of success (Markus and Tanis, 2000). The role of different groups 
of people is also partially tackled by Markus and Tanis (2000), and they mention the communication 
difficulties that accompany the “handoffs” between phases. During Implementation Attempt 2, smaller, 
empowered teams were located together, enabling collaboration and decision making. Furthermore, 
perceptions converged and group borders blurred. Lastly, the introduction of tools (e.g. issue tracking) 
supported efficient collaboration. 
Collaboration (Pantheon): 
In the three teams at different sites were building the ERP competence center. Each team initially had to 
establish and maintain their areas of competence, their tasks and responsibilities. Regular meetings, 
telephone conferences, mutual respect, and informal meetings positively contributed to efficient 
collaboration. The introduction of tools supported efficient and standardized collaboration regarding 
incident handling and the support improved over the program life cycle. Generally, the collaboration 
between the three teams building the competence center was perceived positively by the stakeholders, 
better than expected, contributing to the program success. 
The collaboration with project members from local sites differed. At some sites the collaboration was 
perceived as a positive and transparent one, at other sites the competence center was sometimes 
confronted with unexpected circumstances. The program cluster tried to act as a neutral force and to 
mediate between the two parties.  
The collaboration between the sites seemed to work properly, as the information exchange through regular 
telephone conferences, and physical meetings was facilitated. Thus, sites implementing at a later stage could 
consider the experiences from sites implementing at earlier stages, as stressed by van Fenema et al. (2007). 
Relation to seed concept:  
No seed concept identified. 
Although no seed concept was identified during the literature review, both contexts clearly show the 
importance of efficient collaboration, therefore warranting that this concept is indeed a CSF in the program 
context. At A1/TA collaboration and decision making continuously improved, leading to common 




everywhere. At some sites an improvement of collaboration would have been beneficial.  The PMI values 
the importance of decision making as they state in their “PULSE of the Profession” report that successful 
organizations are “embedding a culture that enables an effective decision-making process and supports the 
people making the decisions” (PMI, 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, they add that in projects and programs the 
right support, information and a transparent process are needed to support effective-decision making. 
Teams with members having different perspectives and experiences will increase the richness and security 
of decision-making (PMI, 2015). We thus believe that in an ERP program where many salient groups are 
involved, it is of major importance to establish an environment, where effective “Collaboration and Decision 
Making” can take place and propose: 
P14: In the ERP program context, efficient collaboration and decision making over the entire life cycle 
contribute to program success. 
6.3.2 Human Capital Management 
Human capital management (A1/TA): 
Within A1/TA all roles at all levels were covered by two persons, one person with an IT background and the 
other with a business background. The sourcing of the team members was in the responsibility of stream-
leads and the relevant technical coordinators. The project and line managers’ bilateral negotiations secured 
the availability for the project beside operational work. During Implementation Attempt 2 the emphasis 
shifted into direction of the project, and additionally workloads were compensated after alignment with the 
HR (Human Resources) departments. Particularly during implementation Attempt 2, roles were clearly 
defined and empowered, resulting in small, fast and empowered teams. The program management could 
prioritize the allocation of resources, which helped to achieve the most important targets. Nevertheless, 
some key players had a strong workload and were not always backed up, which bore certain risks. The need 
for a sufficient amount of key resources was also emphasized within the lessons-learned workshop at the 
end of the program. The results strongly support the need for efficient human capital management, as well 
as the beneficial impact of a program in regard to allocating the resources efficiently to the projects.    
Human skills & competencies (Pantheon): 
The right mixture of human skills was seen as a CSF within Pantheon. Two out of the three sites forming the 
virtual ERP system competence center, had initially no SAP experience. Additionally, at these sites new 




ERP system and process knowledge. Furthermore, external consultants were assigned to internal 
employees, which should secure efficient knowledge transfer. This transfer was visible over the course of 
the rollouts. Additionally, the business experts at the local sites were trained in relation to the product and 
in relation to project work. The business experts were involved early in the life cycle, were able to contribute 
to the solution design and benefitted from information exchange with other sites. One rollout was 
postponed as the site wished so, due to limited resources during the initially planned rollout period. This 
illustrates the need for appropriate resources also at the site-level.  External project management resources 
were hired, as well as some central roles covering solution architecture, quality, performance and general 
issues.  Early in the life cycle all roles and responsibilities were clearly defined. As a consequence, the ERP 
system implementation team, the business experts at local sites and central roles were well staffed over the 
entire life cycle and the paths for organizational learning and job enrichment were paved.   
The program character of the rollouts allowed the efficient allocation of resources from the competence 
center. Furthermore, the program cluster represented the ERP system in relation to other products. During 
the program central resources, as the ERP system competence center, were built which can cover future 
maintenance and enhancement issues as a central service provider. Thus, the program fostered the 
efficiency of the ERP system implementation in relation to human skills and competencies. 
Relation to seed concept:  
No seed concept identified. 
Although no seed concept was identified during the literature review, both contexts clearly show the 
importance of efficient human capital management, therefore warranting that this concept is indeed a CSF 
in the program context. Although similar CSFs, as “project team” (e.g. Somers and Nelson, 2004) can be 
found in the ERP literature, human capital management focuses less on external resources and more on the 
management of internal resources. This includes the early definition of roles and responsibilities, efficient 
sourcing and training, as well as the employee’s opportunity to grow. The PMI emphasizes the necessity to 
align talent management with organizational strategy and the increasing need of project management 
resources. They stress the need to develop high performance teams, selection, career progression and the 
collaboration with contractors (PMI, 2013b). However, whereas they seem to focus rather on project 
managers, our CSFs puts a stronger focus on all employees participating in the projects and programs. This 




internal employees as we could observe at A1/TA reflects the view of Bingi et al. (1999), who also stress the 
possibility that functional departments are often unwilling to sacrifice their best resources toward the ERP 
implementation needs. Thus, the availability of key players and the right resources has to be considered 
early in the life cycle (Nah and Delgado, 2006). Ideally, as Parr and Shanks (2000, p. 295) put it “the best 
people full-time”. This CSF encompasses also the knowledge transfer of consultants to internal resources to 
learn independently maintain the system, as observed at Pantheon, and stressed by Ko et al. (2005). Lastly, 
both contexts show us the beneficial impact of a program in relation to resource allocation, which Lycett et 
al. (2004) summarized as more effective resource utilization. For all those reasons, we propose: 
P15: In the ERP program context, efficient human capital management over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
6.3.3 Flexibility of Program Components 
Flexibility of program components (A1/TA): 
We identified “Flexibility of Program Components” as a new CSF, which is clearly program-specific and would 
not be applicable to a more traditional project level setup. In particular, it relates to separate methodological 
requirements for different projects as exemplified at A1/TA. The reporting project performed well from the 
beginning, and the program management granted the reporting project certain tolerances. Presumably, the 
ability to account for specific setups and requirements contributed strongly to the final success of the ERP 
program. This finding is of particular importance for practitioners, but also future ERP research should build 
more on this insight and its placement within the program management literature. The CSF also refers to 
exercising program management not by the micromanagement of individual projects, which is the 
independent domain of project managers given certain tolerances set by program management. The 
program management must create mechanisms to assess the performance of its processes and projects 
(Cabinet Office, 2011) within these tolerances. “The effective use of tolerances can directly enable the 
efficient execution of a program” (PMI, 2008, p. 82). Thus, we conclude that this finding is congruent with 
well accepted standards of program management. 
Flexibility of program components (Pantheon): 
We did not find any relevant data within the case database of Pantheon, and we would rather suggest that 
the central service providers would have preferred as many similarities as possible between the rollout 




center and the program cluster would have liked to be. In the case at Pantheon the flexibility of program 
components was certainly not wished for, but could only be avoided to a certain extent.  
Relation to seed concept: 
No seed concept identified. 
At A1/TA the flexibility of program components was an advantage, whereas at Pantheon it needed to be 
“tolerated”. This illustrates that a CSF always depends on the context in which a concept is used, a main 
strength of case studies and interpretive research. It seems that is of importance whether the flexibility is 
preferable as within A1/TA or not preferable as in Pantheon. Thus, we propose two propositions which 
should be investigated by future ERP research: 
P16a: In the ERP program context, the flexibility of program components over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success if this flexibility is favored by the program management. 
P16b: In the ERP program context, the flexibility of program components over the entire life cycle 
negatively affects program success when the flexibility is not wanted by program management but needs 
to be tolerated. 
 Axial Codes Without Direct (1:1) Reflection Within Seed Concepts  
In this section we present axial codes, which were not considered as separate CSFs. They were considered 
as a subcategory of another CSF or dropped. 
6.4.1 Commitment of Key Players and Team (Considered in Stakeholder- & Communication 
Management) 
Commitment of key players and team (A1/TA): 
Keeping up the commitment of all relevant stakeholders over the entire life cycle was a big challenge at 
A1/TA. This requires the proper identification of all stakeholder groups, including the line management. This 
was certainly not sufficiently met during Implementation Attempt 1 but improved within Implementation 
Attempt 2, as different go-live variants and migration scenarios were presented and approved during a buy-
in meeting. The commitment of line management is essential as a response to unavoidable trade-offs 
between project- and operative goals. Social activities, compensation for additional workloads, 




as well as proper communication contribute to ensure the commitment of key players and the team over 
the entire life cycle. This commitment appeared to be higher within Implementation Attempt 2 at A1/TA. 
Commitment (Pantheon): 
At Pantheon the commitment of the employees at the different sites differed. One prerequisite was the 
proper communication of changes, which was a joint effort between the central service providers 
(competence center and program cluster) and the site rollout manager. Changes needed to be conveyed 
properly and business experts needed to feel involved and not disempowered. Certain channels were used, 
such as the intranet, newsletter, roadshows and informal meetings. Employees could take on new challenges 
and roles, and could also benefit from the monetary perspective. One limitation of our study is that we did 
not directly measure the commitment of business experts at the different sites, only indirectly as perceived 
by the central service providers. The commitment of the central service providers seemed to be present 
over the entire life cycle. 
Relation to seed concept (Stakeholder- & Communication Management): 
In both contexts the importance of ensuring commitment of the key players and the team was clearly 
evident. Similar actions such as communication, involvement, remunerations and empowerment increase 
the commitment within both cases.  However, after double-checking the descriptions of a relevant seed 
concept (stakeholder and communication management), which included “ensuring ongoing commitment 
from all relevant stakeholders”, we came to the conclusion that, although reflected as axial codes in both 
cases, the commitment of the key players and the team is in fact a subcategory. As such, it can be treated 
as a property of stakeholder- and communication management.  
6.4.2 Readiness of Organizational Culture (Considered in Change Management) 
Within A1/TA, which went through a post-merger phase, organizational culture was a prominent topic, and 
pre-merger identities still existed within the company. However, this topic was mainly covered within the 
change management project, therefore indicating that it could be treated as a subcategory of the CSF change 
management. Also within Pantheon, organizational culture played a role, and the sites were certainly 
different in that direction. We assume that this topic was covered within change management, but as change 
management was in the responsibility of each site we have no direct reflections within axial codes. We 
propose further investigation in that direction, as organizational culture certainly plays a crucial role in ERP 




post-merger integration (Drori et al., 2013), country issues (Xue et al., 2005), accruing benefits in the post-
implementation phase (Zhu et al., 2010) and mandating all systems in a specific language, e.g. English (Sarkis 
and Sundarraj, 2003).  For the moment we treat readiness of organizational culture as a subcategory of 
change management. 
6.4.3 Realization of Benefits (Considered in Establishment of a Vision and a Dynamic Business Case) 
Although the realization of benefits was originally intended as a separate CSF, which is particularly relevant 
after go-live, we have to adapt this view at this phase. We suggest that the realization of benefits is a 
subcategory of “Establishment of a Vision and a Dynamic Business Case”. 
Anticipated benefits are defined early in the program, together with the vision and business case and they 
are irrevocably connected with each other. As a consequence, they are tracked in program documents 
throughout the entire life cycle and even in the operations phase after go-live (PMI, 2008), or as Bernroider 
(2008) puts it: “ERP success criteria defined in the early phases will not capture the entire scope of ERP 
related success during use and later periods”. It is not always possible that a program continues until the 
end of the benefit measurement period, and operational managers take over the responsibility to complete 
those measures (Cabinet Office, 2011). Thus, key performance indicators defined early in the program, will 
be tracked together with the business case and vision throughout the ERP life cycle. 
We could observe the tracking of the business case, the realization of the vision and the anticipated benefits 
within both cases. Given the timing of our interviews, certainly not all benefits were realized in this phase. 
Nevertheless, both case companies treated the initial defined success criteria dynamically and were still 
monitoring their realization. As a consequence, we treat the realization of benefits together with the vision 
and business case and change the label to “Establishment of a Vision, a Dynamic Business Case and 
Associated Benefits”. 
6.4.4 Appropriateness of the ERP Vendor (Dropped for our Contexts) 
Neither within the case at A1/TA, nor within the case at Pantheon, did the question which ERP vendor and 
software package to choose crop up as an axial code. We found slight indications of possible reasons, but 
not enough to constitute a CSF. This might have been the case as the companies already had chosen the ERP 
vendor and the packages, perhaps also in conjunction with existing relationships. Thus, we skip this concept 





In this section we compared the CSFs in the ERP program context derived from our case studies. We related 
them to the seed concepts (of the initial literature review, when possible. We discussed some CSFs, which 
are new in the ERP program context and re-categorized others. Next, we focus on the dependent variable 
perceived success, and relate it to our case 
 Perceived Success and Benefits (Dependent Variable) 
We now want to elaborate on how the relevant stakeholders at A1/TA and Pantheon evaluated their ERP 
programs. In order to achieve this, we recall our initial definition that we derived from the literature review. 
Thus, we compare how a case was perceived by relevant stakeholders in conjunction with relevant metrics 
for this specific case. 
At A1/TA all stakeholders perceived the program as a success. However, most stakeholders admitted that 
not all initial targets had been achieved and the vision and the business case needed to be adapted. 
Nevertheless, the vision and targets were consistently re-evaluated and the business case adapted. In that 
sense, the most important targets associated with the adapted vision could be achieved, as well as the 
dynamic business case and the associated benefits. The program view, allowed the efficient allocation and 
prioritization of resources to projects. The customers of A1/TA did not recognize the system merger, which 
was one main premise. The number of issues after go-live could be reduced quickly. Thus, the program at 
A1/TA could be rated, consistently with the stakeholder views, entirely as a success. 
At Pantheon, the stakeholders (to whom we talked) perceived the program likewise as a success. The 
product quality increased over the course of the rollouts. In the beginning the blueprint and the product 
were developed into direction Apollo1; in the end the product was perceived as very stable, flexible and 
almost without errors. Furthermore, the ERP was successfully integrated into the product portfolio, a 
common release strategy was developed and the adapted time schedule was met. The integration in an 
overarching program was perceived as a major contributor for the successful rollouts of the ERP system. The 
successful rollout was also honored with a quality award in the category “business transformation”, awarded 
by the software vendor. 
We recall our initial definition of ERP program success: 
Success in the ERP program context is how success is perceived by relevant stakeholders in conjunction 




Our cases strongly indicate that both implementations were a success. All stakeholders at A1/TA perceived 
the ERP implementation as successful, although some initial targets needed to be adapted for the sake of 
targets with higher priorities. These results confirm the need to keep business cases viable and valid (Cabinet 
Office, 2011) over the entire life cycle. At Pantheon the increasing product quality was strongly emphasized 
by all stakeholders, reflecting the dynamic nature of the CSFs and the resulting success, as suggested by e.g. 
Lyytinen and Newman (2015).  Both cases support the suitability of our initial success definition as perceived 
success (Lyytinen and Newman, 2015) in conjunction with appropriate metrics (Markus et al., 2000b). In the 
next section we apply the SGISS-model of different perceptions to the ERP program at Pantheon.  
 Application of SGISS-Model of Different Perceptions (A1/TA) within Pantheon 
After deriving the SGISS-model of different perceptions from our results gained at A1/TA we claimed that 
our model is general and parsimonious enough to be extended to other settings (Lee and Baskerville, 2003). 
This is certainly also the case for the SGISS-model, but an important limitation exists. For the case at 
Pantheon, we chose a different core category for plausible reasons, as organizational learning appeared 
more suitable as an overarching theoretical scheme than the mechanistic application of a model (SGISS-
model), for which the data was not collected. 
The core category has analytical power and pulls the other categories together forming an explanatory 
whole. The theory is refined, reviewed for internal consistency, gaps in logic. Poorly developed categories 
are refined and validated (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The application of a theory ex post bears the risk that 
not all categories can be fully developed, as some data points are simply missing. When the data collection 
was already finished, it is often difficult to refine poorly developed categories. Thus, we look primarily if we 
can find some data points within the Pantheon case which indicate that the SGISS-model could be applied 
in principle.   
With regards to different stakeholder groups we found different data points in our data which indicate that 
different perceptions existed. According to the SGISS-model, those different perceptions in regard to each 
CSF form salient groups and a high positive fit of perceptions is a prerequisite for meeting the CSF. As the 
following two quotations indicate this was not the case at Pantheon and thus the different perceptions of 
salient groups could have been root causes for not meeting the targets of various CSFs. 
QCCC1: Apollo1 was the site which was most straightforward...as there was greatest understanding of the 




someone was sitting opposite to me who had no idea about SAP, sometimes not even from IT, since they are 
administrative staff. And now he needs to check if all his wishes were considered. And I am sure that from 9 
sites, 6 said 'Yes!', only since they didn´t know it better....and here Apollo1 had of course an advantage...since 
we used a language which they knew already... A) they scrutinized it better and B) the blueprint was weighted 
heavily towards Apollo1...since we of course had only the experiences of Apollo1, that´s why a lot of processes 
reflected the processes of Apollo1....therefore it [the blueprint] was okay for Apollo1, at least in the SA1 
(settlement area 1). (Rollout (ERP Jupiter project) leader for several rollouts, 437 ff.) 
The first quotation (QCCC1) indicates that different perceptions existed during the blueprint phase. Apollo1 
and the central service providers (mainly ERP system competence center) had similar perceptions regarding 
business processes (CSF 1) and collaboration and decision-making (CSF 2). The other sites, with no SAP 
experience, formed another salient group with different perceptions. Consequently, the product and the 
business processes of the ERP system strongly reflected the requirements of Apollo1, leading to problems 
in the early rollouts. 
QCCC2: We had two rollouts I really was really afraid of.... At [site] WILLNOTMENTION1 and [site] 
WILLNOTMENTION2 during the blueprint-phase...they were reserved and partially presented themselves 
very, very fiercely. ‘We demand this and that and....’....After the blueprint phase, I had not too much contact 
with them, and I could not find out if something had changed in their minds. But it was true that I had the 
feeling they were [during the implementation-phase] set up properly, from the organizational perspective. 
Perhaps my initial fear was baseless, or my skepticism. But...perhaps something simply changed in the mind 
of the customers [sites]. Perhaps in the direction: ‘Ok, it looks like that, we have no other choice than to use 
that thing [ERP system], so it is best we make friends and make the best of it.’ (ERP system expert, work-
package responsible, participated in all rollouts, 830ff.) 
The second quotation (QCCC2) indicates that different perceptions probably existed during the blueprint 
phase and converged during the implementation phase. Salient group 1 (sites) and salient group 2 (central 
service providers, particularly the ERP system competence center) had different views regarding the scope 
(CSF 1) and business processes (CSF 2). Other CSFs could have been impacted too, e.g. in regard to data 
migration, how and which data should be migrated from the legacy systems. As implementation phases for 
the relevant sites were scheduled for a later phase within the life cycle (later wave), the product quality of 
the ERP system was already very high, so it is likely that certain requirements and business processes were 




“scope management” and “business process redesign” and the group borders of the initial salient groups 
blurred. In short, no reasons for different perceptions in relation to these CSFs existed anymore, in contrast 
to the blueprint-phase. It might also have been the case that the perceptions in relation to the CSF 
“collaboration and decision-making” changed.  
Consequently, it seems that the SGISS-model of different perceptions could be used to describe the 
dynamics of CSFs at Pantheon as well, thus indicating the applicability of the model in different settings and 
beyond the case it was developed for, at A1/TA. Again, we want to recall the limitation that the model was 
applied ex post, so certain data points are missing. At least we found some indications and for the 
generalizability of the SGISS-model of different perceptions, which support the suggestion to apply the 
model to further settings.    
Next, we apply the organizational learning model in the ERP program context, derived from the Pantheon 
case, to the A1/TA case. 
 Application of the Organizational Learning Model in the ERP Program Context 
(Pantheon) within A1/TA 
We apply now the model of organizational learning in the program context to A1/TA. Again, the application 
of a theory ex post bears the risk that not all categories can be fully developed, as some data points are 
simply missing. Again, we look primarily to see if we can find some data points within the A1/TA case which 
indicate that the organization learning model in the ERP program context would be suitable.  
First of all, we also need to consider the context of Pantheon. For Pantheon the model was developed for a 
multisite rollout and a phased approach; that is, a rollout in different waves. At A1/TA we did not have an 
implementation for multiple sites and a big bang approach. However, we can treat Implementation Attempt 
1 and Implementation Attempt 2 as separate waves, and the re-planning phase in the middle as a loop of 
organizational learning (Figure 6-1). 
During Implementation Attempt 1 certain actions in regard to CSFs did not lead to the anticipated outcomes. 
This feedback added to the programs knowledge base and could be considered during the re-planning phase.  
There, data were collected, interpreted and new actions for Implementation Attempt 2 were defined, which 
should lead to the anticipated outcomes. Certainly, also during each wave organizational learning can take 
place. Thus, the model derived from the case at Pantheon could also be applied to A1/TA and explain the 





Figure 6-1 Success as a Result of Organizational Learning at A1/TA 
 
Organizational learning within the program at A1/TA is also stressed in quotation QCCC3. Templates and 
structures could be interpreted as the knowledge base of the program or its organizational memory. Based 
on experience and recurrence, new action-outcome links could be chosen, as a response to requirements. 
The new actions applied within Implementation Attempt 2 led to improvements (anticipated outcomes) in 
relation to certain CSFs, as the program manager suggests in QCCC4. Thus, the program was successful as a 
result of organizational learning manifested in dynamically improved CSFs. 
QCCC3: Good internal and external communication is also essential during a project, but I think even more 
important during a program. That involved people [stakeholders] getting informed via the program, that 
consistency and repetition are reflected [within the program]...that a template-requirement is reflected in 
certain structures. A human is driven from the learning perspective, what he already saw and what is 
recurring, is more reasonable transported to the head [mind]. And the program can communicate and 
transport those requirements better. (Technical coordinator of the program, project manager ASAP, 661 ff.) 
QCCC4: The essential point was the increased professionalism in the migration team, we also had some 
changes in the team composition...collaboration and the interplay between development, test migrations, 
tests, integration-tests, end-to-end tests, data cleansing....were much better, and team collaboration much 
better. (Program manager, interview 2, 133 ff.) 
Finally, the lessons learned from the program were highlighted during a closure workshop and can be used 




QCCC5: In April we conducted a formal closure workshop, with the team, core-team, also with lessons 
learned. What was running well, what was not running well? That was very interesting. These results will be 
used within other programs. Since many topics are not [only] program-specific, but also specific to the 
company. What are the takeaways, that we do not make the same mistakes again? (Project manager CSAP 
(change project), 13:8) 
At the time when we conducted our last interview, the new program (Release 2) was intended to start. When 
we treat the new program as new wave, using partially the same structures as the previous program (e.g. 
the steering committee was still in place, similarly human resources), this would be a further indication for 
the suitability of the organizational learning model in the A1/TA context. 
 Benefits and Goals of ERP Program Management 
With respect to our third central research question “What are the benefits for companies to structure their 
ERP-implementations in programs”, we take the categorization of Lycett et al. (2004) and relate it to our 
specific contexts in Table 6-3, on the next page. In column 2 we describe the observed benefits we identified 
in the ERP program at A1/TA. In column 4 we do the same for the ERP program at Pantheon. In both contexts, 
the expected benefits could be observed.  
 Summary 
In this chapter, we compared our cases during a cross-case analysis. We compared the contextual 
characteristics of the selected ERP programs. Then we presented a general list of CSFs in the ERP program 
context, after relating them to the seed concepts of the literature review. Next, we highlighted our definition 
of ERP program success in relation to our programs. Then, we applied the two models of the case to the 
other setting. Lastly, we compared the benefits of the two ERP programs. In the next chapter, we present 
the overall discussion of the results. To this end, we come back to our three central research questions of 






Goal/Benefit Description A1/TA Observed Description Pantheon Observed  
Improved coordination The program ASAP comprised five projects which 
were strongly linked via the program structure and 
the common time schedule. The program 
management had the bird´s eye view of all projects, 
which improved coordination and integrity.  
Yes The program Saturn comprised a magnitude of standard 
products which were rolled out at different sites. The rollouts 
of the ERP system Jupiter significantly benefitted from the 
program structure and its related product clusters, e.g. in 
terms of time management, resource allocation and risk 
management. Previous experiences for similar 
implementations proved to be less successful as they were 




Dependencies and priorities could be managed 
more efficiently. For example, the main project 
ASAP was prioritized compared to the conception 
project release 2. Dependencies between ASAP and 
BSAP could be adequately considered. An 
integrated program view over all projects was 
secured. 
Yes The interfaces, the solution architecture and integration 
management could be sharpened over the course of the 
rollouts. The program secured an integrated view of all sites 
and products. 
Yes 
More effective resource 
utilization 
Resource allocation could be prioritized easily. The 
program manager had the power to decide to which 
projects shared resources were allocated. This was 
visible for ASAP in relation to the conception project 
for release 2. Partially resources were assigned to 
BSAP when there was a strong need for it (e.g. 
urgently required testing resources). 
Yes During all rollouts of Jupiter, the same resources were utilized. 
This included external and internal resources, at all levels. The 
resources could be transferred more easily, and a know-how 
transfer happened over the course of the rollouts and from 
external to internal experts.  In the beginning (wave 2) when 
some sites proved to be problematic more resources needed 





considered at program level where this was explicitly 
mentioned in the meeting minutes and the time schedules.  
More effective knowledge 
transfer 
Lessons learned could be applied during 
Implementation Attempt 2. Furthermore, they 
were conserved, highlighted during the closure 
workshop and are ready to use in future programs. 
The model of organizational learning in the program 
context can be applied to the case at A1/TA. 
Yes Lessons learned and knowledge management were 
continuously employed in the program, and key-persons of all 
sites were involved right from the start. This illustrated that a 
program structure has major benefits compared to a 




Greater awareness and management visibility were 
mentioned several times during the interviews, as 
benefit compared to a traditional project structure. 
This helped to prioritize the program as top priority 
initiative in relation to other initiatives in the 
company’s portfolio. Strong management support 
was particularly visible during Implementation 
Attempt 2. 
Yes The common program governance structure allowed effective 
controlling and monitoring of budgets, time and quality on 




The project managers of the single projects and the 
program management strongly communicated with 
each other. This might have been beneficial 
compared to traditional project structures, where 
each project is managed independently. 
Furthermore, the big bang approach and the 
common time-plan added to timely 
communication. 
Yes The program, as a temporary organization, already had a 
defined stakeholder- and communication management 
structure. The program cluster Saturn/Jupiter reported to the 
steering committee as well as the competence center Jupiter. 
Furthermore, reporting to other internal and external 






Improved project definition All projects within the project were defined clearly, 
and in relation to each other. Thus, an integrated 
view about the overall program benefits and how to 
achieve them could be presented during the 
definition phase. 
Yes The program defined all the projects clearly and employed risk 
management, which was comprehensive and comprised all 
the different program clusters (bundles of projects) and 
products. As such also economics of scale could be realized as 
a consequence of shorter implementation cycles. The shorter 
implementation cycles were already planned in the definition 
phase of Jupiter. 
Yes 
Better alignment with 
business drivers, goals and 
strategy 
As a strategic post-merger initiative ASAP was 
strongly linked to the company´s business strategy 
and the overall goals. These goals were considered 
in the blueprint and the technical solution 
architecture and accompanied by the change 
project. 
Yes The program provided the framework for the realization of 
strategic change, including a magnitude of standard products 
and business process changes, aligned them continuously 
with optimizing the solution architecture and integration 
management. 
Yes 





7 Overall Discussion of Results  
In this chapter we present the overall discussion of our results. We first elaborate on our central research 
questions. Then we present the implications for research and practice, based on these central research 
questions, and the limitations of our research. 
 Elaboration on Central Research Questions 
Central research question 1: What are the CSFs of a successful ERP program and how do they dynamically 
evolve over the course of the program? 
Table 7-1 depicts the final list of CSFs after conducting a cross-case comparison and relating the results of 
each case study to the seed concepts of the literature review. To get a better overview, we can summarize 
the results in categories. The first category (1-13) depicts CSFs were we could directly link the axial codes, to 
the seed concepts, thus basically confirming what we expected during our literature reviews. In the second 
category (14-16) we depict new CSFs in our program contexts, which were not evident in previous research 
and where we suggest further research in different ERP program settings. In the third category (17-20) we 
depict CSFs which were not considered as a separate CSF, but as a subcategory of another CSF (note that 
descriptions of those CSFs were adapted) or concept (17, 18, 19), or dropped entirely for our contexts (20). 
Note also that this list reflects the cross-case results of our settings, but could be different in other settings. 
As our unique instances were related to general ideas (seed concepts) they could apply to multiple 
situations, as suggested by Klein and Myers (1999). As a consequence, we suggest further research and the 
application of our concepts to other ERP program settings, particularly for the new CSFs with no direct 
reflections in the seed concepts. 
This research examines the challenges and CSFs of ERP implementation, and the dynamics, which seem to 
unfold particularly in an ERP program environment, where multiple related projects and groups are involved. 
The results of our interpretive case studies may be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, the 
results are confirmatory in terms of some of our identified CSFs were already discussed in prior research. On 
the other hand, we provide findings which seem to be new, and therefore complementary, in this specific 
ERP program context. Table 7-119 summarizes these CSFs and in terms of our confirmatory findings provides 
extensive references to related literature.  
                                                          




# CSF of ERP programs 
holding in both cases 
Description of CSF  Proposition(s) Literature in alphabetic order (program related 
first) 
1 Top management 
support 
Securing sponsorship and 
commitment during the whole 
program, appointing a steering 
committee 
P1: In the ERP program context, 
top management support 
throughout the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), PMI (2008), 
Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry 
(2004), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Al-
Mashari et al. (2003), Bingi et al. (1999), Finney and 
Corbett (2007), Holland and Light (1999), Markus 
and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Nah and Delgado 
(2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Somers and Nelson 
(2004), Sumner (2000), Umble et al. (2003), Zhang 
et al. (2005 
2 Establishment of a 
vision, a dynamic 
business case and 
associated benefits  
Defining the intended future state, 
communicating vision, comparing 
additional costs for managing the 
change within a program against the 
additional benefits, defining and 
updating regularly program and 
project business cases, defining and 
realizing benefits 
P2: In the ERP program context, 
the establishment of a vision, a 
dynamic business case and the 
pursuing of associated benefits 
contribute to program success. 
Ferns (1991), Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al 
(2004), Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Thiry (2004), Akkermans and van 
Helden (2002), Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and 
Corbett (2007), Holland and Light (1999), Markus 
and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Nah and Delgado 
(2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Umble et al. (2003) 
3 Stakeholder- & 
communication 
management 
Identification and categorization of 
all stakeholders affected by the 
program, deciding how and when 
information will be distributed, 
ensuring ongoing commitment from 
all relevant stakeholders. 
P3: In the ERP program context, 
efficient stakeholder- and 
communication management, 
including the early identification of 
all relevant stakeholder groups and 
the definition of a communication 
strategy, contribute to program 
success. 
Ferns (1991), Cabinet Office (2011), PMI (2008), 
Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Thiry 
(2004), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Al-
Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett (2007), 
Holland and Light (1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), 
Nah et al. (2001), Nah and Delgado (2006), Somers 
and Nelson (2004), Umble et al. (2003), Sumner 
(2000), Zhang et al. (2005) 
4 Securing change 
management 
(including aspects of 
organizational 
culture) 
Ensuring that target business 
environment meets requirements of 
the new business model, organizing 
trainings and education, ensuring 
appropriate resources, managing 
transition into operations, 
considering organizational culture, 
readiness of sites, national cultures 
and legal requirements 
P4: In the ERP program context, 
securing change management 
throughout the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al. (2004), PMI 
(2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), 
Vereecke et al. (2003), Al-Mashari et al. (2003), 
Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus and Tanis 
(2000), Nah et al. (2001), Nah and Delgado (2006), 
Seidel (2009), Somers and Nelson (2004), Umble et 




5 Establishment of a 
company-specific ERP 
strategy 
Defining a company-specific ERP 
strategy (minimum customization, 
phased implementation approach 
vs. big bang strategy 
rolling out a template, release and 
upgrade strategy), aligning the 
program goals with strategic goals 
P5: In the ERP program context, an 
appropriate ERP strategy within 
the IT strategy throughout the 
entire life cycle contributes to 
program success. 
Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo 
(2002), Seidel (2009), Sullivan (2014), Thiry (2004), 
Bingi (1999), Finney and Corbett (2007), Holland and 
Light (1999), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah and 
Delgado (2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Somers and 
Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), Umble et al. (2003) 
6 Establishment of a 
governance structure 
Defining governance structure, 
establishing program office, 
defining decision making, reporting 
requirements, roles, 
responsibilities, interfaces and 
communication to project 
representatives, formal closure 
P6a: In the ERP program context, a 
well-defined governance structure 
throughout the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
P6b: The authorization to give 
direct directives increases the 
actionability of a governance 
structure. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Lycett et al. 
(2004), Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI 2008, Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Seidel (2009), Sullivan (2014), Thiry 
(2004), Vereecke et al. (2003), Yu and Kittler (2012) 
7 Business process 
redesign 
Redesigning business processes in 
accordance with the ERP strategy 
and envisioned target business 
environment, creation of process 
ownerships across functional 
borders 
P7: In the ERP program context, an 
efficient business process redesign 
strategy over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
Al-Mashari et al. (2003), Bingi et al. (1999), Holland 
and Light (1999), Nah et al. (2001), Markus and Tanis 
(2000), Somers and Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), 
Žabjek et al. (2009). Zhang et al. (2005) 
8 Risk and issue 
management 
(Tracking and Tools) 
Identifying and tracking of risks and 
defining the risk strategy, keeping 
risks at an acceptable level, ensuring 
that actions taken succeed, efficient 
usage of tool support 
P8a: In the ERP program context, 
efficient risk- and issue 
management over the entire life 
cycle contribute to program 
success.    
P8b: In the ERP program context, 
appropriate tools foster efficient 
and transparent risk- and issue 
management. 
(Aritua et al., 2011), Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns 
(1991), Lycett et al (2004), Pellegrinelli et al. (2007), 
PMI (2008), Sullivan (2014), Thiry (2004), Davenport 
(2000), Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus and 
Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001) 
9 Integration 
management 
Identifying interdependencies and 
interrelations and defining how to 
manage them, considering shared 
processes, managing transition into 
operations, usage of synergies after 
go-live, providing customer support 
P9: In the ERP program context, an 
efficient, and well elaborated, 
integration management strategy 
over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns (1991), Lycett et al 
(2004), Pellegrinelli (1997), PMI (2008), Ribbers and 
Schoo (2002), Sullivan (2014), Thiry (2004), 




10 Time and scope & 
financial management 
Including scope management 
(defining what is inside the program, 
managing change requests), time 
management (program schedule, 
planned duration and sequencing 
projects, analyzing performance 
against the plans, milestones) and 
financial management (cost 
estimation and budgeting, 
performing within budget, early 
paybacks, ensuring funds) 
P10: In the ERP program context, 
the initial definition of a strategy 
and the dynamic and flexible 
treatments of time, scope-, and 
financial management over the 
entire life cycle contribute to 
program success. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Ferns 1991, Lycett et al 
(2004), PMI (2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Seidel 
(2009), Thiry (2004), Akkermans and van Helden 
(2002), Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah and Delgado 
(2006) 




Securing all quality aspects, 
regression testing, end-to-end 
testing, ensuring that the results 
meet expectations, planning and 
conducting of audits and reviews, 
securing knowledge management 
P11: In the ERP program context, 
the usage of an appropriate 
methodology (including testing) 
over the entire life cycle 
contributes to program success. 
Cabinet Office (2011), Lycett et al. (2004), PMI 
(2008), Ribbers and Schoo (2002), Thiry (2004), Al-
Mashari et al. (2003), Finney and Corbett (2007), 
Markus and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Seidel 
(2009), Sullivan (2014), Vereecke et al. (2003), 
Zhang et al. (2005) 
12 ERP implementation 
partner 
Choosing consultants, managing 
them, building stable relations 
P12: In the ERP program context, 
the efficient cooperation with an 
ERP implementation partner over 
the entire life cycle contributes to 
program success. 
Sullivan (2014), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), 
Bingi et al. (1999), Finney and Corbett (2007), Nah 
and Delgado (2006), Parr and Shanks (2000), Somers 
and Nelson (2004), Sumner (2000), Zhang et al. 
(2005)   
13 Data migration/ 
accuracy & 
management 
Ensuring that data is migrated 
accurately to the ERP system, 
establishing appropriate data entry 
procedures, data governance 
P13: In the ERP program context, 
the early definition and the 
adherence to a data management 
strategy over the entire life cycle 
contribute to program success. 
Sullivan (2014), Finney and Corbett (2007), Markus 
and Tanis (2000), Nah et al. (2001), Somers and 
Nelson (2004), Umble et al. (2003), Vosburg and 
Kumar (2001), Zhang et al. (2005) 
14 New CSF: 
Collaboration and 
decision making 
Empowered teams, appropriate size 
of teams, creating an infrastructure 
which facilitates information 
exchange and decision making 
P14: In the ERP program context, 
efficient collaboration and 
decision making over the entire life 
cycle contribute to program 
success. 
PMI (2015), Markus and Tanis (2000). New in the 
ERP program management context. Further 
research warranted. 
15 New CSF: Human 
capital management 
Management of internal resources, 
effective sourcing and training, 
selecting the right employees, 
availability of key players,  
P15: In the ERP program context, 
efficient human capital 
management over the entire life 
cycle contributes to program 
success. 
PMI (2013b). New in the ERP program management 




new enriched tasks after program is 
finished 
16 New CSF: Flexibility of 
program components 
Keeping integrity through program 
governance, despite different 
methodological requirements, 
effective use of tolerances (Cabinet 
Office, 2011; PMI, 2008) 
P16a: In the ERP program context, 
the flexibility of program 
components over the entire life 
cycle contributes to program 
success, if this flexibility is favored 
by the program management. 
P16b: In the ERP program context, 
the flexibility of program 
components over the entire life 
cycle negatively affects program 
success when the flexibility is not 
wanted by program management 
but needs to be tolerated. 
Cabinet Office (2011), PMI (2008). New in the ERP 
program management context. Further research 
warranted. 
17 N/A Commitment key 
players and team  
Considered in stakeholder-and 
communication- management) 
See P3 N/A (see references in 3) 
18 N/A, Readiness of 
organizational culture  
Considered in change management See P4 N/A (see references in 4) 
19 N/A Realization of 
benefits  
Considered in establishment of a 
vision and a dynamic business case 
and associated benefits 
See P2 N/A  
20 N/A, Appropriateness 
of the ERP vendor  
Dropped for our contexts, further 
research in other settings suggested 
N/A N/A 




Central research question 2: How can the dynamics of CSFs be considered in a general, parsimonious phase 
model?    
We highlighted the two cases in relation to other competing theories (Urquhart et al., 2010), used for the 
second case. Although, the alternative theories could have been applied as well, we still think that the 
chosen core category and the meta-theory used for interpreting each case, suits the data best and provides 
the best explanation what was going on in the case, thus creating the storyline.  Nevertheless, we believe 
that the discussion of the cases in relation to other theories enhances the generalizability of the substantive 
theories, and fulfilled the grounded theory guidelines for “scaling up” and “theoretical integration” 
(Urquhart et al., 2010). Both models are suited to explain the dynamics of CSFs over the life cycle of a 
program, as opposed to the predominant static treatment in existing accounts (Lyytinen and Newman, 2015; 
Markus and Robey, 1988). Furthermore, they can complement each other, attributing organizational 
learning and changing stakeholder-perceptions over the life cycle of a program. 
Central research question 3: What are the benefits for companies of structuring their ERP-
implementations in programs? 
The results suggest that in both programs the anticipated benefits and goals for program management could 
be observed. Both contexts have differences and commonalities. On the one hand, they differed regarding 
the implementation strategy, big bang versus phased, and the number of involved sites (single site versus 
multisite approach). On the other hand, both programs implemented highly integrated products and 
projects, which were largely dependent on each other. A large number of business processes were impacted 
and many stakeholder groups involved. As a consequence, in the settings at A1/TA and Pantheon, both 
contexts were characterized by a high implementation complexity and many interrelations. 
This view is consistent with Ribbers and Schoo (2002), and their three complexity variables for programs; 
that is variety, variability and integration. To recap: Variety reflects the interrelations in a system and will 
increase with the number of sites affected or the functions of an implemented package. Variability is related 
to dynamics over time and the interrelations between the elements of a system. Examples are scope 
changes, lack of resources, and dependencies on other implementations that are competing for resources. 
Integration refers to the planned changes which will be realized, the innovation in IT and business processes. 
In both of our ERP program contexts the implementation complexity was high, and resulted in observable 




Ribbers and Schoo (2002), the employment of a program will lead to benefits (Lycett et al., 2004) which 
could not be realized when the projects are managed independently from each other (PMI, 2008). 
Our results suggest that the number of sites adds to the implementation complexity as suggested by Ribbers 
and Schoo (2002). However, the number of sites is not the only criterion for warranting the creation of a 
program, as Evaristo and van Fenema (1999) suggested for multiple concurrent projects, all of them 
operationally co-located in a single geographical place. They coined this type co-located program with the 
need to negotiate priorities on resource allocation. This is exactly what we could observe at A1/TA, thus 
confirming that benefits realization through programs (Lycett al., 2004), superior to the benefits obtained 
when projects are managed individually (PMI, 2008) can be obtained in a single-site program.  Benefits 
realization in a multisite context, a multiple co-located program (Evaristo and van Fenema, 1999), could be 
observed within the case at Pantheon. Thus, we conclude that the formation of a program is warranted in 
all contexts with a high degree of integration, dependencies and interrelations between the projects, where 
the resources need to    be allocated and prioritized efficiently. These allocations and prioritization are done 
by an additionally entity; that is, the program management, to realize the benefits associated with the 
program. 
 Overall Implications for Research 
Our research has several implications for research. First, our research is the first account (to the best of our 
knowledge), which presented a complete set of CSFs in the ERP program context, considering existing 
concepts of program management literature and the dynamic nature of ERP programs. We added to the 
common body of knowledge through integrating common program management concepts in the ERP 
context, which are grounded in empirical data. Previous work explicitly considering CSF in ERP programs 
(Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Seidel, 2009) did not use the general concepts of established program 
management guidelines (Cabinet Office, 2011; PMI 2008). IT projects [and programs] have higher levels of 
uncertainty than projects [and programs] in other industries (Napier et al. 2009). Thus, it is relevant to find 
adequate support for using the same or similar concepts, as used in the traditional project- and program 
management literature, in the ERP program context. Likewise, we considered existing research on CSFs for 
ERP implementations, and found some new CSFs in the ERP program context. Consequently, our research 
provides the first set of CSFs in the ERP program context, considering ERP and program management 
perspectives, and the dynamics of ERP programs. Future research can build on these findings, and should 




Second, we developed two parsimonious models which can explain the dynamics of CSFs over the entire life 
cycle of an ERP program. The need to consider the dynamics rather than the dominant static view in the 
past, were emphasized in previous prominent accounts (e.g. Markus and Robey, 1988; Lyytinen and 
Newman, 2015). Our research is the first account (to the best of our knowledge), which considers these 
dynamics grounded in rich case study data in the ERP program context. We applied the models to the second 
case and found indications about its applicability in other contexts.  It seems that salient groups and the 
organizational learning perspective are dimensions that are highly important for successful ERP programs. 
Future research should build on these foundations and apply the models to other ERP program settings. 
Furthermore, action research (Robey et al. 2000) accompanying an ERP program over its life cycle would be 
an interesting research avenue.  
Third, the investigated ERP programs delivered benefits which could not be realized in a traditional project 
setup (PMI, 2008). We discussed the cases in relation to the categorization of Lycett et al. (2004) and the 
complexity criteria of ERP programs suggested by Ribbers and Schoo (2002). The results suggest that a single- 
or multisite context is only one criterion to determine the complexity of a program (Evaristo and van 
Fenema, 1999). Additionally, the degree of integration, dependencies and interrelations between the 
projects need to be considered (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002). For future research, it would be interesting to 
evaluate which benefits could accrue in which program settings. Furthermore, we suggest operationalizing 
the complexity criteria, and to investigate different combinations of those criteria. This could strengthen our 
understanding in which settings a program setup is warranted. Lastly, we suggest developing a decision-
making tool for practitioners. This tool should be continuously refined based on a feedback loop with 
practice.  
 Overall Implications for Practice 
Our research has several implications for practice. First, and practitioners should consider our set of 
program-specific CSFs during the entire life cycle of their ERP programs. It is essential for the ERP program 
success to track the dynamics efficiently. Our program-specific CSFs are grounded in data. Thus, we provided 
(to the best of our knowledge) the first set of CSFs in the ERP program context, considering its dynamics. 
Although the set includes partially similar CSF as prior research identified, they were established in a 
program context. Furthermore, the set includes some new CSFs (collaboration and decision making, human 




Second, for practitioners the models can be used for regular health-checks over the entire ERP program life 
cycle to increase the likelihood of a successful outcome of their ERP programs. For ERP programs the number 
of salient groups is potentially higher than in traditional project setups. This is simply due to its typically 
larger size and the number of impacted stakeholder groups. The SGISS-model of different perceptions is 
particularly useful to meet this challenge. On the other hand, the organizational learning model in the ERP 
context considers the potential of an increased knowledge base over the life cycle. Thus, this model is 
particular (but not solely) useful in multisite environments, or phased implementations. Both models can 
complement each other. As such, they are useful tools, considering the dynamic nature of ERP programs 
and CSFs, for application in real-life ERP program contexts. 
Third, based on the complexity, it can be determined whether a program makes sense or not. These findings 
are useful for practitioners when they have to decide which setup is the most beneficial for their ERP 
implementations. We suggest that practitioners take into account the complexity criteria and the potential 
benefits, when they decide whether a program setup makes sense or not. Furthermore, we encourage 
practitioners to collaborate with research. The operationalization of complexity criteria should be 
continuously evaluated and refined. In this way, valuable tools could be created as a joint effort between 
research and practice.   
 Limitations 
Our findings rely on two interpretive case studies, and are grounded in data. Although we emphasize the 
context, and strictly adhered to the grounded theory method and guidelines for interpretive research, 
additional research is necessary to broaden our understanding and to establish more foundations. 
Particularly, we suggest applying our findings to other settings. Furthermore, the models and CSFs in the 
ERP program context should be operationalized and tested quantitatively. Consequently, our theoretical 






In our research we conducted two interpretive in-depth case studies, applying a grounded theory approach. 
We put a special focus on the contextual information. First, we investigated a complex post-merger ERP 
program, where a magnitude of salient groups was involved in the ERP program. Second, we investigated a 
program in a multisite environment with a dedicated program cluster (subprogram) dealing with the ERP 
system. For the interpretive case study, we followed well accepted guidelines of leading interpretive 
researchers (e.g. Klein and Myers 1999; Walsham; 1995; Walsham 2006), and we did the same for the coding 
part, where we used an adapted grounded theory approach (Sarker et al., 2001) which can be seen as being 
less rigid than the paradigm of Strauss and Corbin (1998), but is still based on the basic principles of the 
“Straussian” grounded theory method. 
With respect to the first central research question, we uncovered a range of CSFs of ERP programs, which 
are partially not explicitly covered in the current body of ERP literature. Our analysis has a special focus on 
different phases, as we investigated the entire life cycle, and shows the dynamics of CSFs over its course. As 
a last step we made a cross-case analysis and refined them after relating them to the seed concepts from 
the literature review. As new CSFs in the ERP program context, we want to mention collaboration and 
decision making, human capital management, and the flexibility of program components. Apart from these 
new findings, we confirmed and refined existing CSFs, but took a fresh perspective. First, the CSFs are 
program-specific and grounded in rich data of complex ERP programs. Second, we took a dynamic 
perspective and investigated the CSFs over the life cycle, paying attention to process events and not only 
static elements (Lyytinen and Newman, 2015; Markus and Robey, 1988). Furthermore, considering the 
dynamic process of changing stakeholder perceptions and actions which is evident in ERP implementations 
(Boonstra, 2006). Thus, we believe that our account is unique in the ERP program context and provides 
valuable insights for research and practice. 
With respect to the second central research question, we developed two theoretical, abstract and 
parsimonious models which explained the dynamics of CSFs in the context of each case. First, the “Salient 
Group IS Success (SGISS) Model of Different Perceptions”, where we applied SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) as 
a meta-theory (Sarker et al., 2001). Second, we presented the “Organizational Learning Model in the ERP 
Program Context”, where we applied organizational learning theory (e.g. Daft and Weick, 1984; Duncan and 




to the context of the other case, and observed some indications that the model could also be used in other 
settings.  
Finally, although the programs differed in the context (big bang vs. phased, single site vs multisite) both 
proved to be successful in generating benefits (Lycett et al. 2004) which would not have been possible in 
traditional project structure (PMI, 2008), thus giving an answer to the third central research question. As a 
consequence, we conclude that different variables, specifically the level of integration and the 
interdependencies define if a program is beneficial (Ribbers and Schoo, 2002), but can be generally 
generated in single-site and multisite contexts (Evaristo and van Fenema, 1999). 
In our research, we highlighted what makes ERP programs successful. ERP programs are contemporary 
phenomena and a means for integration of dispersed systems. New technologies allow transactional and 
reporting systems to use the same data storage; that is, a single source of truth. Increasing integration across 
financial and operational processed provide strategic value and competitive advantage (Krüger, 2016). Thus, 
we believe that the importance of ERP programs will rise, and this study provides valuable insights to deal 
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11 Appendix B - A1/TA 
  The Case at A1/TA – Results from a CSF Perspective 
In this part of the appendix we highlight the story at A1/TA from a CSF perspective. Whereas the story is 
very similar to the one in the main part we depict here clearly the open- and axial coding part. 
Furthermore, new insights are given in relation to the SIT interpretation. As a consequence, we provide a 
more complete view in relation to the derivation of CSFs, as presented in the cross-case analysis.  
In Figure 11-1 we depict the salient groups of the program at A1/TA: 
 





In Table 11-1 we depict the timeline of the project ASAP. The program and the other projects were very 
strongly influenced by this project, since it was the main project with the highest priority. Therefore, in 
this paper, we apply a single case study design with multiple, embedded levels of analysis (Yin, 2003). The 
timeline spans 31 months, which we subdivided into 9 phases.  
T No. Time Phase Category 
 1 Oct/ 2010 Blueprint (Conception)   
2 Jun/2011  Implementation  
3 Feb/2012 Re-planning  Crisis & 
Reflection 4 Apr/2012  Realization, Different Migration Concepts  
5 Jul/2012 Migration Runs (Test cycle X), Realization, Functional Tests   
 
 
Post Crisis  
 
6 Sep/2012 Migration Runs (Test cycle Y), Realization, Integration & End to 
End Tests  
7 Nov/2012  Final Tests, Final Migration Test Runs (Test cycle Z)  
8 Dec/2012 Deployment/Cut over/Go-live 
9 Jan/2013 – 
Apr/2013 
Post Go-live  
Table 11-1 Timeline of the Project ASAP 
Pre-Crisis 
During the blueprint phase (No. 1 in Table 11-1), not all the design documents were finished sufficiently. 
The different teams were formed according to their functional areas within A1/TA. In many cases the 
process spanned more than one functional area, and different harmonized and consolidated processes 
needed to fit together. The situation was worsened through the cultural and process differences of the 
formerly independent companies A1 (Mobilkom) and TA (Telekom) (see Quotation 1, Q1, Table 11-2). 
Prototyping was conducted only in a few cases, also due to time constraints. The streams and their IT-
counterparts often had difficulties imagining the complete end-to-end process without sufficient data. 
Furthermore, the new external implementation partner (A1/TA selected one general vendor for the 
blueprint phase) did not meet the expectations. Cultural barriers and knowledge gaps (team setup of the 
external partner) were the main reasons why, in particular, the streams at A1/TA were not satisfied with 
the performance of the implementation partner. Due to these reasons the blueprint phase did not reach 
the anticipated goals. 
During the implementation phase (No. 2 in Table 11-1) the groups within the program tried to catch up. 





general implementation partner, who should also involve former subcontractors (with a history as vendor 
either for A1 or TA) more strongly. This decision was appreciated by all program groups (apart from the 
original vendor). Furthermore, during the tender, the subcontractors were asked to document all the 
existing processes which were outside of the ERP system’s standard. Not only for harmonized processes, 
but also for consolidated processes, adoptions needed to be made. Conjoint decisions, about the new 
adopted design, were often not made in a common meeting of all stream members. Instead the functional 
areas of A1 and TA sat together with their IT-counterparts. Given the strict time plan, the latter often 
finalized the design in a separate meeting and informed their functional areas later. After all, most 
processes were implemented, tested separately within the respective functional areas, but the integrated 
end to end view was still not evident for the single streams (see Q2, Table 11-2). 
In general, cooperation with the new partner was much better in phase 2 than in phase 1, but still different 
views existed (program and project management vs. external IT; streams vs. internal/external IT, program 
and project management), concerning the test cycles for the data migration. The migration tools and the 
external management of the migration-team did not meet the expectations of A1/TA. Moreover, the huge 
amount of data led to long execution times. Even the first test cycles clearly did not achieve the targets. 
Thus, the data migration became the major problem of this phase (see Q3, Table 11-2). 
In addition to the problems of the data migration test cycles, not all the problems in regard to the 
definition of new processes were resolved. The strict time plan (proposed by the formal program sponsor 
the CFO, and the CTO), to which the program management (including project managers) committed, was 
seen as very ambitious by the basis (stream level and below). Some team members even used the term 
“unrealistic” (see Q4, Table 11-2), and with regard to the persisting problems, the doubts concerning the 
planned go-live date in 05/2012 increased. Before Christmas, in 12/2011, almost nobody within the basis 
believed in the feasibility of the original plan.  Since the situation did not change for the better, early in 
2012, also the program management started to consider different scenarios and a rescheduling of the go-
live date. In the meantime, BSAP performed well (see Q5, Table 11-2) 
Representative Quotations (translated) Interpretation from a SIT Perspective 
Q1: When is the blueprint detailed and good enough 
to start with the implementation? This was something 
where we did not really meet the target. It was a huge 
challenge, especially for an endeavor of this size. A 
In the beginning the “new” post-merger group A1/TA 
did still not exist in many heads. Instead, the most 
salient group for individuals in functional areas was still 




second major issue during the blueprint was the post-
merger-phase of the company. On the one hand the 
people from A1, on the other hand the people from 
TA... before they were not really confronted with each 
other. (Program manager)  
Therefore, the strategy to positively distinct the in-
group from the out-group was social competition 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986), which made an agreement 
more difficult.  
Open Codes: Team-Composition; Post-Merger Phase to consider; Blueprint Phase not really finished sufficiently 
Axial Codes: Efficient Human Capital Management; Ensuring Business Process Management; Case-Specific Context 
Q2: The majority of the users is outside the 
FUNCTAREA2 area.... a lack of awareness that the ERP 
system is highly integrated and plays an essential role 
in the entire company. Apart from the FUNCTAREA2 
most functional areas did not know that it will also be 
a change for them. (Director functional area 2) 
Every functional area (apart from FUNCTAREA2) is one 
in-group. They compare themselves with the out-group 
FUNCTAREA2 on the dimension “relevance”. In the 
early phases of the program, different perceptions 
concerning the business impact were perceived.  
Open Code: Expandable Transportation of Awareness concerning Importance and Impact 
Axial Code: Secure Change Management 
Q3: We were always one data migration test cycle 
behind. The vendor expected a technical migration, we 
expected already a first test migration... these two 
perceptions did not fit each other... we expected that 
they provide technically mature migration tools, which 
was not the case.... The functional areas realized that 
not all the data will be migrated.... and they asked 
themselves: “how can I work with that data”. 
(Technical coordinator program, project manager 
ASAP) 
Obviously, different groups shared different 
perceptions. Whereas the program and project 
expected that the migration tools are technically 
mature and a first test cycle with plausible data, the ERP 
vendor saw this test run pure technically. Furthermore, 
the functional realized that the data will be migrated 
only partially. This led necessarily to tensions between 
the groups. (program and project management vs. 
external IT; streams vs. internal/external IT, program 
and project management). 
Open Codes: Emerging Indicators for Rescheduling; Negative Perceptions concerning Data Migration Test Cycles; fail to 
fully manage expectations 
Axial Codes: Ensure Data Migration/ Accuracy; Define Stakeholder & Communication Management 
Q4: The program management and the project 
managers approved the first go live date, but the basis 
did not believe that this date is feasible right from the 
start. With basis, I mean stream leaders, work 
The program management and the project managers 
affiliated with the higher-status group program 
sponsors. In other words, the most salient group for the 




package owners and project staff. I mean you need to 
convey this plausibly to the basis, otherwise the date 
won't be accepted. And we did not manage to 
transport this properly. Therefore, we lost the basis for 
a certain time. That was one reason why we had to 
skip the first go live date. (Technical coordinator 
program, project manager ASAP) 
the in-group organization. The most salient group for 
the “basis” remained their informal lower-status group, 
since the higher status group did not get them on 
board. Thus, different perceptions regarding the 
feasibility of the time plan persisted.  
Open Codes: Loosing Trustworthiness; Unrealistic Timeframe 
Axial Code: Ensure Realistic Planning of Time Schedule 
Q5: We have people who push things 
forward.....that´s why we said we make our own 
documents....but we remained lean....This was only 
possible because we have been our own project....and 
the program management was happy with our 
performance right from the start. (Technical 
coordinator BSAP) 
The group-members of BSAP created positive 
distinctiveness by comparing themselves with the out-
group (e.g. ASAP) on a new dimension. They had no 
need to deliver the same amount of documents, and 
were more flexible. Tajfel and Turner (1986) call that 
social creativity.  
Open Codes: BSAP with separate Methodology Requirements; Project Empowerment is seen positively  
Axial Code: Flexibility of Program Components 
Table 11-2 Representative Quotations (Pre-Crisis) 
CSFs Description Groups at A1/TA 
Ensure Business Process 
Management 
Redesigning business processes in accordance 
with the ERP strategy and envisioned target 
business environment. 
Streams, Internal and External IT 
(with Subgroups A1 & TA) 
Ensure Realistic Planning of 
Time Schedule 
Defining an ambitious but realistic time-frame. Program Sponsors, Program and 
Project Management, Basis  
Ensure Appropriateness of 
the ERP Vendor 
Choosing the appropriate ERP vendor, ensuring 
ongoing vendor support. 
ERP Vendor 1, ERP Vendor 2, 







Ensuring that data is migrated accurately to the 
ERP system with appropriate tools. 
ERP Vendor 2, Basis  
Secure Change 
Management 
Creating awareness of business impact and 
relevance. 
Change-SAP, Streams 
Flexibility of Program 
Components 
Not all of the components needed to meet the 
same strict requirements, which was 
particularly good for BSAP.  
Project BSAP 
Table 11-3 Most Important CSFs and Involved Groups (Pre-Crisis) 
In Table 11-3 the CSFs (and the particular properties/dimension in the description), which were not really 
met are depicted. Other relevant CSFs (“Secure Top Management Support”, “Establish Governance 
Structure”, etc.) were addressed appropriately. Additionally, in the last row we report on the program-
specific CSF “Flexibility of Program Components”. 
Crisis and Reflection 
Within the re-planning phase (No. 3 in Table 11-1), the original go-live date was cancelled. This decision was 
appreciated by the basis (stream level and below, see Figure 11-1). The project ASAP was responsible for the 
cancellation, but likewise all projects were affected (For example, BSAP was performing well all the time). 
Furthermore, one stream was split into two streams, which reflected strongly the interest of both new 
groups. The perceived workload decreased heavily for the basis, but at the same time increased significantly, 
for the program management and the project managers, who started to refine the new schedule and to 
prepare different scenarios. 
Within phase 4 (Realization, Different Migration Concepts, Table 11-1), the program management prepared 
a detailed plan for the new go-live date in 01/2014, which was presented in a decision workshop in 06/2012. 
As the data migration was considered as the most serious issue, five different alternatives were proposed. 
Furthermore, five different deployment scenarios were presented. Additionally, issues with a critical 
business impact were highlighted. The decision workshop served as a large buy-in of all relevant 
stakeholders, since beside the CFO, the CTO, the program management and the project managers, also 
directors and stream leaders (in total 26 persons) participated. Although the new schedule was still 




and agreed in accordance on a specific combination of the migration/deployment scenario. The 
consequence was a strong overall commitment to the new envisioned go-live date (see Q6, Table 11-4) 
Representative Quotation (translated) Interpretation from a SIT perspective 
Q6: The crisis had a positive effect on the complete 
program. We used the time to reflect what went wrong, 
what do we need to improve, where do we need to 
change the structure, how must we change our 
collaboration.... A new quality of collaboration.... The 
team found together… (Project manager Change-SAP) 
During phase 3 and 4 the group formation (group “program”) 
was strengthened. The extent to which an individual 
identifies with a group may be affected by interpersonal 
interaction, common history, shared goals or threat (Ashfort 
and Mael, 1989). We assume that pressure might also have 
been a condition. 
Open Codes: Positive Reflection of the Past; New Quality of Collaboration 
Axial Codes: Establish Collaboration and Decision Making; Secure Lessons Learned 
Table 11-4 Representative Quotation (Crisis – Re-planning and Reflection) 
Actions Description CSFs influenced 
Buy-in Meeting Securing the commitment of stakeholders. 
Decisions made on data migration and 
deployment scenarios. 
Top Management Support, Establish 
Commitment of Key Players, Ensure 





The data migration team was reinforced with 
additional workforce, most notably at the 
management level. The program management 
realized that the collaboration between functional 
areas, IT, and the implementation partner needed 
to be improved. 
Ensure Data Migration/ Accuracy 
Quality Gates 
introduced 
For data migration, end to end tests, Integration 
Tests Percentage of executed test cases, 
percentage of priority 1 errors.  
Define Program Methodology  
Issue Tracking Tool  An issue management tool was introduced. To 
prioritize tickets and generate reports. 
Secure Issue Management, Defining 









Convey management decisions to Basis, (decisions 
made in decision workshop). 
Secure Change Management, Define 




Separate project rooms were provided to 
strengthen the communication and collaboration, 
and to improve decision making. 
Establish Collaboration and Decision 
Making, Ensure Business Process 
Management 
Table 11-5 Most Important Corrective Actions During the Crisis 
Table 11-5 depicts the corrective actions, which we deemed most important during the crisis. These actions 
influenced certain CSFs, as we show in column 3. 
Post-Crisis 
The data migration test cycle X (No. 5 in Table 11-1) resulted in additional errors. The bug-fixing, together 
with the open issues in the implementation (development) of processes, was a challenge for the 
implementation team and tickets needed to be prioritized. This was done with a dedicated issue tracking 
tool, which was introduced at that time. The introduction of the tool was generally appreciated and allowed 
a detailed reporting and communication of the current status (see Q7, Table 11-6).  
The data migration test cycles X and Y (No. 6 in Table 11-1) continued with the goal to meet the target values 
of the quality gate. This was the prerequisite to start with the final test cycle Z in 11/2012. One realized still 
room for improvement concerning the data preparation for the upcoming data migration runs. Finally, very 
late, integration- and end to end tests started and new issues popped up. This resulted in new change 
requests, which needed to be prioritized. Especially in the CS (Customer Service) -stream some critical 
integration-tests failed. High priority was given to the issues concerning customer oriented processes, and 
further downtimes and tests were arranged. Additional awareness (at least informally) was given to this 
topic, since a service oriented company got bad press because of their bad deployment of a new system. By 
that time at the latest, all groups within the program realized the strong impact an ERP system might have 
on public appearance, and that the link to the organizational and environmental context is especially 
important (see Q8, Table 11-6). 
In this phase (Final Tests, Final Migration Test Runs, Test cycle Z, No. 7 in Table 11-1) the progress slowly 




the end to end tests (with data of data migration test cycle 2) did not meet the envisioned targets and the 
test phase needed to be prolonged. 19 processes were classified as business critical, and needed to pass the 
final tests. Finally, with a lot of commitment, and increased professionalism, of the whole program team 
(especially from the project ASAP), all the critical business processes met the acceptance criteria, and data 
migration test cycle Z passed the target values of the quality gate (see Q9, Table 11-6). Hence, one day after 
the final end to end tests, the steering committee formally approved the go-live scenario. 
The deployment and go-live phase (No. 8 in Table 11-1) was seen as a success by all stakeholder groups. No 
business critical business issues remained and the steering committee approved the formal go-live date. The 
project BSAP also went live successfully a few weeks later, followed by the project Pro-SAP, which 
successfully went live in 06/2013. The project ASAP+ (conception release 2) was delayed and successfully 
concluded later, i.e., it was rescheduled due to the higher priority of ASAP.  
In the post go live-phase (No. 9 in Table 11-1), all the open issues were addressed and prioritized. Again, also 
within this phase, the issue tracking tool proved to be very valuable and offered high transparency to the 
relevant stakeholders (see Q7, Table 11-6). All issues were either solved or postponed to release 2. It is 
important to note that the project Change-SAP was strongly involved in communication and training issues 
during the post go-live phase. Finally, a last workshop was conducted to reflect upon the entire program. 
The program was evaluated as a success in most dimensions. While the aspect of collaboration was rated 
unanimously as excellent in phases 8 and 9, it was assessed as very bad for phase 2 (start of the 
implementation). Open issues were handed over to operations (including roles, tools, processes), and 
lessons learned were saved for future programs. 
 
Representative Quotations (translated) Interpretation from a SIT Perspective 
Q7: The open issues were managed with an issue 
tracking tool. We used it heavily, also for reports 
depending on the priority and the business impact. 
(Program manager) 
The introduction of the issue tracking tool was appreciated by 
all groups, since it positively affected the program. Therefore, 
it strengthened the identification with the in-group 
“program”, and group formation through shared goals 
(Ashfort and Mael, 1989). The tool made communication with 




Open Codes: Positive Perceptions concerning the Usage of an Issue Tracking tool; Intensive Communication of Issues 
and Errors 
Axial Codes: Secure Issue Management; Define Stakeholder & Communication Management 
Q8: We had many concerns. That's why we prepared 
ourselves for the situation. The worst thing is to get 
bad press, how it happened to the company 
WILLNOTMENTION.... this would have been the worst 
case. (Stream leader, stream 1, functional area 1) 
Employees of functional area 1 belong to different in-groups 
(e.g. their stream, the project, the program, the organization). 
The out-group is the company (environment), who failed in 
implementing an IS properly. Given this situation, it is clear, 
that one wanted to avoid a negative public appearance, by any 
means. 
Open Codes: No bad Press and no negative Public Appearance; Detailed Cut-Over (Deployment) Planning 
Axial Codes: Emphasize Vision and Business Case; Dimensions for Success; Define Program Methodology, Case-Specific Context 
Q9: The essential point was the increased 
professionalism in the migration team, we also 
had some changes in the team 
composition...collaboration and the interplay 
between development, test migrations, tests, 
integration-tests, end-to-end tests, data 
cleansing....were much better. (Program 
manager) 
The relevant in-group formation “Data Migration” was 
strengthened. Additionally, the interplay with salient out-
groups “streams” improved. Also the identification with 
higher-status groups (project, program, organization) 
increased. 
Open Codes: Strengthening and Restructuring of the Migration Team; Perceptions concerning the Collaboration improved steadily; 
Increasing Professionalism within the Migration Team 
Axial Codes: Ensure Data Migration/ Accuracy; Efficient Human Capital Management; Establish Collaboration and Decision Making 
Table 11-6 Representative Quotations (Post-Crisis) 
Table 11-7 (below) depicts the CSFs, which we deemed most important during the Post-Crisis. In the 
description the properties/dimensions, which were of particular importance at A1/TA are shown.  
In this section we presented our interpretive case study. We started with the program structure, followed 
by the introduction of salient groups within the program at A1/TA. Next, we presented the timeline and 
continued with our storyline, which is based on social identity theory (SIT). We interpreted some aspects 




Crisis and Reflection, Post-Crisis). Furthermore, we considered the salient in-groups and out-groups. Next, 
we discuss the most relevant findings of our study, its limitations and avenues for future research. 
CSFs Description Groups at A1/TA 
Ensure Data Migration/ 
Accuracy 
Collaboration and lessons learned in the migration 
team, additional workforce for the migration team, 
committed migration scenario, collaboration with 
other teams, ensure data freeze.  
Streams, Internal IT, ERP Vendor  
Emphasize Vision and 
Business Case 
No negative public appearance, customers should 
not recognize the change, adapted business case 
secured, meeting the defined success dimensions. 
All Groups within the 
Organization, especially the 
Program Groups 
Facilitate Collaboration 
and Decision Making 
Trusting each other and other groups, small teams 
which are enforced to make fast decisions, interplay 
between IT and streams. 
All Program Groups 
Enforce Program 
Methodology 
Strict quality gates for data migration cycles, end to 
end testing, integration tests. 
All Program Groups 
Establish Commitment of 
Key players 
Absolute commitment to 2nd go-live date. All Program Groups 
Realize Benefits Transition into operations, lessons learned, 
reflecting the project and reviewing the targets. 
Streams, Internal IT, Program and 
Project Management 











Unrealistic timeframe - 
perceived not to be 
realistic
Program schedule
Pressure from top 
management(board)
Clear commitment to 
2nd go live date – all 
groups
Realistic timeframe – 
perceived to be 
realistic
Communication and 





of all projects 
Communication and 
meeting of milestones 
could have been 
better 
Figure 11-2 Axial Coding – Network View – Realistic Timeframe - A1/TA 
Implementation Attempt 2 
Implementation 
Attempt 1 
Lack in engagement 





 Integrative Memos – Realistic Timeframe - A1/TA  
Axial (integrative memo), realistic timeframe (subcategory) 
The first go-live date was defined by the board and supported by the program management, program office, 
project leaders (management coalition). The decision was perhaps influenced by the premise that only 
certain go-live dates were possible, regarding year end closing or quarter closing (Functional Director 2). 
The first go-live date was seen as absolutely not doable by many key players “the Basis” (several 
statements...). Statement of program group: “very, very ambitious”. In certain cases, also timelines 
regarding the change project were not seen feasible (Stream Lead).   
The conception and blueprint phase already had delays. The plan was seen by some players as already being 
unrealistic in this phase; according to a Functional Director 1, even before the implementation phase was 
started. One aspect which was raised is the fact that the ERP vendor changed and perhaps would have 
needed an assimilation phase (Functional Director 2). Although some players also defended the initial plan 
of the program (and top) management, they perceived the plan as not doable, as Functional Director 2 said 
“it is always difficult, since when you would have stretched the time plan by 6 or 9 months, then perhaps 
other problems had occurred, due to less pressure, although the daily work would have been more 
comfortable”. The unrealistic timeframe was stretched several times in the lessons-learned workshop and 
its minutes. 
Nobody wanted to say something against the first time-plan, as high top-down pressure was perceived and 
the go-live date was clearly defined (two persons of management coalition, one person of the Basis).  
Retrospectively also the program management admitted, the partial greenfield-approach and the timeframe 
of Implementation Attempt 1 was not realistic (Several quotations).  
The unrealistic timeframe had also consequences on the engagement and commitment of the staff (Change 
Manager, Functional Director 1), and problems appeared during the data migration test cycles 1,2 and 3, 
where nothing worked out properly. 
The Basis (implementation below project leads) did not believe the plans anymore, and the program 
management lost credibility. This lack of commitment, engagement and believing in the feasibility of the 




cancellation- and postponement decision was officially taken by the steering committee only late (March 
2012), as a decision with that impact needs a proper and structured analysis in advance.  
In the buy-in meeting (26-Jun 2012) a realistic but ambitious timeframe, with different cutover variants, 
migration variants, was presented to representatives of all impacted stakeholder groups. This plan was seen 
as realistic; the decision was taken in unison. Afterwards, the new plan was communicated from the 
stakeholder representatives to their groups. As such, the absolute commitment of these groups was secured 
for the 2nd go-live date. This ambitious timeframe and commitment manifested in weekend work and night 
shifts (“it was an enormous effort” (1 person from the Basis). Functional people and business experts worked 
together and made the 2nd go-live date happen. This willingness to meet the 2nd go-live date and the 
absolute commitment were also stressed in the lessons-workshop and its minutes. 
Functional areas as logistics reported that the 2nd time schedule worked out properly, with all core 
functionalities, and it was good that not earlier alternatives were pursued. Some areas as Customer Services 
really needed this time to meet all the requirements 
The pressure was after the cancelation of Implementation Attempt 1 a little bit lower for a limited time, but 
increased as the 2nd go-live date approached (2 persons from the Basis). The pressure on the 2nd go-live 
date also effected that certain positions of stakeholder groups were weakened and the stakeholder groups 
(Mobilkom, Telekom) worked cooperatively together with the commonly accepted date, and found 
appropriate solutions (Management coalition). 
 
Axial memo (integrative memo) – stakeholder and communication management (core category) 
In the beginning, not all stakeholders were properly identified (e.g. line management). It was difficult in any 
case to receive the commitment of the functional areas. The functional areas had the wrong perception that 
it is an IT endeavor. Many stakeholder groups needed to be involved as stated by one member of the PMO, 
e.g. portfolio-management, enterprise solution architecture. 
At a later stage [perhaps also impacted by the fact that the project manager of the change project was 
exchanged, and the new project manager had more experience regarding communication], change impacts 
were clearly communicated as well as the errors which might be expected. Different channels were used, 




it to the next levels. In that relation also a meeting intended for the line management was scheduled [very 
late] as recorded in the meeting minutes of 09-Nov-2012 and 28-Nov-2012. To a certain extent the 
information meetings were scheduled right from the start, but stronger in Implementation Attempt 2. 
A key-user concept was developed, and single points of contact regarding training were defined. The key-
users should transport the information to lower levels. The responsible persons for training were trained 
from training consultants. During the re-planning it was explicitly defined and recorded that the “results 
must be conveyed to lower levels by line manager”. The line managers act as multipliers 
Only at a later stage was it possible to communicate to the functional areas, which expectations (again 
perceptions) they could have towards the new system. They realized which data they could expect in the 
new system (data migration). Furthermore, the implementation team realized that the process could only 
be observed and tested together with the data (which was not there in a sufficient state during 
Implementation Attempt 1) The data migration strategy was not properly communicated during the 
blueprint-phase. This should have been done (Technical Director Program, Project Manager ASAP), although 
it would have been “abstract” and hard to comprehend for the functional areas. As a consequence, also the 
process view needed to be corrected several times. 
During Implementation Attempt 1 daily SCRUM meetings were scheduled as it is recorded in the minutes of 
03-Feb-2016 [Perhaps as a final means to meet the deadline of Implementation Attempt 1] 
A functional director clearly asserted that the communication and the Communication and meeting of 
milestones, as well as quality, improved over the course of the rollout. 
The change impact was not clearly transported “not enough project-marketing, no pure accounting-
endeavor”, expectations transported to the management. Not all Stakeholder groups were identified, e.g. 
one major area and its impact was not clearly identified. Only commitment of the top management is not 
enough. Commitment is also needed within the functional areas. In areas where the stakeholders were 
identified, they trusted the project members. 
The quality of collaboration and the expectations to each other were reflected during the re-planning. In the 
beginning partially too many persons were involved in the meetings (too large rounds). No clear definition 
of accountability. Later, during Implementation Attempt 2 small, empowered teams were co-located (in 




The reporting function (to the management) benefited significantly through the program construct. 
Overview of several projects and transparency were mentioned several times. 
The buy-in meeting 29-Jun-2012, where all major stakeholders were involved, contributed significantly to a 
better work situation and a successful Implementation Attempt 2. Reflection, new-definition of 
communication strategy (managers transport info to subordinates, to secure the involvement of all 
stakeholders), separate project rooms, smaller, empowered teams, data migration scenarios, cut over 
scenarios. Very important was the definition of a new go-live date (several scenarios discussed) 
Approval of all stakeholder groups secured a strong commitment during Implementation Attempt 2. 
Tools contributed to better communication, in Implementation Attempt 2. 
Post go-live: hypercare support was planned during the cut-over planning. Errors and expected solution 
times were properly communicated. Training sessions were partially repeated, skills and training materials 
optimized. Finally, during the lessons learned workshop (end of hypercare phase) the communication 
(internal and external) was seen positively. Emphasized was the target-group-specific communication and 
the communication-plan.   
Selective coding: realistic timeframe regarding core category (stakeholder- and communication 
management) 
During Implementation Attempt 1 the go-live date was defined by the board and supported by the program 
management (Believers). It seems that other stakeholders (line managers, implementation team starting 
from stream-leads) were not much involved in the definition of this date. The go-live was tacitly accepted 
from these Skeptics, but had was not perceived as doable (realistic). This had an impact on commitment, 
engagement and the management coalition (Believers) lost trustworthiness. Nobody of the Skeptics 
believed in the plans “they put on the walls” and its feasibility. As a consequence, a negative fit of 
perceptions towards the CSF “realistic timeframe” existed. The CSFs was not met. 
 2 salient groups: Believers vs. Skeptics  
During the re-planning several scenarios were discussed, and all stakeholders- groups were identified 
properly and involved. During a buy-in meeting one scenario regarding “new timeframe, new go-live date” 




subordinates, securing that all levels are involved. Several other actions (e.g. regarding decision making and 
empowerment of smaller teams) helped to save time. 
During Implementation Attempt 2, all stakeholder groups perceived the feasibility of the timeframe, 
showing strong commitment and wanted to stick to the go-live date at all costs. They worked long hours and 
weekends. The time-schedule where all stakeholder groups were “bought in” through effective stakeholder- 
and communication management was perceived as ambitious but doable (realistic). As a consequence, the 
group borders blurred, all stakeholders had the same perceptions towards the CSF, leading to a high positive 
fit towards the CSF “realistic timeframe”. The CSF was met.  





12 Appendix C - Pantheon 
 
 Some Reference CSFs (Concepts) 
Program Governance/Project Governance 
During the rollouts, the program cluster proved to be very valuable, and we propose that the establishment 
of this additional entity was the best choice, particularly when many stakeholder groups are involved (Chang 
et al. 2014) with different backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives (Jiang et al. 2014). First, the program 
cluster provided valuable guidance throughout the implementation life cycle and introduced best practice 
methods which were consistently sharpened. Second, the program cluster had an overview of the larger 
picture, the overall timelines of all projects within the Jupiter rollout series, but also to surrounding projects 
and products in the environment. The program cluster also intervened in situations which were not always 
evident for the sites. Third, the program cluster was participating in and reporting to the steering committee 
and therefore secured top management support (Bernroider, 2008; Markus and Tanis, 2000; Ribbers and 
Schoo, 2002; Seidel, 2009), which is indispensable. Fourth, the program cluster also had a mediating role 
from a neutral perspective which helped to find resolutions when other stakeholder groups (sites vs. Jupiter 
Competence Center) had different perceptions. This was often necessary since the two parties often acted 
like a customer and an external implementation partner, although both were under the roof of Pantheon.  
Bottom line, we believe that embedment into the larger program and the introduction of the program 
cluster was absolutely essential. 
 
Business Process Redesign 
The general business blueprint and the development of the template were not met sufficiently and weighted 
towards Apollo1, but was improved within the flexible blueprint phases during each rollout. In general, we 
believe that it is a huge challenge to develop a comprehensive template which covers all envisioned 
consolidated and harmonized business processes in sufficient detail, particularly when too much time passes 
between the blueprint and the rollout, and the requirements and surroundings change (“moving targets”). 
The results suggest that a blueprint phase with a fit-gap analysis should be done at the start of every rollout 
project, which details the outcome of the general blueprint. Furthermore, it seems that the more the 




course, this proposition needs further investigation and we see here a potential for further research. For 
Pantheon, it might have been one reason that the scheduled rollout implementation times had to be 
extended.  
Overall, the program contributed to an effective business process redesign, although the missing directive 
power made process harmonization more difficult. First, the global blueprint and the integrated view with 
respect to other products paved the path for increased awareness (also for future contract negotiations) at 
the site-level. Second, although the blueprint could not meet the envisioned targets, the case at Pantheon 
illustrates the dynamics of a learning program. This includes the products and best practice lists issued by 
the program cluster and the Jupiter Competence Center. Third, a strict change process prevents the 
development of unnecessary process varieties. Fourth, the development of a common release management 
(with inclusion of Jupiter and other products) secures common and integrated end-to-end processes. For all 
those reasons, this CSF was strongly leveraged by the program. 
Appropriate Methodology  
Particularly for an endeavor of this size, an appropriate methodology is of major importance. This is stressed 
extensively in program management literature (e.g., Cabinet Office, 2011; Lycett et al., 2004; PMI, 2008), 
but also in ERP literature (e.g., Markus and Tanis, 2000; Ribbers and Schoo, 2002; Seidel, 2009). In our 
specific case it is important to mention that an appropriate methodology was used extensively at the level 
of the program cluster, as well as for the ERP implementation itself; the Jupiter Competence Center used a 
well-established method developed by the ERP vendor. Moreover, the methodology was adapted and 
improved over the course of the rollouts. Furthermore, a rigid change process and a common release 
management strategy secures the integrity of the ERP system over all sites and with respect to other 
products. Certainly it helped that quite a few members of the program cluster and from the Jupiter 
Competence Center were experienced and certified users. All in all, we conclude that the usage of 
appropriate methodologies contributed to the overall success.  
Target Group Specific Trainings 
Pantheon conducted training at all levels, which was certainly an important factor for the success of the 
Jupiter implementation. In program management and ERP research, training is addressed extensively, but 
mostly covered under the summary term ‘Change Management’ (e.g., Cabinet Office, 2011; Lycett et al., 




In our case the training included product training for the members of the Jupiter Competence Center, 
general and specific process and product training for key-users, and project preparation training for key-
users. This training was so comprehensive that we decided that it exceeds the level of a subcategory. From 
a program cluster perspective, it was beneficial that certain training sessions were bundled, including 
participants from different sites, and that the learning effect with respect to this CSF was transferred from 
one site to another. Thus, we conclude that “target group specific trainings” were leveraged by the 
integrated program view. 
Lessons Learned - Continuous Improvement & Product Quality 
The continuous improvement over the course of the rollouts was a CSF of major importance for the success 
of the overall rollout series. The ‘watermelons’ Vesta2 and Neptune2 had the worst starting conditions, since 
on one hand the initially planned implementation time was simply too short for them, and on the other hand 
the blueprint was not meeting their needs. This was a turning point in the project and the implementation 
times were extended; the product quality was improved significantly.  Furthermore, all participating 
stakeholder groups gained experience over the course of the rollouts. This was due to the sharing of 
experiences, e.g., the biweekly telephone conference where all relevant stakeholder groups participated, 
the increasing awareness about potential problems, and the continuous improvement of best practice 
guidelines. The continuous improvement was certainly only possible since Pantheon followed a phased 
rollout approach (subsequent rollouts) compared to a big bang approach, where everything is implemented 
at once (Davenport, 2000; Markus et al., 2000a). As a consequence, the remaining rollouts could profit 
significantly, from a methodological and best practice perspective, as well as from the perspective of a 
continuously improved product quality.  
 
 Sample Quotations for Concepts: 
Program Governance/Project Governance 
A really complex issue which was evident throughout the program cluster was the complex enterprise 
structure with the autonomous sites. Basically, each site was responsible for its rollout project and the 
implementation of Jupiter (Q14). The program cluster accompanied the rollouts with best practice methods 
and a neutral view (Q15), but had no authority to give directives, like it is common in a matrix organization. 




current status. Nevertheless, although the program cluster as additional coordinating and neutral entity was 
without a doubt necessary, the enterprise structure of Pantheon was challenging at its best. 
Q14: In principle the problem of self-administration [autonomous sites] is that each site, or each part in each 
site, is independently responsible, ok. And, when I’ve got a matrix organization, I have to check where the 
linking is stronger, horizontally or vertically? How is it, for example, if someone sitting in a site gets an order 
from the Jupiter Competence Center, but he knows that this against the view of his director, what is he going 
to do? The Jupiter Competence Center is a temporary organization, compared to the line organization. After 
all, there are many potential causes of conflict, which wouldn’t occur in a ‘real’ hierarchical organization. 
(Senior program manager, 153 ff.) 
Open code: Self-administration (autonomy) without real directive power needs to be treated carefully 
Axial codes: Program governance; project governance 
Q15: ....it [we] were those blue helmets [UN peacekeeping forces], with the motivation to lead confusing 
structures or conflicting situations, to support them professionally, summarizing, and trying to observe 
neutrally....since we were not suffering when something was implemented differently or needed to be 
implemented...or [we did not have] the pressure of the functional areas...we were free and could view at a 
topic from different angles, and trying to lead to a decision. And when this was not possible there was the 
program steering committee as an escalation level, where we said: ‘ok, this problem needs to be led over to 
a different project’, or making recommendations.....since when someone is involved and discussion partner, 
then it is hard to moderate, when one has interest. (Junior program manager 23:7) 
Open Codes: Program cluster from a neutral perspective as mediator; reporting of program cluster to 
program steering committee 
Axial Codes: Program governance; project governance; Stakeholder- and communication management 
Quotation Q16 illustrates again the autonomy from the sites. This manifested that the situation during some 
rollouts was a black-box for the members of the Jupiter Competence Center. This is very interesting, since 
for the same rollouts (Juno5 and Minerva5) the senior program manager of the program cluster rated the 
project management capabilities of these sites as excellent. It seems that particularly for Juno5 the program 
cluster had insights in regard to the status of certain deliverables, which were not visible to the members of 




Q16: After all, the transparency which we would have desired existed only conditionally. Minerva5 laid open 
everything what they did, and what they do, where they have got problems. Juno5 only said: ‘everything 
works properly or the Jupiter Competence Center is responsible since they didn’t resolve the error in time.’ 
This was difficult in the beginning... (External senior consultant, Jupiter Competence Center lead for several 
rollouts, 545 ff.) 
Open codes: Sites own governance and responsibility of rollouts; no directive power towards sites for the 
Jupiter Competence Center, different levels of transparency from sites to competence center 
Axial codes: Project governance; collaboration  
 
Business Process Redesign 
Although the Jupiter Competence Center spent considerable time and effort to prepare an extensive 
blueprint document, it was not specific enough to meet the requirements of the different sites. The blueprint 
was acceptable for Settlement Area 1 for the Apollo1 rollout, since this was the only site where an SAP legacy 
application existed in that specific area, and where the functional and business experts had SAP experience. 
For Settlement Areas 2 and 3, Apllo1 faced a similar situation as the other sites for all settlement areas. 
Furthermore, Apollo1 was the first rollout and therefore subject to fewer changes (legal, process and 
changes in surrounding and related products), called ‘moving targets’ in quotation Q8. Eventually, the 
situation improved as the missing sections were subsequently carried out over the path of the rollouts, as 
Q17 indicates.   
Q17: First, when the sites don’t take the blueprint discussions seriously. For example, that they say: ‘ok, this 
is in 5 years, who cares what happens in 5 years,’ and when they don’t break it down into the details...second, 
deliverables were realized differently since it was not described so detailed in the blueprint, for example not 
meeting the requirements....third, certainly the changing requirements, since I shoot at a moving target. 
Since during the blueprint [phase] I can say to a certain point in time: ‘this is the situation now,’ but how it 
will be in 5 years, when it will be implemented, nobody knows, it can happen a lot [in the meantime]. And 
these things, these moving targets, were in a major part implemented in the meantime. (Senior program 




Open codes: Steadily changing requirements - moving targets; different perceptions regarding blueprint and 
template 
Axial codes: Business process management; scope management, perceptions 
 
Appropriate Methodology 
The strict usage of an appropriate implementation methodology was evident at all levels throughout the 
whole implementation life cycle. The program cluster Saturn/Jupiter used certain checkpoints and checklists 
as Q18 indicates. The methodology was refined continuously over the course of the rollouts. Exactly as the 
program cluster the Jupiter Competence Center also understood the importance of a proper usage of 
methodology. In their case they used a well-established method of the ERP vendor. Furthermore, within 
Pantheon, project management certifications or ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library) are prevalent. Thus, we 
conclude that from the methodological perspective best practices were met.   
Q18: The entry points were definitely very important. We saw....during their introduction that the importance 
was very high, ok, and for the last sites, it was rather like that we knew what we have to do, it was rather 
formalism. After all, it was important, that we structured certain things and that we defined processes. 
....certain checkpoints and checklists, saying that this must be finished before we can go to the next phase. 
(Senior program manager, 1189 ff.) 
Open codes: Program methodology for standard products has positive effects; continuous learning curve 
over the course of the rollouts 
Axial codes: Methodology; lessons learned - continuous improvement 
Q19: As SAP uses a proven implementation methodology in their projects, ASAP was used for the Jupiter 
project. The 6 key elements are Project Preparations, Business Blueprint, which contains the analysis of the 
business requirements and the description of future processes. In our project this was the “holy bible.” Once 
you have the Business Blueprints finished, the Implementation phase starts followed by the Preparation for 
Go-live. The project life cycle ends with the Go live and Support phase. Then, the phase Run SAP starts. 
(Submission template, quality awards, business transformation category p. 6) 




Axial code: Methodology 
 
Target Group Specific Trainings 
At the beginning of each rollout, different trainings were conducted for the new project members, in 
particular key-users. On the one hand, they were trained as new users of the upcoming SAP standard product 
Jupiter (Q20); on the other hand, they were prepared for the rollout project. Particularly for the project part, 
the extent of providing training depended on prior experience of the site staff. All in all, it seems that 
considerable effort was spent in getting the different staff ready for the rollout projects.    
Q20: The trainings were composed that initially....during one day the focus was the overview of Jupiter. What 
is Jupiter How does Jupiter work? Which processes, do we have in Jupiter and things like that.... Then 
later…the detailed trainings. (ERP expert, work-package responsible, participated in all rollouts, 56 ff.) 
Open code: Extensive key-user trainings at rollout start with differentiation between general and specific 
training 
Axial code: Trainings 
Q21: The focus was on the staff of the sites, making them fit for such a large project. The people from the 
functional areas were mainly, one cannot generalize, but there were many sites where the people from the 
functional areas were not used to work on projects. They had their daily routines....and now they need to 
implement something new, test it and things like that. With those things they were not so familiar, to work 
on projects, deadlines...we tried to prepare them for all those things. (Senior program manager, 518 ff.) 
Open codes: Program cluster conducts rollout preparation trainings; different project cultures as starting 
conditions for program cluster 
Axial codes: Trainings; contextual conditions 
 
Lessons Learned - Continuous Improvement 
An essential point for the increasing success of the rollouts was certainly the continuous improvement 




program cluster Saturn/Jupiter had certain best practices lists, a kind of knowledge database for the 
underlying methodology, which was subsequently updated and improved. This helped to carry forward the 
lessons learned, as illustrated in quotation Q22, and improved the quality of recommendations and 
preparations for future project teams of other sites. Furthermore, together with the Jupiter Competence 
center a regular telephone conference was established. Beside the program cluster and the Jupiter 
Competence center the rollout managers from all sites participated, regardless if their implementation was 
already finished or not yet started. This regular telephone conference raised awareness and ensured 
learning amongst participants.    
Q22: Carrying forward the lessons learn from one site to the other, mainly [about] the structure and the 
sequence of the rollout project....for example...about social issues, how one needs to structure a project, also 
in regard to certain tests which made problems...’please look at that in particular, this is interesting for you 
etc., or this phase which you planned is simply too short according to our experience and needs to be longer,’ 
or does it make sense to plan certain deliverables earlier since their rectifications last longer. Well, conveying 
such experiences to the sites. (Senior program manager, 1117 ff.) 
Open Code:  Dynamic lessons learned best practice list program cluster 
Axial Code: Lessons learned - continuous improvement 
 
Q23: After all, it was a large learning effect, and in that direction also the attention of the other sites... ‘there 
are troubles during the project leader-telcos [telephone conferences]’ where others also started earlier to 
engage with that, perhaps taking the blueprint and reading it, marking sessions and making first thoughts  
in that direction...how we will implement it and how will the project organization look like....where do I see 
difficulties, what one needs to consider in each case.....the attention that they find themselves, in no case in 
a difficult situation like that. (Junior program manager: 24:1) 
Open code: Awareness of sites regarding potential problems; perceptions 
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 Integrative Memos – Business Process Redesign - Pantheon 
Axial (integrative memo), Business Process Redesign 
The mandate of the program cluster Saturn-Jupiter pursued the clear goal to harmonize business processes 
(business partner settlements in three settlement areas) as much as possible, considering site autonomies. 
The top management decided that SAP will be the software (operating on a common platform) that replaces 
the various legacy host applications. The endeavor was part of a larger program Saturn, including the 
internalization of the data center. 
A development project was started with the Jupiter Competence Center after they got the mandate from 
Pantheons top management. The first phase was to raise the user requirements of all sites, and to write a 
common blueprint. The process redesign and the concrete realization needed to consider site autonomies 
(federalism), local laws, and the corresponding liberties regarding the concrete contracts with business 
partners in the relevant settlement areas. The sites are characterized by fundamentally different settlement 
processes in Settlement Area 1, as a result of nine local laws, negotiated with the special interest groups of 
the business partners. For Apollo1, a legacy application for Settlement Area 1 existed and the SAP experts 
of Apollo1 were assigned to lead the development project. They were supported by the IT experts of Mars3 
who led developments within Settlement Area 2, and IT experts of Neptune2 who led developments within 
Settlement Area 3. Settlement Area 2 had different settlement rates for each subsidiary, but at least one 
underlying common law which made process agreements easier. Settlement Areas 2 and 3 had no SAP legacy 
application which made the development more difficult. 
Additionally, the development and the blueprint were separated into general and specific parts, and were 
written by analysts and developers after input from functional people at each site. The sessions also included 
an impact assessment. The blueprint was very detailed but was weighted towards Apollo1 because of the 
existing SAP application at Apollo1 (Settlement Area1) and the SAP knowledge of IT experts at Apollo1. This 
happened, although it was planned to write a non-software-specific blueprint. Despite those efforts the 
blueprint was very bad (“a disaster”) for all sites. This was caused because the functional people could not 
answer the questions from the SAP-experts as they had no SAP experience or the relevant experience about 
the legacy systems (black boxes). Furthermore, they could not judge what is important and what is not. 
The understanding of business people regarding the ERP system and the new processes only increased after 




the template, and the ERP system strongly reflected the requirements of Apollo1. Additionally, the 
requirements changed in the meantime, as the duration of the development project was more than three 
years (laws changed and new contracts were concluded). These gaps needed to be closed in separate fit-gap 
sessions during the rollout projects. Lastly, the autonomy of the sites contributed to the need for product 
improvements. 
The deficits of the blueprint and the standard templates and the different perceptions (rollout team vs. 
functional people and site) led to rollout delays as the standard template required major adjustments. 
However, the number of adjustments declined over the course of the rollouts (and waves), as a result of 
“lessons learned” and the flexibilities of the system (custom built, that is not SAP standard) and the 
associated rigid change process. 
Despite the constraints caused by federalism and the associated basic agreements with the special interest 
groups, a conversion of the sites (and increased awareness) is visible (as much as it was possible) and 
therefore Pantheon moves towards its initial goal (process harmonization). This is caused by the periodic 
exchange of information across different sites and roles (telephone conferences and fewer physical 
meetings), which adds to a common understanding of the benefits of process harmonization; on the other 
hand, the one-platform architecture plays a role (performance, side effects). Furthermore, a common 
release concept is in place and integrated with other standard products within Pantheon. 
 
Selective Coding: Lessons Learned regarding Business Process Redesign 
The program (cluster, rollout team, but also sites) realized that the solution is not valid for all sites. 
Particularly in Settlement Area 1, with different local laws, the solution could not be applied as developed 
and was not so flexible as intended (hoped) in the blueprint. Furthermore, the business people in the rollout 
projects only realized the meaning of the blueprint after the first template (test system) was introduced. As 
a consequence, the blueprint and the template did not reflect the requirements and process variations of 
all sites. During the blueprint phase the Jupiter Competence Center and the business people had different 
understandings regarding the intended outcome of the blueprint.   
Anticipated outcome: Blueprint and new business processes in the system match with site requirements, 





1) Multisite implementations with processes complying with different laws. Dimensions: (a) No. of sites; (b) 
No. of processes   
2) Flexibility/Maturity/Quality of system (product) 
3) Time between blueprint and implementation: (a) Degree of affectedness, (b) Timeliness of targets, 
comprehension of business regarding new system and requirements (high/low), leading to valid 
requirements 
Actions: Facilitate comprehension of system and requirements (training, test instance of system), 
requirements and fit-gap closed to realization phase, flexible blueprint-phase with sufficient time for 
template-adjustments. 
Lessons Learned: The program facilitates a flexible adjustment of the standard-template (product) regarding 
local process (or global process variations). Valid requirements can be comprehended closer to the 
implementation phase, what raises the degree of affectedness of business people at the sites (immediate 
impact). A necessary condition is sufficient (possibly learned) comprehension of the system, what might be 
facilitated through training and a test instance. The standard product learns as well, as functional and 
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